Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, the City of Arlington and the City of San Antonio, sought review of a Declaratory Ruling and subsequent Order on Reconsideration that the FCC issued in response to a petition for a declaratory ruling by a trade association of wireless telephone service providers, CTIA. In the proceeding before the FCC, CTIA sought clarification of Sections 253 and 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 253, 332(c)(7), regarding local review of wireless facility siting applications. Both cities claimed (1) the FCC lacked statutory authority to establish the 90- and 150-day time frames; (2) the FCC's 90- and 150-day time frames conflicted with the language of section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v); (3) the FCC's actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; and (4) the FCC violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., because its establishment of the 90- and 150-day time frames constituted a rulemaking subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. Arlington also raised a procedural due process claim. The court denied Arlington's petition for review on the merits. The court dismissed San Antonio's petition for review because the court lacked jurisdiction because San Antonio did not timely file its petition for review.

Plaintiffs, a trade organization representing incumbent cable operators in Texas and an incumbent cable provider, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their claims that Senate State Bill 5 violated the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution or was preempted by federal law. SB 5 was aimed at reforming the cable service industry in Texas by creating a new state-level franchising system that obligated the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to grant a franchise for the requested areas if the applicant satisfied basic requirements. New entrants could obtain a single statewide franchise that avoided the expense and inconvenience of separate municipal franchise agreements across the state. Overbuilders could terminate their existing municipal franchise agreements in favor of the convenience of the statewide franchise. Incumbent cable providers, however, could not similarly opt out for the statewide franchise, until after the expiration of the municipal license. The court held that because the statute unjustifiably discriminated against a small number of incumbent cable providers in violation of the First Amendment, the court reversed.

Plaintiffs, Matthew Cantrell's family, filed suit against the City of Murphy and several of its officers after 21-month-old Matthew died of accidental hanging when he was found tangled up in a soccer net in the back yard of his home. This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the officers deprived Matthew of his due process rights under DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, where plaintiffs failed to establish that the officers had a special relationship with Matthew when they separated him from his mother. The court also held that because the officers had probable cause to detain Matthew's mother, the district court did not err in granting the officers summary judgment on this portion of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs sued law enforcement officers for excess use of force, assault and battery, and unlawful entry after the officers breached the locked door to the private bedroom of plaintiffs' 27-year-old son, Scott, to arrest him for threatening his mother. Scott attacked the officers with two knives, and in the ensuing melee, the officers shot and killed him. The court held that the officers' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. Because the court held that Scott's Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force was not violated, the court need not consider the issue of whether that right was clearly established. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of official immunity to the officers on plaintiffs' assault-and-battery claims; unlawful-entry claims; and warrantless arrest claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all claims.

This appeal arose out of an oil spill on the Neches River. Appellants challenged the National Pollution Funds Center's (NPFC) final claim determination denying reimbursement for costs arising from the spill. The district court rejected appellants' challenge to the agency determination. The court concluded that the NPFC's interpretation of 33 U.S.C. 2703 was entitled to deference and that appellants have not demonstrated that the NPFC's denial of the third-party affirmative defense claim should be overturned under the standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.

Plaintiffs filed a civil action against St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Rodney Strain and Deputies Bryan Steinert, Julie Boynton, and Wayne Wicker, each in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs brought claims for negligence under Louisiana state law and for deliberate indifference based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The only three issues to survive summary judgment were the state-law negligence claims and the section 1983 claims against Steinert in his personal capacity and Strain in his official capacity. At issue were the two section 1983 claims. The court dismissed Steinert's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because he challenged the district court's factual conclusions on interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed Strain's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Strain was being sued in his official capacity, the suit against him was "in essence" a suit against a municipality, and municipal governments could not raise immunity defenses on interlocutory appeal.

In 2008, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act No. 530, Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 48:394, which required that all railroad companies obtain permission from the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) before closing or removing private railroad crossings. During the pendency of this litigation, in 2010, the Louisiana Legislature adopted Act 858, amending Section 48:394 in light of the court's decision in Franks Investment Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. Plaintiff filed the instant action against LPSC and its commissioners in their official capacity, seeking a declaration that Section 48:394 was preempted by federal law, and both preliminary and permanent injunctions against the enforcement of that section. The court held that Louisiana had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also held that, because the parties agreed that if the State was entitled to immunity the case would be dismissed, the court dismissed the appeal and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the action.

Plaintiff sued Hudspeth County and Sheriff West under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for Hudspeth County but not for West, finding that genuine disputes of material fact precluded a determination of the application of qualified immunity. In particular, the district court found genuine disputes existed as to West's knowledge of plaintiff's status as an El Paso Police Department (EPPD) officer and plaintiff's authority to operate in Hudspeth County as part of the 34th Judicial District task force. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court where West failed to show legal error in the district court's analysis.

Petitioners petitioned for review of Order 720, which adopted the Posting Rule, and 720-A of the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC). Petitioners contended that the Posting Rule exceeded the authority granted to FERC by the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717, in violation of section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(C), which prohibited any agency action "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations." The court held that all attempts by FERC to show that section 1(b) did not limit the scope of section 23 of the NGA were unavailing and the NGA unambiguously precluded FERC from issuing the Posting Rule so as to require wholly intrastate pipelines to disclose and disseminate capacity and scheduling information. Therefore, under Chevron step one analysis, FERC had no statutory authority to promulgate Order 720 and 720-A and thus, violated section 10(e) of the APA. Accordingly, the petitions for review were granted and the orders vacated.

Plaintiff, a group representing taxicab companies that hold only one to three permits for cabs, asserted that the city's plan to distribute new taxicab permits violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the city and plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating taxi companies differently based on size and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.