Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shortly after COVID-19 struck the Wallace Pack Unit, plaintiffs filed suit seeking injunctive relief on behalf of three certified classes of inmate for violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to their health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment in light of the dangers of COVID-19 for a geriatric prison population, and that defendants violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by failing to accommodate for specific risks to wheelchair-bound and other mobility-impaired inmates.On April 16, 2020, the district court entered a preliminary injunction which was stayed by the Fifth Circuit on April 22 and then vacated on June 5. On September 29, 2020, the district court issued a permanent injunction, concluding that plaintiffs did not need to exhaust administrative remedies; defendants were deliberately indifferent; and defendants violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's permanent injunction and rendered judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the prison officials were not deliberately indifferent based on a lack of a systemic approach. After considering Policy B-14.52, its unwritten additions, and its administration, the court explained that the record does not support a finding of deliberate indifference in the way the officials considered and adopted a response to COVID-19. The court also concluded that the prison officials were not deliberately indifferent based on a failure to abide by basic public health guidance regarding testing, social distancing, mask use, handwashing, sanitation, and cleaning. Finally, the court concluded that the mobility-impaired inmates failed to establish their prima facie ADA claim, and consequently their Rehabilitation Act claim. View "Valentine v. Collier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the DOE, alleging that the TEA had discharged her in retaliation for whistleblowing. Congress enacted a broad-based whistleblower protection program as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (NDAA). The NDAA prohibits any recipient of federal dollars from retaliating against whistleblowers who report an abuse of that money.The Fifth Circuit granted the TEA's petition for review, vacated the offending order, and remanded for prompt entry of dismissal. The court agreed with the TEA that the DOE's investigation of plaintiff's complaint and award of damages violated Texas's sovereign immunity. The court explained that whistleblower-retaliation investigations into a state, like any other administrative proceedings brought by private parties, are barred by sovereign immunity. The court joined two other federal courts that have directly addressed the issue and held that the NDAA is not adequately clear for any waiver from sovereign immunity to be effective. Furthermore, the clarity required for a waiver of sovereign immunity to be "knowing" cannot be met by regulations clarifying an ambiguous statute. Rather, the needed clarity must come directly from the statute. View "Texas Education Agency v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

There is no conflict between the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Bail Reform Act (BRA) that prevents DHS from civilly detaining a criminal defendant after she has been granted pretrial release pursuant to the BRA.As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court's December order is appealable under the BRA, 18 U.S.C. 3145 and 3731. The court explained that the September release order released defendant from criminal detention under the BRA and, considered by itself, the court would lack jurisdiction over the September release order because it was issued by a magistrate judge and not a district court. However, the December order was the district court's affirmation of the September release order in response to defendant's motion to clarify her release status.On the merits, the court concluded that the district court correctly rejected the applicability of 8 U.S.C. 1226(e) and 1252(g) in its December order, explaining it was "not attempting to review or set aside any decision or action to commence removal proceedings" but was instead "attempting to enforce the Magistrate Judge's [September release] Order." The court considered decisions by six other circuits that have addressed the issue and concluded that pretrial release under the BRA does not preclude pre-removal detention under the INA. The court explained that, fundamentally, the BRA and INA concern separate grants of Executive authority and govern independent criminal and civil proceedings. The court concluded that the remaining claims lacked merit and vacated the district court's December order precluding ICE from detaining defendant pending completion of her criminal proceedings. View "United States v. Baltazar-Sebastian" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied petitions for review of the Service's incidental take statement and biological opinion in connection with the construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas terminal in south Texas (the Annova project). The court held that the Service complied with its obligations under the Endangered Species Act in authorizing the harm or harassment of one ocelot or jaguarundi and in determining that the proposed project was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of either cat.In this case, the incidental take statement is not arbitrary and capricious because it clearly specifies the anticipated take and specifies the amount or extent of the anticipated take. Furthermore, the reinitiation trigger is clear and enforceable. Finally, the failure to include the reasonable and prudent measures word-for-word in the terms and conditions does not render the incidental take statement arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court explained that the no-jeopardy conclusion is