Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Texas merchants filed suit challenging Texas’ Anti-Surcharge Law, Tex. Fin. Code 339.001. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied a preliminary injunction. Merchants claim that the law penalizes them for characterizing pricing as a “surcharge”, while at the same time not prohibiting a “discount” for non-credit-card transactions; and is unconstitutionally vague. Reviewing the parties’ claims de novo, and in the light of the States’ broad authority to regulate economic conduct, the court held that Texas’ law regulates conduct, not speech, and, therefore, does not implicate the First Amendment. Instead, the law ensures only that merchants do not impose an additional charge above the regular price for customers paying with credit cards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rowell v. Pettijohn" on Justia Law

This case concerns a plan to replace public housing units destroyed by Hurricane Ike in part by redeveloping on two of the sites destroyed by Ike. At issue are questions concerning the scope of standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.; whether Congress intended by that Act to abrogate States' sovereign immunity; and whether defendants can avail themselves of a safe harbor provision in the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended by the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dismissal of the Individual Plaintiffs and GOGP because they did not appeal; plaintiff has Article III standing to bring her claim that the planned redevelopment will deprive her of the social and economic benefits that result from living in an integrated community; Congress did not make clear an intent to abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from suits brought under the Fair Housing Act, a conclusion reached by other courts considering the issue; and the district court properly granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants on plaintiff’s Fair Housing Act claim, concluding that plaintiff's claim was precluded by a safe harbor provision found at 42 U.S.C. 1437p(d). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McCardell v. HUD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty-six states, filed suit challenging the government's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (“DAPA”) as violative of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. 553, and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The district court temporarily enjoined the implementation program and the government appealed, moving for a stay of the injunction. The court concluded that the government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the states lack standing. In this case, at least one state - Texas - is likely to satisfy all three requirements of Article III standing. Further, the government has not made a strong showing that the interests that the states seek to protect fall outside the zone of interests of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1252; that judicial review is precluded in this case; that DAPA does not require notice and comment; and that the remaining factors also favor the states. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for stay and the request to narrow the scope of the injunction. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Frederick Morton and Walter Powers, Jr., individually and in his capacity as President of the Fraternal Order of Police, and cross-claimant the New Orleans Civil Service Commission (“CSC”) appealed the district court’s judgment upholding certain ordinances passed by the City of New Orleans related to paid detail for officers of the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”). The Fifth Circuit approved a Consent Decree entered into by agreement between the United States and the City of New Orleans; the Consent Decree was the product of a nearly year-long United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigation into the NOPD which “revealed longstanding patterns of unconstitutional conduct and bad practices and policies within the department.” As relevant here, the DOJ found that the structure of NOPD’s system of paid detail undermined the quality of NOPD policing and facilitated abuse and corruption by officers. To fix the problems associated with paid details, the Consent Decree required the City to “completely restructure” the existing system in which NOPD officers negotiated details and received payment directly from private employers. Morton and Powers alleged in their petition that the paid detail ordinances violated the federal and state Constitutions, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court held a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, in which the CSC participated. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion, finding that the CSC lacked jurisdiction over NOPD officers’ paid detail work; the ordinances did not violate the state or federal Contract Clauses because, even if contracts between the officers and private employers existed, they were subject to approval by the Superintendent and the ordinances were a legitimate exercise of the City’s police power; and the ordinances did not violate Louisiana’s Anti-Expropriation Clause because NOPD officers working paid details were not a “business enterprise,” and, in any case, the OPSE, a non-profit entity, did not compete with any paid detail business. All parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial. Following the trial, the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims and the CSC’s cross-claim. Plaintiffs and the CSC appealed the district court’s rulings on all claims and further alleged that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Powers v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants are several Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and deportation officers (collectively, "Agents") and the State of Mississippi. They filed this suit against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the directors of departments within that agency (collectively, "DHS"), in their official capacities, challenging DHS's 2012 directive, which required its officials to use "deferred action" as to a certain class of aliens in immigration removal proceedings. The Agents alleged that exercising deferred action violated federal law, because the law required them to detain all illegal aliens for the purpose of placing the aliens in removal proceedings. The State of Mississippi alleged that the deferred action has caused additional aliens to remain in the state and, thus, causes the state to spend money on providing social services. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that neither the Agents nor the State of Mississippi demonstrated the concrete and particularized injury required to give them standing to maintain this suit. Therefore the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Crane v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Congress passed the Clean Water Act "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." The Act bans "the discharge of any pollutant by any person," unless affirmatively allowed by law. This case began when a group of environmental organizations petitioned the EPA to "use its powers [pursuant to section 1313(c)(4)(B)] to control nitrogen and phosphorous pollution" within the Mississippi River Basin and the Northern Gulf of Mexico. The EPA declined to do so. While the agency agreed that nitrogen and phosphorous pollution "is a significant water quality problem," it did "not believe that the comprehensive use of federal rulemaking authority is the most effective or practical means of addressing these concerns at this time." The petitioners filed suit, arguing the EPA had violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the CWA by declining to make a necessity determination. The EPA moved to dismiss the case on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, arguing that the decision whether to make a necessity determination was a discretionary act that the court lacked authority to review. The parties also cross-moved for summary judgment on the merits. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in "Massachusetts v. EPA" the district court held that the "EPA could not simply decline to make a necessity determination in response to . . . [the] petition for rulemaking." It remanded the case to the agency with orders to conduct a necessity determination. In doing so, the district court declined to issue specific guidance on "the types of factors that EPA can or cannot consider when actually making the necessity determination." This appeal followed. The Fifth Circuit surmised this case posed two questions: (1) whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the EPA's decision not to make a necessity determination; and (2) was the EPA required to make such a determination. The Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, and that the EPA was not required to make such a determination. View "Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

