Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are flight attendants who sustained injuries in connection with their employment by United Airlines. They filed claims in the Northern District of Texas, but the district court dismissed them because the flight attendants failed to adequately plead diversity jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that the parties agree that the flight attendants could have invoked the district court’s jurisdiction if they had included the proper allegations. The flight attendants appealed, and this court affirmed. They filed the instant case shortly after. The district court dismissed the claims as barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal presents two primary questions, both of which concern the interpretation of the jurisdiction savings statute.   The Fifth Circuit wrote that it cannot make a reliable Erie guess on these important matters of state law. Accordingly, the court certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas: 1) Does Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064 apply to this lawsuit where Plaintiffs could have invoked the prior district court’s subject matter jurisdiction with proper pleading? 2) Did Plaintiffs file this lawsuit within sixty days of when the prior judgment became “final” for purposes of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 16.064(a)(2)? View "Sanders v. Boeing Company" on Justia Law

The Restaurant Law Center and the Texas Restaurant Association (“Plaintiffs”) challenge a Department of Labor regulation that refines how the federal minimum wage applies to tipped employees. The district court denied Plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on the sole ground that they failed to establish irreparable harm from complying with the new rule.   The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently showed irreparable harm in unrecoverable compliance costs. The court explained that the 30-minute limitation is a new constraint on the tip credit that both requires distinct recordkeeping and affects the existing 20-percent standard. Neither the district court nor the Department explained why this new requirement would not impose new costs. To the contrary, the rule itself confirms that employers who want to continue claiming the tip credit—like Plaintiffs’ members—will “incur ongoing management costs” to ensure employees do not spend more than 30 minutes continuously performing directly supporting work. The court found that the district court abused its discretion in finding no evidence of irreparable harm View "Restaurant Law Center v. LABR" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was denied a bathroom break by his supervisor at a Dallas, Texas, warehouse until he was forced to defecate on himself at his workstation. Plaintiff sued his employer, UPS, for negligent supervision, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court dismissed the first two claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and granted UPS’s motion for summary judgment on the third. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that the district court correctly held that Plaintiff has not met the standard for IIED claims. However, it erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim was preempted by federal law. Further, the court wrote that based on its Erie guess, the court also disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the alleged facts do not constitute an invasion of privacy. The court concluded that the invasion of privacy tort covers the alleged facts. In recent years, there have been troubling reports of industry practices that deny employees adequate bathroom breaks. It is important to clarify that such actions, or similar examples of public humiliation by an exhibition of intimate personal details or actions, are not immune from liability. View "Amin v. United Parcel Service" on Justia Law

After the Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board withdrew an unfair labor practice complaint that his predecessor had issued against a union, the aggrieved employer requested permission to appeal the complaint’s withdrawal to the Board. The Board denied the request, concluding that the Acting General Counsel’s decision was an unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion. The employer then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review of the Board’s order.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the petition for review, that Acting General Counsel’s designation was valid and that the Board permissibly determined that Acting General Counsel had discretion to withdraw the complaint against the Unions. The court explained that the Board’s own conclusion that the General Counsel has the discretion to withdraw unfair labor practice complaints in cases where a motion for summary judgment has been filed but no hearing has occurred, and the Board has neither issued a Notice to Show Cause nor transferred the case to itself fits squarely within the holding of UFCW. As such, it is a permissible interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) View "United Natural Foods v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Texas Government Code Section 808. He contends that Section 808’s divestment requirement violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing and dismissed his claims against the Texas Comptroller and the Texas Attorney General (collectively, “Defendants”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims. Article III grants jurisdiction to federal courts only over actions involving an “actual case or controversy.” The court concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged injury is—at most—speculative; he has wholly failed to allege that any risk of economic harm is “certainly impending.” Because Plaintiff cannot show how any investment or divestment decisions will affect his future payments, he cannot show that he has suffered an injury. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Section 808 causes him an injury by violating his own personal Fourteenth or First Amendment rights. View "Abdullah v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The United Auto Workers union (“UAW”) and three pro-union Tesla employees filed multiple charges with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) alleging unfair labor practices against Tesla. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Tesla had committed most of the alleged violations, and the NLRB issued an order largely affirming the ALJ. Both Tesla and the UAW filed petitions for review, and the NLRB filed a cross-application to enforce its order. Tesla and the UAW each challenged two of the NLRB’s findings through this appeal.