Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner had not established a lawful admission and that, even if he had, it would not matter because expiration of his temporary residency canceled any effect that the admission would have had. The court concluded that petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing that he was admitted to the United States in 1993. Therefore, the court affirmed the BIA's ruling that petitioner did not demonstrate that he was lawfully admitted and is therefore ineligible for an adjustment of status. Furthermore, the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's motion to reopen based on the ineffective assistance of prior counsel because petitioner has not shown that his evidence was so overwhelming that the BIA’s continued disbelief in his factual assertions was arbitrary, capricious, or utterly unreasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review because the BIA did not err in rejecting petitioner's initial appeal or his motion to reopen. View "Gomez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, argues that his asylum status was not terminated when he adjusted to legal permanent resident (LPR) status and that, if it was, the IJ erred in denying his subsequent reapplication for asylum. When affirming the IJ's assertion that petitioner’s LPR status terminated his asylum status, and as a result, his deportation proceedings could commence without termination of his asylum status, the BIA relied on its precedential decision, C-J-H-. The court concluded that, because the BIA failed to address and interpret relevant provisions of the Immigration Nationality Act (INA), including section 1158(c), 8 U.S.C. 1158(c), it did not exercise its Chevron discretion in C-J-H-. Accordingly, the court remanded for the BIA to interpret the relevant INA provisions in the first instance. View "Ali v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for illegal reentry in the United States as a previously removed alien. The court rejected defendant's claim that the IJ’s failure to make an express determination of voluntariness constituted a due process violation and concluded that such failure did not render her proceedings fundamentally unfair. Further, the court rejected defendant's contention that an ICE agent's misinformation about the possibility of obtaining relief rendered her waiver unknowing and involuntary because the court's precedent precludes defendant from demonstrating plain error. Therefore, defendant has not carried her burden of showing that the agent’s advice rendered her proceedings fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cordova-Soto" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's conclusion that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal and order of removal. At issue was whether the BIA erred in determining that petitioner's 2003 conviction for possession of marijuana in a drug-free zone rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). In this case, the court found that petitioner presented evidence, and the government has not disputed, that his 2003 conviction was his first; it was for possession for his own use, not for distribution; and he possessed 4.6 grams of marijuana. Therefore, the court granted the petition because petitioner's 2003 conviction satisfies the personal-use exception as Congress wrote it, and because the BIA’s decision under review identified no other ground for holding him ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Esquivel v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's finding that he is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). Petitioner contends that, because that subsection provides that an alien convicted of “an offense under [8 U.S.C.] 1182(a)(2)” is not eligible for cancellation of removal, the plain reading of the statute shows that only aliens who have been convicted of a single offense for a crime involving moral turpitude or a controlled-substance offense, as set forth in section 1182(a)(2)(A), are ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied the petition, concluding that, even if there is ambiguity, the BIA’s construction of sections 1182(a)(2)(B) and 1229b(b)(1)(C) in the instant case is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language that is entitled to deference. The BIA noted that although it had consistently found that the language of section 1229b(b)(1)(C) included all the offenses listed in section 1182(a)(2), its prior decisions were not necessarily dispositive because they had involved aliens who were ineligible under section 1182(a)(2)(A). The BIA, assuming that the statute was ambiguous, examined the legislative history and determined that petitioner's argument on that point was unpersuasive. View "Pina-Galindo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, born in a military hospital located on a U.S. military base in Germany, petitioned for review of an order of removal. After a careful review of the decisions of the Supreme Court, other circuit courts of appeals, and its own court, the court held that petitioner is not a citizen, because the United States military base where he was born, which is located in modern-day Germany, was not “in the United States” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Thomas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of her appeal. Petitioner's order of removal was reinstated following her illegal reentry into the United States. The BIA ruled that she may not apply for asylum and is ineligible for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that 8 U.S.C.1231(a)(5)’s plain language, relevant regulations, and analogous case law all compel the conclusion that aliens whose removal orders are reinstated may not apply for asylum. The BIA did not err by declining to consider petitioner’s eligibility for asylum relief; petitioner's parole did not render Section 1231(a)(5) inoperative; petitioner does not qualify for withholding of removal because she has not demonstrated that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that she was not persecuted on account of her family membership; and petitioner has not demonstrated that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that she did not qualify for CAT protection. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty-six states, filed suit challenging the government's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (“DAPA”) as violative of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. 553, and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The district court temporarily enjoined the implementation program and the government appealed, moving for a stay of the injunction. The court concluded that the government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the states lack standing. In this case, at least one state - Texas - is likely to satisfy all three requirements of Article III standing. Further, the government has not made a strong showing that the interests that the states seek to protect fall outside the zone of interests of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1252; that judicial review is precluded in this case; that DAPA does not require notice and comment; and that the remaining factors also favor the states. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for stay and the request to narrow the scope of the injunction. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was not "admitted in any status" at least seven years prior to his commission of a state offense as required by 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2). The court concluded that a plain reading of section 1229b(a)(2) makes clear that it is satisfied so long as an alien has resided in the United States continuously for seven years after being admitted, as defined at section 1101(a)(13)(A), regardless of the precise legal state or condition of the alien at the time of admission. The court further concluded that, contrary to the Board’s conclusion, petitioner’s alleged wave-through admission meets this requirement, such that he is eligible for cancellation of removal relief under section 1229b(a). Given his admission, it matters not whether his status under the immigration law at that time was lawful or unlawful or that of an immigrant or nonimmigrant. Accordingly, the court granted the petition, vacating the Board's decision and remanding for further proceedings. View "Rubio v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Sierra Leone, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he lacked derivative United States citizenship under former 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3). The court held that the BIA misinterpreted the reach of the court’s decision in Bustamante-Barrera v. Gonzales, which requires “sole legal custody” only when an alien minor’s parents have a joint custody order following divorce or judicial separation. Bustamante-Barrera is inapplicable to the present case and petitioner need only prove “actual uncontested custody.” Applying the proper standard, the court concluded that petitioner’s school records indicate that his mother had actual custody from 1991 to 2000. However, because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the actual custody was uncontested, the court remanded. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(5)(B), transferred to the district court for the judicial district in which petitioner resides. View "Kamara v. Lynch" on Justia Law