Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's finding that he is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). Petitioner contends that, because that subsection provides that an alien convicted of “an offense under [8 U.S.C.] 1182(a)(2)” is not eligible for cancellation of removal, the plain reading of the statute shows that only aliens who have been convicted of a single offense for a crime involving moral turpitude or a controlled-substance offense, as set forth in section 1182(a)(2)(A), are ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied the petition, concluding that, even if there is ambiguity, the BIA’s construction of sections 1182(a)(2)(B) and 1229b(b)(1)(C) in the instant case is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language that is entitled to deference. The BIA noted that although it had consistently found that the language of section 1229b(b)(1)(C) included all the offenses listed in section 1182(a)(2), its prior decisions were not necessarily dispositive because they had involved aliens who were ineligible under section 1182(a)(2)(A). The BIA, assuming that the statute was ambiguous, examined the legislative history and determined that petitioner's argument on that point was unpersuasive. View "Pina-Galindo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, born in a military hospital located on a U.S. military base in Germany, petitioned for review of an order of removal. After a careful review of the decisions of the Supreme Court, other circuit courts of appeals, and its own court, the court held that petitioner is not a citizen, because the United States military base where he was born, which is located in modern-day Germany, was not “in the United States” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Thomas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of her appeal. Petitioner's order of removal was reinstated following her illegal reentry into the United States. The BIA ruled that she may not apply for asylum and is ineligible for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that 8 U.S.C.1231(a)(5)’s plain language, relevant regulations, and analogous case law all compel the conclusion that aliens whose removal orders are reinstated may not apply for asylum. The BIA did not err by declining to consider petitioner’s eligibility for asylum relief; petitioner's parole did not render Section 1231(a)(5) inoperative; petitioner does not qualify for withholding of removal because she has not demonstrated that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that she was not persecuted on account of her family membership; and petitioner has not demonstrated that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that she did not qualify for CAT protection. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty-six states, filed suit challenging the government's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (“DAPA”) as violative of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. 553, and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The district court temporarily enjoined the implementation program and the government appealed, moving for a stay of the injunction. The court concluded that the government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the states lack standing. In this case, at least one state - Texas - is likely to satisfy all three requirements of Article III standing. Further, the government has not made a strong showing that the interests that the states seek to protect fall outside the zone of interests of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1252; that judicial review is precluded in this case; that DAPA does not require notice and comment; and that the remaining factors also favor the states. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for stay and the request to narrow the scope of the injunction. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was not "admitted in any status" at least seven years prior to his commission of a state offense as required by 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2). The court concluded that a plain reading of section 1229b(a)(2) makes clear that it is satisfied so long as an alien has resided in the United States continuously for seven years after being admitted, as defined at section 1101(a)(13)(A), regardless of the precise legal state or condition of the alien at the time of admission. The court further concluded that, contrary to the Board’s conclusion, petitioner’s alleged wave-through admission meets this requirement, such that he is eligible for cancellation of removal relief under section 1229b(a). Given his admission, it matters not whether his status under the immigration law at that time was lawful or unlawful or that of an immigrant or nonimmigrant. Accordingly, the court granted the petition, vacating the Board's decision and remanding for further proceedings. View "Rubio v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Sierra Leone, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he lacked derivative United States citizenship under former 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3). The court held that the BIA misinterpreted the reach of the court’s decision in Bustamante-Barrera v. Gonzales, which requires “sole legal custody” only when an alien minor’s parents have a joint custody order following divorce or judicial separation. Bustamante-Barrera is inapplicable to the present case and petitioner need only prove “actual uncontested custody.” Applying the proper standard, the court concluded that petitioner’s school records indicate that his mother had actual custody from 1991 to 2000. However, because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the actual custody was uncontested, the court remanded. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(5)(B), transferred to the district court for the judicial district in which petitioner resides. View "Kamara v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Rony Alexander Paz Calix, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States in December 1997 as a lawful permanent-resident alien. He was convicted in February 2001 for possession of marijuana and in July 2007 for possession of cocaine. Paz Calix sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ ruling that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal under the “stop-time rule.” The government argued that the Fifth Circuit could not consider his claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the claim. On the merits, the Court agreed with the BIA’s holding that Paz Calix was ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Paz Calix v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Jose Mendoza was indicted on one count of unlawfully entering the United States after having previously been deported. He pleaded guilty to that count. After finding that Mendoza had previously been deported in 2008 following a federal conviction for conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, the sentencing judge applied an eight-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Mendoza was sentenced within the advisory guidelines range to a sentence of forty-one months. He challenged this eight-level enhancement on appeal; the specific issue raised was whether the district court committed plain error when it found that Mendoza’s prior money laundering conviction was an aggravated felony. The parties did not dispute that Mendoza was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Mendoza contended, however, that the district court relied on the presentence report in order to prove that his prior conviction was an aggravated felony, in violation of "Shepard v. United States," (544 U.S. 13 (2005)). The Fifth Circuit affirmed: the evidence a court may consider under a specific circumstances inquiry is broader than the evidence that may be considered under a modified-categorical analysis inquiry. The district court did not err in examining the PSR in order to determine that Mendoza committed an aggravated felony. View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants are several Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and deportation officers (collectively, "Agents") and the State of Mississippi. They filed this suit against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the directors of departments within that agency (collectively, "DHS"), in their official capacities, challenging DHS's 2012 directive, which required its officials to use "deferred action" as to a certain class of aliens in immigration removal proceedings. The Agents alleged that exercising deferred action violated federal law, because the law required them to detain all illegal aliens for the purpose of placing the aliens in removal proceedings. The State of Mississippi alleged that the deferred action has caused additional aliens to remain in the state and, thus, causes the state to spend money on providing social services. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that neither the Agents nor the State of Mississippi demonstrated the concrete and particularized injury required to give them standing to maintain this suit. Therefore the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Crane v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Elmer Gomez-Alvarez pled guilty to illegal reentry without a written plea agreement. His pre-sentence report ("PSR"), which relied on the 2013 version of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, recommended a 16-level sentencing enhancement for a prior "drug trafficking offense" conviction. The PSR listed "Jorge Ortiz" as one of several aliases used by Gomez-Alvarez and indicated that Gomez-Alvarez had been convicted of the offense in California "using the name Jorge Ortiz." Attached to the PSR was a California felony complaint. Also attached to the PSR was an abstract of judgment indicating that Jorge Ortiz pled guilty to "possession for sale of [a] controlled substance" but did not specify the substance. Application of the sentencing enhancement based on the California offense resulted in a total offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of V, which produced a guideline range for imprisonment of 77 to 96 months. Gomez-Alvarez raised several written objections to the PSR. Relevant to this appeal, he objected to the 16-level enhancement on grounds that the documents relied upon by the government failed to establish the fact of a qualifying predicate conviction. He argued that the language of the California statue was overbroad, and that although "the charging instrument [the Complaint] allege[d] . . . possession and purchase of heroin," the Abstract did not specify a controlled substance. Finally, Gomez-Alvarez raised the following one-sentence written objection: "Further, it has not been established with credible documentation that the person purportedly convicted was, in fact, Mr. Gomez-Alvarez." Gomez-Alvarez then argued in favor of a below-guideline-range sentence on grounds that his criminal history was over-represented. The district court agreed and concluded that criminal history category IV more accurately represented Gomez-Alvarez's criminal history. As a result, Gomez-Alvarez's The district court sentenced Gomez-Alvarez to 57 months of imprisonment and did not impose a term of supervised release. Gomez-Alvarez timely appealed. After careful consideration, the Fifth Circuit concluded there was no clear error in the sentencing court's judgment, and that the lower court's findings were plausible in light of the record as a whole. As such, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Gomez-Alvarez's sentence. View "United States v. Gomez-Alvarez" on Justia Law