Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

IEC-Houston petitioned for review of two of the Board's orders stemming from unfair labor practice charges against IEC-Houston and others. The charges stemmed from allegations that IEC-Houston's member employment-assistance programs discriminated against the hiring of union members and "salts" in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3). Concluding that the court had jurisdiction, the court granted IEC-Houston's petition for review and denied the Board's cross-petition for enforcement where IEC-Houston was deprived of due process of law because it was charged and tried under Section 8(a)(3), while each Board panel rejected the ALJ's finding of liability under Section 8(a)(3), and instead found violations of Section 8(a)(1) under a novel theory of liability. The Board's change of liability theories on appeal was error and it was not harmless error. Accordingly, the court did not reach the merits of the Board's novel Section 8(a)(1) theory of liability. View "Correct Electrical, Inc., et al. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

ATO challenged the City's enactment of an ordinance offering taxicabs certified to run on compressed natural gas (CNG) a "head-of-the-line" privilege at a municipally-owned airport. At issue was whether the ordinance was preempted by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7543(a). The court concluded that the ordinance, enacted using traditional police powers, was not superseded by any clear and manifest purpose of Congress, above all where Congress's term "standard" had been identified as one "susceptible" to a mandate/incentive distinction. The court also concluded that the ordinance could have its intended effect and substitute CNG cabs for traditional cabs at the airport but it did not show that the City's cab drivers faced such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects as to force them to switch vehicles. Accordingly, the ordinance was not preempted by section 209(a) of the Act and the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ass'n of Taxicab Operators USA v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law

This case presented a constitutional challenge to Texas's statutory scheme, which does not allow 18- to 20-year-old adults to carry handguns in public. The court held that the state scheme withstood this challenge because the court was bound by a prior panel opinion of this court, NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives. Because plaintiffs Jennings and Harmon were now 21, the court remanded their claims to the district court with instructions to dismiss them as moot. The court also reversed the district court's ruling that the remaining plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge Texas's general criminal provision barring persons from carrying handguns in public. Finally, with respect to the general criminal provision, the court rendered, and with respect to the licensing law the court affirmed the district court, holding that the Texas scheme did not violate the Second or the Equal Protection Clause. View "Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of America Inc, et al. v. McCraw" on Justia Law

Elgin sought review of a final decision by DHHS upholding a ruling of an ALJ affirming a determination by the CMS that Elgin had violated certain safety requirements by serving "undercooked" eggs to its elderly residents. The court concluded it would not defer to DHHS's interpretation of the State Operations Manual (SOM); there was not substantial evidence to find that Elgin violated the SOM; and DHHS could not issue ambiguous interpretative documents and then interpret those in enforcement actions. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and set aside the finding of deficiency and resultant penalties. View "Elgin Nursing Center v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, waste haulers that operate throughout the City, filed suit against the City claiming that its ordinance, which imposed a permit fee for the collection or disposal of waste within city limits, violated the dormant Commerce Clause by imposing an excessive burden on interstate waste haulers. The court concluded that the City's ordinance did not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce or place excessive burdens on plaintiffs' interstate commerce. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that their alleged injuries fell within the zone of interests protected by the dormant Commerce Clause and the court declined to address their arguments because they lacked prudential standing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Cibolo Waste, Inc., et al v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

Southwest appealed the district court's dismissal of its claim regarding the Medicare Part D statute, 42 U.S.C. 1395w-101 et seq., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Citing Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Southwest argued that its claim provided a narrow exception to 42 U.S.C. 405(h)'s requirement that required a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a claim in federal court. The court concluded that caselaw interpreting the application of section 405(h) to Medicare claims emphasized that the Illinois Council exception was extremely narrow and appropriately applied only in cases where judicial review would be entirely unavailable through the prescribed administrative procedures. Because Southwest has not carried its heavy burden of showing that the Illinois Council exception applied, the court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the suit. View "Southwest Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a contract FBI employee, sued the government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 et seq., alleging sex discrimination and retaliation. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment. The court concluded that subsection (g) created a security exemption to Title VII where access was denied to a premise where secure information was kept. Therefore, plaintiff could not be granted relief under Title VII where the government advanced numerous reasons for revocation of her access to the building where secured information was kept, all of which were related to security breaches she allegedly committed. View "Toy v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action suit in state court against the Levee District and Flood Protection Agency. Plaintiffs then initiated a second state court suit against the Levee District and the Agency. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an amended petition, joining the Corps as a defendant, seeking declaratory judgment that defendants did not possess a servitude over their property. The Corps then removed the case to federal district court, the district court granted in part and denied in part the Corps' motion to dismiss, and the United States petitioned for permission to appeal. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs' action against the Corps fell within the scope of the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a, so as to waive the United States' immunity to suit and authorize federal subject matter jurisdiction. Because the title dispute here concerned ownership of the purported servitude - a title dispute between plaintiffs and a third party - and because it was plausible to read the QTA as only authorizing suit when the underlying title dispute was between plaintiff and the United States, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lonatro, et al v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between the City and RBIII where the City demolished a dilapidated building on property that RBIII owned. The City did not provide notice to RBIII before razing the structure and RBIII filed suit against the City. The district court granted summary judgment for the City on all claims except a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim. Those claims were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of RBIII. The City then appealed. The court agreed with the City's argument on appeal that the district court's jury instructions did not accurately reflect the applicable law and that, under the correct legal standards, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. Because the court vacated the trial court's judgment against the City, the court need not consider the other issues raised in the City's appeal. View "RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

This matter arose from the multidistrict litigation (MDL) related to allegations that the Emergency Housing Units (EHUs) provided by FEMA in Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita contained materials which emitted dangerous levels of formaldehyde. This appeal involved only the Louisiana plaintiffs. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs' negligence claims regarding the use of EHUs were barred by the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims that FEMA negligently responded to formaldehyde complaints under the Louisiana Good Samaritan provision of the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 29:733:1. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' gross negligence claim under the misrepresentation exception to the FTCA. View "In Re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Lit." on Justia Law