In Texas, individuals under the age of 25 cannot obtain driver’s licenses unless they submit a driver education certificate to the Department of Public Safety (DPS). Driver education certificates, in turn, are only available from private driver education schools licensed by the TEA. The named plaintiffs were all deaf individuals who contacted a variety of TEA-licensed private driver education schools, all of which informed the named plaintiffs that the schools would not accommodate them. Because they cannot obtain driver education certificates, the named plaintiffs cannot obtain driver’s licenses. Plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the TEA to bring driver education into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied the TEA's motion to dismiss but certified its order for immediate appeal.On appeal, plaintiffs essentially argued that the TEA’s pervasive regulation and supervision of driver education schools transforms these schools into agents of the state. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the mere fact that the driver education schools are heavily regulated and supervised by the TEA does not make these schools a "service, program, or activity" of the TEA. "Admittedly, this case is further complicated by the fact that the benefit provided by driver education schools - a driver education certificate - is necessary for obtaining an important governmental benefit - a driver’s license. Given the broad remedial purposes of the ADA, it would be extremely troubling if deaf young adults were effectively deprived of driver’s licenses simply because they could not obtain the private education that the State of Texas has mandated as a prerequisite for this important government benefit. [. . .] the DPS may well be required to give exemptions to certain deaf individuals who cannot obtain driver education certificates, given that using these certificates as an eligibility criteria allegedly 'screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out' deaf people and may not be 'necessary for the provision of the' driver’s license program. But the named plaintiffs have not sued the DPS, so we need not decide this issue." View "Ivy v. Williams" on Justia Law

Leading up to the 2012 state Senate elections in Texas, Texas failed to gain preclearance of its recently enacted Senate redistricting plan as required under then-existing law. Because Texas’s new plan had not been precleared, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit and successfully blocked the plan for the 2012 elections. A three-judge district court panel in San Antonio enjoined Texas’s plan and ordered an interim plan in its place. But after the election, the Supreme Court held that the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula, which automatically subjected Texas to the preclearance requirement, was unconstitutional. Regardless, after the Court’s decision, Texas repealed the contested redistricting plan and adopted the court-imposed plan in its place, thus mooting Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The district court then awarded Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and costs. Texas appealed the award of costs. Because the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erroneously characterized Plaintiffs as prevailing parties, the Fifth Circuit reversed. View "Davis v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Manuel Rodriguez-Avalos appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision. Rodriguez was a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without having been admitted or paroled. In January 2011, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspection revealed that Rodriguez was one of fourteen employees of an Omaha, Nebraska grocery store against whom identity-theft complaints had been filed with the Federal Trade Commission. A DHS agent interviewed Rodriguez, who admitted his identity to the DHS agent and admitted that he had no documentation allowing him to enter or work in the United States. Rodriguez was then placed under arrest for administrative immigration violations. Rodriguez was subsequently indicted and charged with, inter alia, falsely and willfully representing himself to be a United States citizen. The BIA dismissed his appeal after an Immigration Judge’s denied of his application for relief from removal. The BIA held that the prison sentence Rodriguez served following his conviction for falsely and willfully representing himself as a United States citizen barred him from demonstrating the “good moral character” necessary to be statutorily eligible for relief from removal. Finding no reversible error in the BIA's decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the City misreported charges under the Texas Driver Responsibility Program to plaintiffs and that the State overcharged plaintiffs as a result. On appeal, defendant, the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety, challenged the district court's partial denial of his motion to dismiss the case against him for want of jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiff Fontenot lacks standing to sue; plaintiffs Miller and Zamarron have no live controversy with the State for correction of driving records, and therefore the class action claim for similar relief is moot and nonjusticiable; the refund claims to recover surcharges are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity; and the court found it unnecessary to discuss the State's jurisdictional defense. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying state sovereign immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction. View "Fontenot v. McCraw" on Justia Law