Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Thryv, Inc., a company that had a dispute with the union representing some of its sales employees. The union complained to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that Thryv engaged in several unfair labor practices. The NLRB agreed with the union and ordered Thryv to take significant steps to remedy the alleged violations. Thryv petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review.Previously, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the NLRB's General Counsel in part and Thryv in part. The ALJ agreed with the General Counsel that Thryv failed to respond to the Union’s information requests, constituting six unfair labor practices. However, the ALJ disagreed with the General Counsel that Thryv’s layoffs violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), finding that Thryv had bargained in good faith.The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Thryv violated the NLRA by failing to comply with the Union’s information requests. However, it disagreed with the ALJ about the layoffs and held them unlawful. The NLRB held that Thryv had an obligation to bargain with respect to the layoffs and that Thryv breached that obligation by presenting the layoffs as a fait accompli and withholding information from the Union that the Union needed to bargain effectively.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted Thryv’s petition and vacated the NLRB’s order in part. The court disagreed with the NLRB's conclusion that Thryv's layoffs violated the NLRA. The court held that Thryv was permitted to implement its last best, final offer (LBFO) upon reaching an impasse with the Union. The court found that Thryv complied with the terms of the LBFO, which included providing the Union with thirty days’ notice before initiating layoffs, providing the Union an opportunity to discuss the layoffs, and offering severance payments to the affected employees. Therefore, the court concluded that Thryv's layoffs were lawful so long as Thryv and the Union remained at overall impasse on the date the layoffs occurred. The court also enforced the NLRB’s order requiring Thryv to cease and desist from failing and refusing to furnish the Union with requested information that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its functions as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees. View "Thryv v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves MCR Oil Tools, L.L.C., who filed a petition for review against the United States Department of Transportation, its Secretary Pete Buttigieg, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and William S. Schoonover in his official capacity as Associate Administrator of Hazardous Materials Safety. The petition was filed in response to an order from the Department of Transportation.The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Prior to this, the case had been reviewed by the Department of Transportation, but the details of the lower court's proceedings and decisions are not provided in the document.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the petition for review. The court decided to expedite the matter to the next available randomly designated regular oral argument panel. Additionally, the court ruled that the motions for stay pending review and for administrative stay should be decided by the argument panel. The court carried these motions with the case, consistent with their panel practice. However, the court did not express any opinion on the disposition of these motions. View "MCR Oil Tools v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by the Sierra Club to the pre-construction permits issued by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) to Commonwealth LNG, LLC for its planned liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility. The Sierra Club argued that the facility’s emissions would exceed National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and that LDEQ failed to require Commonwealth to use the best available control technology (BACT) to limit those emissions.Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, LDEQ argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, asserting that the claim arose under state law, not federal law. However, the court found that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because when LDEQ issued the permit, it was acting pursuant to federal law, not merely state law.On the merits, the court found that LDEQ did not act arbitrarily in its use of significant impact levels (SILs) to calculate which pollutants will have an insignificant effect on the NAAQS. The court also found that LDEQ did not act arbitrarily in its use of AP-42 emission factors to determine potential emissions from an LNG facility that has not yet been built. Furthermore, the court held that LDEQ did not violate its public trustee duty under Louisiana law, which requires LDEQ to evaluate and avoid adverse environmental impacts to the maximum extent possible.The court denied Sierra Club’s petition for review and affirmed LDEQ’s permitting decision. View "Sierra Club v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The case involves Elliott Sterling, who was convicted for engaging in a fraudulent scheme to obtain loan and grant funds from the Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid Program. Sterling submitted fraudulent applications on behalf of students, both real and fictional, and also committed fraud in connection with his educational consulting business. He was indicted for multiple counts of wire fraud, financial aid fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from specified unlawful activity. Sterling chose to represent himself during the trial after his request for a new counsel was denied.The district court found Sterling competent to waive his right to counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se in his defense. After a 9-day jury trial, Sterling was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 132 months of imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Sterling appealed, raising several Sixth Amendment claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no merit in Sterling’s procedural or substantive challenges. It held that Sterling's waiver of counsel was clear, unequivocal, and voluntary, and that he was competent to represent himself at trial. The court also found that the district court did not err in allowing Sterling to represent himself at his own competency hearing, and that the district court's determination of Sterling's competence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Sterling" on Justia Law

