Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from FEMA's determination that the Holy Cross School was eligible for public assistance funds to construct a new school campus on the site of Cabrini Church and Cabrini School in Gentilly to replace its old campus six miles away in the Lower Ninth Ward. Friends of Cabrini Church filed a complaint against FEMA, alleging that, inter alia, the section 106 review process, which defined the "area of potential effects" (APE), C.F.R. 800.4(a), 800.16(d), was deficient. On appeal, Friends of Cabrini Church subsequently challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FEMA. The court held that because Friends of Cabrini Church lacked standing to bring its claims, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.

Plaintiffs, five individuals with disabilities, alleged that defendant recently built and altered sidewalks that were not readily accessible to them and requested injunctive relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(e). At issue was whether Title II and section 504 extended to newly built and altered public sidewalks. Also at issue was whether that private right of action accrued at the time the city built or altered its inaccessible sidewalks, or alternatively at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks. The court held that plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce Title II and section 504 with respect to newly built and altered public sidewalks, and that the right accrued at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks.

Plaintiff was a secretary of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. during his service as a district judge until Porteous was impeached and the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit suspended Porteous's authority to employ staff, which resulted in plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff sued the Judicial Council and fifteen of its members seeking declaratory relief, reinstatement to her position, monetary relief, and attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's order insofar as it dismissed her claims against the members of the Judicial Council. The court held that plaintiff lacked prudential standing to bring her constitutional challenge to the Judicial Council's action. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the ultra vires exception applied to sovereign immunity where her claims for injunctive relief were moot in light of Porteous's removal from office; claims for back pay and retirement credits were barred by sovereign immunity; and plaintiff lacked the necessary injury-in-fact to pursue declaratory relief. The court also held that even if plaintiff had standing to seek declaratory relief, she had not pleaded a sufficient claim of ultra vires action by the Judicial Council to overcome the jurisdictional bar of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed suit in district court against the United States, alleging negligence in record-keeping and the administration of a certain life insurance policy. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed from the district court's order granting the United States' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that plaintiffs did exhaust its administrative remedies, but its claim arose out of a misrepresentation and was barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671.

Thomas E. Clemmons, the former director of operations for Ameristar Airways, Incorporated (Ameristar), filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging he was discharged in retaliation for reporting air safety issues to the Federal Aviation Administration. The Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (Board) found a violation of the employee protection provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, ordering an award of back pay. The court held that because Clemmons had presented a prima facie case of retaliation and adduced evidence capable of rebutting Ameristar's proffered explanations, substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of liability. The court held, however, that because the question of whether Clemmons' insubordinate email, which was after-acquired evidence, "was of such severity that [he] would have been terminated on these grounds alone" was a question of fact, the court remanded to the agency to make that determination and to adjust the back pay award if necessary.

Petitioner, a skilled nursing facility that participated in the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs, petitioned for review of the final decision of the Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) finding that petitioner was in substantial noncompliance with regulations covering skilled nursing facilities, and affirming civil monetary penalties and denial of payment for new admissions. Finding that the DAB's decisions were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court dismissed the petition for review.

These three closely related appeals arose out of two district court cases, each involving a different tract of land owned by the Avoyelles Parish School Board (School Board), where neither tract was accessible by public road and both shared borders with the Lake Ophelia Wildlife Refuge (Refuge), which was owned by the United States Department of Interior (Department). The School Board filed these suits against all adjoining landowners, including the Department, to fix the School Board's legal rights of passage to the respective enclosed lands. The district court fixed rights of passage that burdened Refuge lands and concluded that the Department could not impose certain desired restrictions on the School Board's actions on Refuge lands. On appeal, the court reversed both judgments in full and remanded for further proceedings.

In 2009, Texas enacted a statutory scheme (the Act), Tex. Bus. Com. Code Ann. 17.921-17.926, where the Act required "for-profit entities" to make certain disclosures when collecting donated clothing or household goods through "public donation receptacles," when making telephone or door-to-door solicitations, and when making mail solicitations. Plaintiffs (charities) brought a constitutional challenge to the Act alleging that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Attorney General subsequently appealed certain portions of the district court's holding that portions of the statutory scheme were unconstitutional. The court held that the charities lacked standing to challenge the (c) provisions and therefore, the portion of the district court's opinion addressing the constitutionality of the (c) provisions was vacated. The court also held that the portion of the district court's opinion holding that part of section 17.922(d) that read "and a flat fee of (insert amount) is paid to (name of charitable organization)" was unconstitutional was affirmed. The court further held that the sold-for-profit disclosure requirements scattered throughout the Act were constitutional and the district court's contrary conclusion was reversed. Therefore, the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss any claim based on the (c) provisions for want of jurisdiction and for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, action on behalf of her minor son against the government for injuries allegedly related to his exposure to potentially dangerous, high levels of formaldehyde in their Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided emergency housing unit (EHU). At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claim was time-barred. The court held that neither the discovery rule, equitable estoppel, or the continuing tort doctrine applied in this case and therefore, plaintiff's FTCA claim accrued in May 2006 and her July 2008 administrative filing was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Defendant filed suit in state court demanding compensation from the State of Louisiana for the commandeering of its real property following Hurricane Katrina. While the state court litigation was pending, the United States initiated condemnation proceedings involving part of the same property in federal district court. To avoid potentially conflicting judgments, the United States sought a stay of the state court proceedings. The district court entered a stay and defendant appealed. At issue was whether the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, precluded the issuance of the stay and even if not prohibited, the issuance of the stay was not proper on the facts of the case. The court found that, in light of Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, the uncertainty surrounding the ownership of the property at issue and the extent of the United States' interest militated in favor of enjoining the state court litigation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court noted that the district court would need to determine the best manner in which to proceed in reaching an answer to the title questions that arose because of the commandeering. The court concluded that the district court might resolve the question itself, lift the stay for the limited purpose of allowing the state court to determine title, or take other steps to avoid the potential for inconsistent rulings in the two proceedings.