Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Maghreb appealed the district court's grant of plaintiff's motion for non-recognition of a Moroccan judgment under Texas's Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 36.001–36.008. Under de novo review, the court held that the Texas Recognition Act’s due process standard requires only that the foreign proceedings be fundamentally fair and inoffensive to “basic fairness.” In this case, the Moroccan judicial system does not present an exceptional case of “serious injustice” that renders the entire system fundamentally unfair and incompatible with due process. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that non-recognition was justified under Section 36.005(a)(1) of the Texas Recognition Act. The court further concluded that plaintiff has not established, as required by the Texas Recognition Act, that Morocco would refuse to recognize an otherwise enforceable foreign judgment simply because it was rendered in Texas. The court rejected plaintiff's claims regarding service of process and his amenability to jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Exploration" on Justia Law

Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG (Rickmers) sought to enforce a Philippine arbitral award given to Lito Martinez Asignacion for maritime injuries. Asignacion sued Rickmers in Louisiana state court to recover for his injuries. Rickmers filed an exception seeking to enforce the arbitration clause of Asignacion’s contract. The state court granted the exception, stayed litigation, and ordered arbitration in the Philippines. The district court refused to enforce the award pursuant to the public-policy defense found in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the prospective-waiver doctrine. Rickmers appeals. Finding that the district court erred in reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to enforce the award. View "Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG" on Justia Law

This suit arose out of an insurance policy SWEPCO, a public electric utility serving Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, purchased from Underwriters for coverage associated with the construction of a power plant in Louisiana. On appeal, SWEPCO challenged the district court's order granting Underwriters' motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the district court's order was not a final, appealable order within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201-08, or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-16. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Southwestern Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. 11607(b)(3), against defendant for the return of their child. The parties settled and plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys' fees and necessary expenses. The court found that the settlement order was sufficient to create a duty on the district court to order an award of necessary fees and expenses under section 11607(b)(3)'s fee-shifting provision. The court concluded that the district court functioned within its broad discretionary powers in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing and deferred to the district court's determination that $39,079.13 was a reasonable award for the necessary expenses incurred by plaintiff in obtaining the return of her child. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Salazar v. Maimon" on Justia Law

Three children who are natives of Mexico appealed the district court's finding under the Hague Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11, that they were being wrongfully retained in the United States and should be returned to their mother. While the appeal was pending, USCIS granted the children asylum. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the children, who are not parties, have standing to appeal where their well-being was at stake. On the merits, the court concluded that no jurisdictional defect arose from the fact that the director of child and family services was not the actual physical custodian of the children; the absence of ORR as a party was not a meaningful defect; and the Hague Convention was a proper mechanism for the recovery of the children. Accordingly, the district court did not lack jurisdiction to enter the order that the children be returned to their mother. Because the children's fundamental interests are at stake in the district court proceedings and no respondent is making an effort to represent those interests, the court remanded to the district court to appoint the children a guardian ad litem. The district court did not clearly err by failing to account for the mostly retrospective harm allegedly suffered by the children, or the conclusions of the psychologist, which were based on the children's belief that the same conditions would be present upon their return. Finally, the court concluded that an asylum grant did not remove from the district court authority to make controlling findings on the potential harm to the child. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Sanchez v. R.G.L." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint with OSHA, asserting that Saybolt and Core Labs had violated Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a), by retaliating against him for blowing the whistle on an alleged scheme to violate Colombian tax law. OSHA, an ALJ, and the Board all rejected petitioner's complaint. The court concluded that petitioner did not demonstrate that he engaged in protected conduct because he did not complain, based on a reasonable belief, that one of six enumerated categories of U.S. law had been violated. Petitioner had not demonstrated that he engaged in any protected activity, and given this, the court could not say that Core Labs knew that petitioner engaged in a protected activity that was a contributing factor in the unfavorable actions of withholding petitioner's pay raise and ultimately terminating him. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Board's dismissal of petitioner's complaint because he had not demonstrated that his claim fell within the scope of section 806. View "Villanueva v. U.S. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Trout Point sought to enforce a defamation-based default judgment that they obtained against defendant in Nova Scotia, Canada. Defendant, owner and operator of a public affairs blog, published entries on his blog alleging a link between Aaron Broussard, the former Parish President of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and Trout Point Lodge and others. At issue was the newly-enacted Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), 28 U.S.C. 4102. The court affirmed the district court's determination that Trout Point could not satisfy its burden under the SPEECH Act of showing that either (A) Nova Scotian law provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press in defendant's case as would be provided by the First Amendment and relevant state law, or (B) defendant would have been found liable for defamation by a Mississippi court. View "Trout Point Lodge, Ltd., et al. v. Handshoe" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their conviction for conspiracy to possess illicit substances aboard an aircraft with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 963. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their participation in a plan to transport cocaine from South America to the United Kingdom on board commercial airplanes. The court concluded that Congress intended that the substantive crime underlying the conspiracy charge - possession with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 959(b) - applied extraterritorially; section 963 could be applied extraterritorially; under Blackmer v. United States, application of section 959(b) to Defendant Parker, a U.S. citizen, did not violate the Due Process Clause; extraterritorial application of section 959(b)(2) in this case was permissible as implementing Congress' treaty-making power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; and the recital of facts and the elements of conspiracy to commit the relevant offense was sufficient to enable defendants to prepare their defenses. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Lawrence, et al." on Justia Law

Appellees, the Rubins, requested that the district court issue a Writ of Garnishment against the assets of Hamas and HLF after obtaining a judgment against Hamas for damages resulting from a terrorist attack in an outdoor pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. The district court executed the writ but the Rubins could not execute against HLF's assets because those assets had been restrained under 21 U.S.C. 853 to preserve their availability for criminal forfeiture proceedings. The district court subsequently denied the government's motion to dismiss the Rubins' third-party petition under section 853(n) to assert their interests in the restrained assets and vacated the preliminary order of forfeiture. The district court held that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-297, title II, 201, 116 Stat. 2337, allowed the Rubins to execute against HLF's assets not withstanding the government's forfeiture proceedings. The court reversed, holding that section 853(n) did not provide the Rubins with a basis to prevail in the ancillary proceeding; TRIA did not provide the Rubins a basis to assert their interest in the forfeited property; TRIA did not trump the criminal forfeiture statute; and the in custodia legis doctrine did not preclude the district court's in personam jurisdiction over HLF. View "United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Chevron's involvement in litigation over the alleged environmental contamination of oil fields in Ecuador. Ecuador sought discovery from John Connor and GSI Environmental, his company, for use in a foreign arbitration against Chevron. During the course of extended litigation with Ecuador, Chevron, an intervenor in the district court, benefited repeatedly by arguing against Ecuador and others that the arbitration was a "foreign or international tribunal." Because Chevron's previous positions were inconsistent with its current argument, judicial estoppel was appropriate to make discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782 available for Ecuador. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for determination of the scope of discovery. View "Republic of Ecuador, et al v. Connor, et al" on Justia Law