Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Mississippi and Alabama residents, brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, action against the Government for injuries allegedly related to their exposure to elevated levels of formaldehyde contained in the component materials of the Emergency Housing Units (EHUs) provided to them by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The district court concluded that the Mississippi and Alabama emergency statutes barred suit against a "private person under similar circumstances" and granted the Government's motion to dismiss. Because the Mississippi and Alabama emergency statutes abrogated the tort liability of a private person who voluntarily, without compensation, allowed his property or premises to be used as a shelter during or in recovery from a natural disaster, the Government's voluntary, cost-free provision of the EHUs to disaster victims, in connection with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, was also immunized conduct under the FTCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing plaintiffs' FTCA claims against the Government for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and held that plaintiffs' remaining questions did not warrant certification.

This interlocutory appeal arose out of the deaths of two civilian drivers in a United States military supply-truck convoy in Iraq when insurgents attacked in April 2004. State tort claims were brought by or on behalf of spouses and family members of the decedents against KBR. KBR contended that the district court erred in denying its motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment in which it argued that the Defense Base Act (DBA), 42 U.S.C. 1651-54, provided plaintiffs exclusive remedy and preempted all state tort claims that have been asserted. The court concluded that the DBR preempted plaintiffs' state law claims and therefore did not consider whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the alternative grounds on which KBR sought dismissal.

Plaintiffs, Matthew Cantrell's family, filed suit against the City of Murphy and several of its officers after 21-month-old Matthew died of accidental hanging when he was found tangled up in a soccer net in the back yard of his home. This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the officers deprived Matthew of his due process rights under DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, where plaintiffs failed to establish that the officers had a special relationship with Matthew when they separated him from his mother. The court also held that because the officers had probable cause to detain Matthew's mother, the district court did not err in granting the officers summary judgment on this portion of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, an engineer aboard defendant's dive vessel, challenged the denial of his claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, et seq., and general maritime law and of his costs. Defendant challenged the amount plaintiff was awarded for cure and his being awarded attorney's fees, including the amount. Based on the court's review of the record, the court held that the denial of plaintiff's Jones Act and general maritime law claims were not clearly erroneous. In regard to plaintiff's challenge of the district court's application of the collateral-source rule in determining the amount of cure awarded him, the court held that, regardless of what plaintiff's medical providers charged, those charges were satisfied by the much lower amount paid by his insurer. Consequently, the district court erred by awarding the higher, charged amount. The court also held that the district court clearly erred in finding defendant arbitrary and capricious in denying maintenance and cure to plaintiff. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's Rule 54(d) motion for costs.

This insurance coverage case arose out of an underlying personal injury lawsuit brought by Michael Parr against Gilbane Building Company. Gilbane, a general contractor, sought defense and indemnification from Admiral Insurance Company based on an insurance policy held by Empire Steel Erectors, a subcontractor. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that Admiral owed a duty to defend and indemnify. As a preliminary matter, the court held that Gilbane qualified as an additional insured. The court held that, pursuant to the strict eight-corners rule, Admiral had no duty to defend where the petition did not affirmatively allege any facts implicating the negligence of either Empire or Parr. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Gilbane on the duty to defend. The court held, however, that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Admiral owed Gilbane a duty to indemnify for the cost of its settlement with Parr and the district court's summary judgment on that matter was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zurich, SRS, and an insurance adjuster on his claim for wrongful denial and delay of workers' compensation benefits under Texas state and common law. At issue on appeal was whether appellees complied with the duty of good faith and fair dealing in resolving appellant's claim. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that appellant failed to raise a material fact issue with respect to his common-law bad faith cause of action.

Plaintiffs sought to reopen a judgment entered in 2001 after the district judge that entered judgment for defendants in plaintiffs' person injury case was impeached and removed from office. Plaintiffs filed what they termed an independent action in equity on grounds that the judgment was procured by fraud involving the district judge. A new district judge dismissed the suit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court reversed and remanded after applying a five-element analysis of an independent action in equity.

This appeal arose from the settlement of a class action where defendant paid substantial sums for res judicata protection from the claims of persons assertedly injured by the toxic emissions of an industrial plant. The monies were allocated among three subclasses, one of which was to receive medical monitoring. Upon the monitoring program's completion, substantial sums remained unused. The district court denied the settlement administrator's request to distribute the unused medical-monitoring funds to another subclass of persons suffering serious injuries. Instead, the district court repaired to the doctrine of cy pres and ordered that the money be given to three charities suggested by defendant and one selected by the district court. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a cy pres distribution in the teeth of the bargained-for-terms of the settlement agreement, which required residual funds to be distributed within the class. The court reversed the district court's order distributing the unused medical-monitoring funds to third-party charities and remanded with instructions that the district court order that the funds be distributed to the subclass comprising the most seriously injured class members.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment to National Union with respect to his claims under the Texas Insurance Code (Insurance Code), Tex. Ins. Code Ann. 541.003, 541.051, 541.052, 541.061, and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 17.46, 17.50, asserting misrepresentation and unconscionability. At issue was the Description of Coverage documents that National Union sent to plaintiff regarding eligibility for permanent total disability benefits under two insurance policies. The court held that plaintiff's contention that he had insufficient notice of National Union's basis for seeking summary judgment on his misrepresentation claims was unsustainable. The court also held that the definition of permanent total disability in the Descriptions of Coverage was ambiguous. The court held, however, that the ambiguity did not rise to the level of a misrepresentation within the meaning of the Insurance Code or the DTPA. To the extent that the Insurance Code required additional information to clarify an ambiguity, the reference to the master policy as controlling adequately informed a reasonable person that an ambiguity in the Description of Coverage was not binding if it conflicted with the policy. The court further held that plaintiff's unconscionability claims failed where he had not offered any reasoning as to the relevance of certain evidence regarding allegations of unconscionable conduct and where the claims were premised on conduct that had occurred after his injury and well after the inception of coverage under the policies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.