In September 2020, George Fluitt was indicted on three counts of fraud and offering kickbacks related to genetic testing services that his company, Specialty Drug Testing LLC, provided to Medicare beneficiaries. As part of a nationwide investigation into genetic testing fraud, the Government executed search warrants at laboratories referred to as the Hurricane Shoals Entities (“HSE”), allegedly operated by Khalid Satary. The Government copied several terabytes of data from HSE, some of which were later determined to be material to Fluitt’s defense.In the lower courts, the Government established a “Filter Team” to review materials seized in its investigation and identify any that might be privileged. The Filter Team’s review was governed in part by a Protocol Order, which established a multi-step process for notifying a third party that it might have a claim of privilege and then adjudicating that claim. HSE and Satary provided privilege logs to the Filter Team, asserting thousands of claims of privilege. Both Fluitt and the Filter Team found these privilege logs to be facially deficient as they made only threadbare assertions of privilege, without any accompanying explanation.In the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the appellants failed to establish their claims of privilege. The court also found that the appellants' argument that they are not bound by the Protocol Order was a red herring, as the magistrate judge evaluated the appellants’ privilege logs under the standards established by federal caselaw. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Fluitt “has not shown a need for the documents” and has not “demonstrated any kind of relevancy.” The court found that the record suggests that Fluitt “has a need” for the potentially privileged documents, as the Government determined that the potentially privileged materials were material to preparing Fluitt’s defense. View "United States v. Fluitt" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the eligibility of a dredging barge, the DB AVALON, to operate in U.S. waters. Federal law stipulates that only vessels "built in the United States" can dredge in U.S. waters, a determination made by the U.S. Coast Guard. Curtin Maritime Corporation sought the Coast Guard's ruling that the AVALON, which incorporated foreign-made spuds and a crane, could operate in U.S. waters. The Coast Guard ruled that the AVALON would be considered U.S.-built. Diamond Services Corporation, a competitor of Curtin, challenged this ruling as arbitrary and capricious.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court deferred to the Coast Guard's interpretation of its own regulations and granted the Coast Guard summary judgment. Diamond Services Corporation appealed this decision.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that the Coast Guard's interpretation of its own regulations was reasonable. The court found that the regulations were genuinely ambiguous as to whether the crane was part of the AVALON’s superstructure. The court also found that the Coast Guard's interpretation fell within the regulatory zone of ambiguity and was reasonable. The court concluded that the Coast Guard's ruling was made by the agency, implicated the agency’s substantive expertise, and reflected fair and considered judgment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for the Federal Defendants. View "Diamond Services v. Maritime" on Justia Law

Elden Don Brannan was living with his sister and her three children in Corpus Christi, Texas. In 2022, Brannan's sister called 911 to report that Brannan had assaulted her boyfriend and was threatening suicide. She informed the police that Brannan had a "pipe bomb" in his bedroom closet. The bomb squad removed the device and Brannan was arrested. He was later indicted by a grand jury for possessing an unregistered "destructive device" in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). His sister testified that Brannan had built the device from disassembled fireworks. Brannan's defense was that the device was not an explosive but a "makeshift roman-candle or fountain firework" designed to emit a pyrotechnic display.Brannan was found guilty by a federal jury. He moved for acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show he had designed the device as a weapon. These motions were denied. Brannan also requested the court to instruct the jury that to convict him under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), it had to find he had intentionally designed the device for use as a weapon. The court rejected this proposed instruction, reasoning that Brannan's intent to design the device as a weapon was not an element of the offense but an affirmative defense. The jury found Brannan guilty and he was sentenced to 24 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Brannan argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the jury instruction omitted an element of the offense. The court disagreed, affirming Brannan's conviction. The court held that under its binding precedent, the exception to § 5861(d) is an affirmative defense, not an element of the crime. Therefore, the government did not need to prove that the device was "designed for use as a weapon." The court also concluded that the district court did not err by following the circuit’s pattern instructions and declining to add "designed as a weapon" as an element of § 5861(d). View "United States v. Brannan" on Justia Law

Eric Demond Lozano, a Texas state prisoner and Sunni Muslim, filed a lawsuit against three officials of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Establishment Clause. Lozano claimed that his ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened due to the conditions in the prison. His claims included the inability to shower privately before Jumah, a weekly prayer service, due to non-Muslim inmates being allowed to shower at the same time; insufficient space to pray in his cell due to hostile cellmates; and lack of access to religious programming and instruction, specifically Taleem and Quranic studies, due to the absence of Muslim volunteers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the TDCJ officials. The court found that Lozano failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on whether the absence of a Muslim-designated unit or dorm violated the Establishment Clause. The court also concluded that Lozano provided no evidence to support his allegation that the faith-based dorms required inmates to study Christian materials.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment on Lozano's RLUIPA claims regarding Jumah showers and adequate prayer space. The appellate court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact on whether Lozano's ability to practice his religion was substantially burdened. The court also vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on Lozano's RLUIPA claim regarding additional religious programming and his Establishment Clause claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lozano v. Collier" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the procedural interplay between two Mississippi statutes—the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and the Mississippi Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). Mark Johnson, the plaintiff, filed a retaliation complaint under the MWPA, alleging that he was fired from his position as general manager of the Clarksdale Public Utilities Authority (CPU) for reporting inefficiency and incompetence. Johnson later added claims for First Amendment retaliation and breach of contract.The district court held that the procedural requirements of the MTCA applied to Johnson’s MWPA claim, and because the court concluded he didn’t comply with them, it dismissed his claim. The district court also concluded that Johnson’s First Amendment retaliation and breach-of-contract claims were time-barred because the three-year statute of limitations for these claims ran after Johnson filed his first complaint but before he amended to add these claims—and neither claim relates back. Johnson appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was unable to make a reliable Erie guess as to whether the MTCA’s procedural requirements apply to MWPA claims because it lacked clear guidance from Mississippi courts on how the two statutes interrelate. Therefore, the court certified this question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi: When a plaintiff brings a claim against the government and its employees for tortious conduct under the MWPA, is that claim subject to the procedural requirements of the MTCA? View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law

A group of Indian nationals, legally present in the United States on employment-based visas, filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of State and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The plaintiffs were seeking permanent residency and challenged the defendants' approach to distributing immigrant visas. They argued that the defendants' policies of deferring adjudication of their applications until a visa number becomes available violated the statute governing adjustment of status for nonimmigrants. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief under the Administrative Procedure Act and the federal Declaratory Judgment Act.The plaintiffs had initially moved for a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, but their motion was denied. They appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.The Fifth Circuit, however, found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The court cited the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to address many challenges brought in the context of immigration proceedings. The court concluded that the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions precluded it from hearing the plaintiffs' challenge. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Cheejati v. Blinken" on Justia Law