Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Issuer Banks appealed the district court's dismissal of their negligence claim as third party beneficiaries of Heartland's contracts with other entities. This case arose out of a group of hackers' breach of Heartland's data systems, compromising confidential information belonging to customers of Issuer Banks. Mindful that the New Jersey Supreme Court has long been a leader in expanding tort liability, and in light of the lack of a developed record illuminating any contractual remedies available to Issuer Banks, the court held that, in this instance, the economic loss doctrine did not bar Issuer Banks' negligence claim at this stage of the litigation. The court declined to decide on the remaining complex issues that Heartland raised. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Heartland Payment Sys., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2671-80, seeking compensatory damages for loss of property and personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence and malice of the VA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the VA's motion to dismiss where the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA), 38 U.S.C. 511, and in the alternative, the United States' sovereign immunity, barred the district court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. View "King v. US Dept. of Veterans Affairs, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, landowners, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., seeking damages from the government for its role in the design, construction, and maintenance of a portion of a highway that prevented sufficient drainage periods of heavy rainfall. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court erred when it declined to apply Louisiana's continuing-tort doctrine to delay commencement of the running of the FTCA's two-year limitations period. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not been aggrieved by a Louisiana continuing tort and have failed to bear their burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction because plaintiffs' claim was time-barred. View "Young, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others, filed suit against several governmental and private parties after her husband died in a training accident at the Texas Department of Public Safety Training Academy. Because this case involved important and determinative questions of Texas law as to which there was no controlling Texas precedent, the court certified questions to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding the receipt of benefits under Texas Labor Code 417.002. View "Carty v. Texas Dep't of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a nonsubscriber action under Texas Labor Code 406.033 against her employer, Home Depot, claiming that Home Depot's negligence caused her on-the-job-injury. On appeal, Home Depot appealed the district court's remand after Home Depot removed the case to federal court. Because the policy underlying 28 U.S.C. 1445(c) and this court's instruction that ambiguities in removal statutes should be construed against removal, the district court construed section 1445(c) in favor of remand. Accordingly, the court had no authority to review such remand orders and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. View "Ernewayn v. Home Depot USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Brink, and others, claiming that he was raped while in jail when he was nineteen years old and that the rape occurred as a result of ineffective locks on cell doors. Brink argued on interlocutory appeal that the district court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began running against plaintiff at the moment the torts occurred. The court concluded that the Mississippi Code clearly distinguished between the concepts of emancipation and the disability of infancy, as well as the implications of each, and Mississippi cases did not illustrate an intent to deviate from this clear distinction. Therefore, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against plaintiff until he reached the age of majority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute involving a Master Services Agreement (MSA) between BHP and Deep Marine. At issue on appeal was whether Underwriters could enforce BHP's contractual insurance, defense, and indemnity obligations to Deep Marine after Deep Marine's bankruptcy discharge. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo that the MSA required indemnification against liability and that Deep Marine will eventually be held liable, Underwriters still could not prevail because BHP's indemnification obligation runs only to Deep Marine; Deep Marine would not, and could not, incur any loss in the Duval action, so Underwriters could not seek indemnification from BHP; because BHP had agreed to continue providing Deep Marine with a nominal defense, Underwriters would not have a breach of contract claim against BHP; the additional insured and primary insurance requirements do not apply BHP's self-insurance; BHP's only obligation was an indemnification obligation to Deep Marine; unlike Underwriters, it had no secondary liability to injured tort victims, like Duval; and Duval had no claim against BHP and, therefore, tender under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) was improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duval v. Northern Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Appellees, the Rubins, requested that the district court issue a Writ of Garnishment against the assets of Hamas and HLF after obtaining a judgment against Hamas for damages resulting from a terrorist attack in an outdoor pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. The district court executed the writ but the Rubins could not execute against HLF's assets because those assets had been restrained under 21 U.S.C. 853 to preserve their availability for criminal forfeiture proceedings. The district court subsequently denied the government's motion to dismiss the Rubins' third-party petition under section 853(n) to assert their interests in the restrained assets and vacated the preliminary order of forfeiture. The district court held that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub. L. No. 107-297, title II, 201, 116 Stat. 2337, allowed the Rubins to execute against HLF's assets not withstanding the government's forfeiture proceedings. The court reversed, holding that section 853(n) did not provide the Rubins with a basis to prevail in the ancillary proceeding; TRIA did not provide the Rubins a basis to assert their interest in the forfeited property; TRIA did not trump the criminal forfeiture statute; and the in custodia legis doctrine did not preclude the district court's in personam jurisdiction over HLF. View "United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the wife and children of the decedent, filed suit against defendants after the decedent died in the hospital after being administered a transdermal pain patch. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's joinder of several non-diverse defendants and the district court's remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(e). The court joined its sister circuits and held that section 1447(d) precluded appellate review of a remand order issued pursuant to section 1447(e). Moreover, appellate review of the district court's joinder ruling was barred. Accordingly, the court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Fontenot, et al. v. Johnson & Johnson, et al." on Justia Law

KEC appealed from the district court's order denying its motion for a declaration and specific performance of the obligations of BorgWarner under the Master Settlement Agreement, the Merger Agreement, and the Cooperation Agreement. This case arose when plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that KEC, BorgWarner, and others improperly disposed and negligently disposed of substances containing toxic chemicals at the Crystal Springs site, where KEC owned a facility manufacturing transformers, and such negligence resulted in injuries to plaintiffs. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the terms of the Merger Agreement and Cooperation Agreement were not incorporated into the Master Settlement Agreement, and BorgWarner fulfilled its obligations under the Master Settlement Agreement. View "Alford, et al v. Kuhlman Corp." on Justia Law