Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), case arising out of medical malpractice that led to the death of Melissa Busch, the United States and Ms. Busch's family members, plaintiffs, cross-appealed the district court's judgment. The case arose out of repeated medical misdiagnoses that led to the untimely death of Ms. Busch from synovial foot cancer. The court held that the district court did not err in finding the Government fully liable for the damages award because the Government did not present adequate evidence of NE Methodist's liability. The district court also did not err in concluding that Ms. Busch was not comparatively negligent because the evidence showed that Ms. Busch acted as a reasonable prudent person of her same training and experience would have acted in similar circumstances. The court held, however, that the district court did err in its assessment of plaintiffs' claim for household services. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

This case involved the Corps' dredging of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a shipping channel between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as levees alongside the channel and around the city. The Corps' negligence in maintaining the channel, grounded on a failure to appreciate certain hydrological risks, caused levees to fail and aggravated the effects of 2005's Hurricane Katrina on the city and its environs. Claimants filed hundreds of lawsuits and this opinion concerned three groups of bellwether plaintiffs, all suing the United States for flood damages. The district court found that neither the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA), 33 U.S.C. 702, nor the discretionary-function exception (DFE) to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), protected the government from suit; the district court found that three plaintiffs had proven the government's full liability and four had not. Another group of plaintiffs (Anderson plaintiffs) had their cases dismissed on the government's motion, the district court finding both immunities applicable. A different group (Armstrong plaintiffs) were preparing for trial of their own case against the government. The government appealed its losses in Robinson; the losing Robinson plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Anderson plaintiffs also appealed. On the theory that a favorable ruling might moot the pending Armstrong trial, the government petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to order the district court to stay trial until the court issued an opinion in Robinson and Anderson. The three cases have been consolidated on appeal. The court held that the district court's careful attention to the law and even more cautious scrutiny of complex facts allowed the court to uphold its ruling in full, excepting the court's minor restatement of FCA immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments in Robinson and Anderson, denying the government's petition for writ of mandamus to stay the Armstrong trial.

This case arose when claimant served plaintiff with a complaint, alleging that his injuries were caused by the unseaworthiness of the M/V St. Andrew and by the negligence of plaintiff and its employees. Claimant became entangled in a line and was pulled into a mooring bit, seriously injuring his left leg. Following a state court trial, claimant won a judgment in excess of $750,000 and plaintiff subsequently appealed. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of its limitation act as untimely. Because a challenge to the timeliness of a limitation action was a challenge to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction and because plaintiff had notice claimant was mounting such a challenge in his motion to dismiss, the district court did not err by construing plaintiff's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the six-month deadline was triggered when claimant delivered his complaint to plaintiff on April 28, 2009, and that plaintiff's January 18, 2010 petition was untimely filed. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it opted not to hold an evidentiary hearing on claimant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Christopher M. Loften died from a rare disease called Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis (TEN) after taking Motrin. Lofton's wife and children brought suit against defendants asserting that Motrin caused the disease and defendants had failed to warn consumers about the risk of these severe autoimmune allergic reactions. At issue on appeal was whether the district court correctly found that federal law preempted Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 82.007(b)(1), which required plaintiffs to assert, in failure to warn cases, that a drug manufacturer withheld or misrepresented material information to the FDA. The court held that section 82.007(b)(1) required a Texas plaintiff to prove fraud-on-the-FDA to recover for failure to warn and this requirement invoked federal law supremacy. Therefore, because the court concluded that section 82.007(b)(1) was a fraud-on-the-FDA provision analogous to the claim considered in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., the court held that it was preempted by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq., unless the FDA itself found fraud. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The parents of a National Guardsman killed in an electrocution accident in Iraq brought suit against a civilian contractor who they claimed was responsible. Plaintiffs argued that Iraqi law governed the limitations period within which the suit needed to be brought but the district court held both that Iraqi law was not sufficiently proven and that the claims were barred by Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period. The court reversed and remanded, determining that Iraqi law was sufficiently proven. By operation of Louisiana Civil Code Article 3549, the Iraqi three-year prescription period applied. Based on what had been introduced, that period did not expire prior to suit and CPA Order 17 did not prevent this suit. Whether parents were proper parties, and any other issues beyond what the court had identified, were for further reconsideration on remand.

Plaintiffs were involved in a vehicular accident with Bart Allen, an employee of Gator Sign Company, whose vehicle hit plaintiffs' car from behind when they stopped to make a left turn. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability was granted, but a jury trial was conducted on damages, resulting in a verdict for plaintiffs for $38,500. Plaintiffs claimed that the district court should have granted their motion for a new trial. The court held that because the district court properly allowed the jury to consider defendants' medical expert witness's testimony, and with that testimony the record contained adequate support of the verdict, the court affirmed the judgment based on the damage award.

Plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the custody of TDCJ-CID, sought damages under 48 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that her constitutional rights were violated when her ovary and lymph nodes were removed without her consent during a radical hysterectomy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians who performed the surgery, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In light of the circumstances, the court could not say that the law was, or was at the time of defendants' conduct, clearly established such that a reasonable official in the physicians' positions would understand that their conduct violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Noting that the law governing claims involving unwanted medical treatment in the prison context was far from certain, the court held that plaintiff failed to rebut defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity on her Fourteenth Amendment claim and summary judgment was appropriate. The court disposed of plaintiff's other claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Two insurers disputed whether their respective insurance policies required them to defend the insured against allegations regarding an accidental death. Both insurers sought a declaratory judgment from the district court that their policies did not cover the underlying lawsuit. Alma Batie, daughter of Darline Rigsby, sued Preferred Ambulance in Texas state court on behalf of herself and as a representative of Rigsby's estate (the underlying lawsuit). After the district court ruled that each insurer must provide primary coverage for the accident, both insurers appealed. The court held that, for purposes of defining the scope of each insurer's duty to defendant, both Western World and National Casualty must provide primary coverage of the underlying lawsuit. Neither the exclusions in their respective policies nor the "other insurance" provision in the Western World policy limited either insurer's duty to defendant. Accordingly, to the extent that National Casualty had paid more than half of the defense costs in the underlying lawsuit to this point, it was entitled to contribution from Western World.

In a wrongful death action arising out of a helicopter crash, the sole issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in applying Louisiana's wrongful death statute rather than Florida's wrongful death statute. Decedent lived in Florida, he boarded the helicopter in Louisiana, and the helicopter struck a bird and crashed seven minutes after takeoff in Louisiana. Eight of the nine individuals on board were killed including decedent. The court agreed with the district court's analysis that Louisiana had the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state-law claims against Stryker under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that a hip replacement product manufactured by Stryker malfunctioned and caused him injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's strict liability, design defect, negligence, and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 17.41 et seq., claims to the extent they were premised on a failure to warn or a marketing defect; affirmed as to plaintiff's breach of express warranty claims; and reversed and remanded the following: (1) plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims, to the extent they were based on manufacturing defects that violated the FDA's Current Good Manufacturing Practices or are inconsistent with Stryker's manufacturing processes or procedures that were approved by the FDA; (2) his claim for breach of an implied warranty to the extent it relied on the failure to comply with the FDA's requirements; and (3) his DTPA claim, to the extent that it relied on a breach of an implied warranty.