Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a personal injury suit between the parties where plaintiff slipped and fell on defendant's premises. Plaintiff contended that the district court exceeded its authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) when it corrected the judgment dismissing plaintiff's case to reflect that the dismissal was "with prejudice" instead of "without prejudice." The district court had adjudicated plaintiff's claims on the merits via a grant of summary judgment and a grant of summary judgment necessarily resulted in a dismissal with prejudice. Therefore, the court concluded that Rule 60(a) authorized the district court to enter the corrected judgment and affirmed.

Plaintiff brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, action on behalf of her minor son against the government for injuries allegedly related to his exposure to potentially dangerous, high levels of formaldehyde in their Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided emergency housing unit (EHU). At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claim was time-barred. The court held that neither the discovery rule, equitable estoppel, or the continuing tort doctrine applied in this case and therefore, plaintiff's FTCA claim accrued in May 2006 and her July 2008 administrative filing was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Consolidated Graphics defendants sought to recover the cost of defending a suit against them and indemnity for an adverse judgment against them in that suit from two insurers. At issue was whether the primary insurer or an excess insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify the Consolidated Graphics defendants in an underlying tort suit. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that the primary insurer had no duty to defend the Consolidated Graphics defendants in the underlying litigation and therefore, the excess insurer had no duty to defend the primary insurer's policy limits. The court also held that the Consolidated Graphics defendants could not establish a basis for coverage and therefore, the primary insurer and excess insurer were not obligated to indemnify them. The court also held that the district court's grant of the primary insurer's motion to amend its pleadings on the same day that court entered final judgment in the case did not alter the summary judgment evidence in the record or the arguments in the motion. Accordingly, any error in that regard was harmless.

This case involved the construction and application of a combined professional and general liability insurance policy issued by appellant to appellee where appellee requested a defense from appellant under the policy for a civil lawsuit. In that underlying suit, plaintiff alleged that while her mother was terminally ill, she consented to appellee's harvesting of some of her mother's organs and tissues after her mother's death and consented to the harvesting because appellee was a non-profit corporation. Appellee, instead, transferred the tissues to a for-profit company, which sold the tissues to hospitals at a profit. Appellee subsequently sought coverage under its general liability insurance with appellant and appellant denied coverage because the conduct alleged was outside the scope of the insurance policy's coverage. The court certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of Texas: (1) "Does the insurance policy provision for coverage of 'personal injury,' defined therein as 'bodily injury, sickness, or disease including death resulting therefrom sustained by any person,' include coverage for mental anguish, unrelated to physical damage to or disease of the plaintiff's body?" (2) "Does the insurance policy provision for coverage of 'property damage,' defined therein as 'physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including consequential loss of use thereof, or loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed,' include coverage for the underlying plaintiff's loss of use of her deceased mother's tissues, organs, bones, and body parts?"

Plaintiff appealed, inter alia, the magistrate judge's electronic order dismissing his case against defendant where plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant after plaintiff underwent emergency surgery after his colonoscopy. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal. The court held that the record contained no evidence that plaintiff consented to having his case disposed of by a magistrate and that the district court had not entered an appealable judgment or order. Therefore, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the suit and dismissed plaintiff's appeal. The court noted, however, that the district did have an obligation to issue a written, paper order when it disposed of a case.

Plaintiffs in this putative class action were buyers and processors of farm-raised crawfish who sought to recover their economic loss from a pesticide manufacturer under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, (LPLA), La. Rev. State. Ann. 9:2800.54. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the manufacturer because plaintiffs' economic loss was unaccompanied by damage to their own person or property. The court held that, although plaintiffs have submitted evidence suggesting that they worked closely with crawfish farmers, plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence suggesting that the pesticide actually harmed their crawfish. The court also held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs were deprived of an actual, legal right to buy crawfish from the crawfish farmers. The court further denied plaintiffs' request to certify their proposed question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order of summary judgment.

This case involved a coverage dispute between St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul") and its insured where the insured wrote a recommendation letter for a former employee who later injured a patient. St. Paul appealed the district court's judgment, in which the court concluded that the commercial general liability policy issued by St. Paul covered the insured's claim for the damages he was required to pay in a misrepresentation lawsuit. The court held that there was no coverage under the policy for the amounts at issue and therefore, reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of St. Paul.

Appellant and his wife sued Halliburton Company ("KBR"), alleging claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium where the claims stemmed from the wife's work in Iraq as a civilian contractor for KBR. At issue was whether the district court erred by concluding that appellant could not, as a matter of law, maintain a loss of consortium claim because the claim arose from a civil rights violation against his wife. The court held that, under Texas law, a loss of consortium claim was derivative of the tortfeasor's liability to the physically injured person. Therefore, where appellant's loss of consortium claim derived solely from his wife's civil rights claim, his right to recover under Title VII could not be supported by his loss of consortium claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued defendant under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2800.51-.59, for his injuries that resulted from his firing a Remington Model 710 rifle ("rifle"). At issue was whether the district court erred in its findings regarding the bolt-assembly pin and its "reasonably-anticipated-use" finding. The court applied a highly deferential standard and held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that the bolt-assembly pin was not in the rifle when plaintiff fired it and suffered injuries from the uncontained explosion. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that defendant should not have expected the rifle to be fired after someone had removed, but failed to install, the bolt-assembly pin. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, Wayne Hagan and James Joubert, alleging that Joubert was negligently excavating on a backhoe and severed plaintiff's underground fiber-optic cable in violation of the Louisiana Damage Prevention Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN 40:1749,11 et seq., and that Hagan was vicariously liable because Joubert was acting as his agent at the time. At issue was whether the district court erred when it refused to give the jury plaintiff's proposed instruction on trespass. Also at issue was whether the district court erred when it excluded statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employee under Federal Rule of Evidence 408; when it refused to certify plaintiff's witness as an expert; and when it held that defendants were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The court certified the first issue where the Louisiana Supreme Court had not previously determined what standard of intent was used for trespass to underground utility cables and the issue was determinative of whether plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on its trespass claim. The court held that the statements made by Hagan's attorney to plaintiff's employer could have been excluded on other grounds given that it was inadmissible hearsay against Joubert and therefore, the court declined to remand for a new trial on this ground. The court also held that the district court did not commit a reversible error where plaintiff did not proffer the substance of plaintiff's witness' excluded testimony. Finally, the court deferred addressing the attorneys' fees issue pending the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision on the first issue.