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court held that the NLRB’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, and it did not abuse its broad remedial discretion in declining to issue a notice-reading remedy. The court explained that the UAW cited no authority mandating a notice reading to remedy repeated violations in the absence of intervening cease-and-desist orders. And, as Tesla emphasizes, the company at most continued to commit violations after having a complaint filed against it, not after being ordered to cease its conduct. Moreover, given the deferential standard of review and the “special respect” given to the NLRB’s choice of remedy in light of its policy expertise and its broad, discretionary remedial powers, the court declined to disturb the NLRB’s order in this regard. View "Tesla v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After the EEOC closed its investigation into Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination, the agency issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue notice. This notice, however, only reached Plaintiff’s attorney and not Plaintiff himself. The EEOC then sent a subsequent notice acknowledging that the first had not reached Plaintiff and advising him that his 90-day window in which to file suit began to run upon its—the second notice’s—receipt. Plaintiff filed his complaint 141 days after his attorney is presumed to have received the first notice and 89 days after Plaintiff and his attorney received the second. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit as untimely and held that equitable tolling was unavailable.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. The court explained that Plaintiff’s case did not present the kind of exceptional circumstances that may warrant equitable tolling; the district court failed to consider controlling precedent from this court that tolling may be available when the EEOC affirmatively misleads a claimant about the time in which he must file his federal complaint. The court wrote that this was an abuse of discretion. Further, the court found that the district court did not proceed beyond this first prong of the tolling analysis the record at this motion to dismiss stage does not disclose whether Plaintiff diligently pursued his rights. View "Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant for three years between 2017 and 2020. Initially, he was paid hourly and received overtime compensation, but in March 2018, despite no change in job responsibilities, Defendant converted him to a salaried position. In March 2020, Plaintiff gave his two-week notice to Defendant that he would be resigning. Three days later, Defendant terminated him.Plaintiff sued, claiming that Defendant failed to pay him overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(a). Defendant sought summary judgment, claiming Plaintiff was exempt from overtime compensation requirements under the Motor Carrier Act exemption as a “mechanic.” The district court agreed, granting summary judgment in Defendant's favor. Plaintiff appealed.Generally, the FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime compensation to any employee working more than forty hours in a workweek. However, as relevant here, under the MCA exemption, the overtime compensation requirement does not apply if “the Secretary of Transportation has [the] power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service” for the employee. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Motor Carrier Act exemption applied due to Plaintiff's position as a mechanic. View "Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought claims of age discrimination and retaliation against her former employer, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). The district court granted summary judgment to USPS on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court reversed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s age discrimination and retaliation claims arising out of her February 26, 2019 termination from USPS Central Station, as well as her retaliation claim arising out of the May 2019 recission of her job offer at the Metairie USPS station. The court affirmed dismissal of all other claims.   The court concluded, in assessing Plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim, that Plaintiff’s evidence creates a fact issue as to whether USPS’s proffered reason for her termination is pretextual. Specifically, Plaintiff has submitted evidence that her supervisors set her up for failure by obstructing her efforts to succeed at her job, including by hiding her mail, making her clock into street time when she was, in fact, in the office, and denying her the tools necessary for her deliveries. Moreover, Plaintiff has submitted evidence that USPS did not document the performance deficiencies it relies on as the basis for Plaintiff’s termination. And again, the circumstances of the station manager’s “hiring” of Plaintiff render inappropriate the “same actor” inference. A reasonable jury could find, based on this evidence, that USPS’s reason for terminating Plaintiff was pretext for retaliation based on her EEO activity directed against the USPS. View "Allen v. USPS" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Methodist Hospitals of Dallas (Methodist) for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC asserts that Methodist’s categorical policy of hiring the most qualified candidate violates the ADA when a qualified disabled employee requests reassignment to a vacant role, even if he or she is not the most qualified applicant. The EEOC also alleged that Methodist failed to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee, who was not reassigned to a vacant position for which she applied. The district court granted Methodist’s motion for summary judgment on both claims. The EEOC appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court’s ruling in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett requires Methodist to make exceptions to its most-qualified-applicant policy and that the employee was entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court as to Methodist’s most-qualified-applicant policy and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court affirmed the judgment as to the EEOC’s reasonable accommodations claim involving the employee. The court explained that at summary judgment, an employee’s “unilateral withdrawal from the interactive process is fatal to her claim,” so long as the employer “engaged in a good-faith, interactive process with the employee regarding her request for a reasonable accommodation.” Based on the evidence, no reasonable jury could find that Methodist was unwilling to participate in the interactive process. When the employee did not respond to either the August 7th letter or the follow-up letter after her appeal of her termination, she caused the breakdown of the interactive process. Thus, Methodist did not act unlawfully. View "EEOC v. Methodist Hospitals" on Justia Law