not arbitrary and capricious where the Service's conclusion was reached after evaluating both the direct and indirect effects of an action on the cats. The court rejected petitioners' challenge to the opinion's mitigation measures, namely the conservation of acreage, as arbitrary and capricious. View "Sierra Club v. Department of Interior" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied petitions for review of the Service's incidental take statement and biological opinion in connection with the construction and operation of a liquefied natural gas terminal in south Texas (the Rio Grande project). The court held that the Service complied with its obligations under the Endangered Species Act in authorizing the harm or harassment of one ocelot or jaguarundi and in determining that the proposed project was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of either cat.In this case, the incidental take statement is not arbitrary and capricious because it clearly specifies the anticipated take and specifies the amount or extent of the anticipated take. Furthermore, the reinitiation trigger is clear and enforceable. Finally, the failure to include the reasonable and prudent measures word-for-word in the terms and conditions does not render the incidental take statement arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court explained that the no-jeopardy conclusion is not arbitrary and capricious where the Service's conclusion was reached after evaluating both the direct and indirect effects of an action on the cats. View "Sierra Club v. Department of Interior" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Commission's final rule prohibiting the manufacture and sale of any children's toy or child care article that contains concentrations of more than 0.1 percent of any one of five phthalates.The Fifth Circuit held that EMCC has standing to bring its challenge to the Final Rule and the court has jurisdiction to review the Final Rule. The court also held that the Commission procedurally erred by not providing an adequate opportunity to comment on the rule and by failing to consider the costs of a portion of the rule. Having reviewed the record and the Final Rule, the court can discern the Commission's path for each of the six decisions at issue and held that its explanations are not "so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Because there is a serious possibility that CSPC will be able to remedy its failures, the court concluded that remand, rather than vacatur, was appropriate in this case. View "Texas Association of Manufacturers v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion.The States filed suit against the United States, raising constitutional challenges to Section 9010 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), as well as statutory and constitutional challenges to an HHS administrative rule (Certification Rule).As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the States had standing. The court reversed the district court's ruling that the States' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims were not time-barred and dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction. On the merits, the court held that the Certification Rule and Section 9010 are constitutional and lawful. As a result, the court explained that there can be no equitable disgorgement, regardless of whether such a remedy would be otherwise appropriate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the Section 9010 claims and reversed the district court's judgment that the Certification Rule violated the nondelegation doctrine. Therefore, the court rendered judgment in favor of the United States. Because the court held that neither the Certification Rule nor Section 9010 are unlawful, the court vacated the district court's grant of equitable disgorgement to the States. View "Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former alien detainee, filed suit alleging that CoreCivic's work programs are not voluntary. Plaintiff claimed that CoreCivic forced her to clean detention facilities, cook meals for company events, engage in clerical work, provide barber services for fellow detainees, maintain landscaping, and other labors. Furthermore, if she refused, CoreCivic would impose more severe living conditions, physical restraints, and deprivation of basic human needs.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of CoreCivic's motion to dismiss under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. 1589(a). The court concluded that sections 1589(a) and 1595 impose civil liability on "[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of" four coercive methods. The court rejected CoreCivic's contention that this language does not capture labor performed in work programs in a federal immigration detention setting. The court explained that nothing in the text supports this claim; CoreCivic is clearly an entity covered by the term "whoever;" and it has clearly "obtain[ed]" the labor of these alien detainees. The court rejected CoreCivic's remaining claims to the contrary and declined to apply the rule of lenity. Because on its face section 1589 unambiguously protects labor performed in work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, the court concluded that the "judicial inquiry is complete." View "Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc." on Justia Law

After employees of M.D. Anderson lost patients' data, HHS fined M.D. Anderson $4,348,000. M.D. Anderson petitioned for review, and HHS conceded that it could not defend a fine in excess of $450,000. HHS then sought a reduction of the penalty by a factor of 10.The Fifth Circuit granted M.D. Anderson's petition for review and held that the civil monetary penalty (CMP) violates the Administrative Procedure Act because it is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. In this case, HHS steadfastly refused to interpret the statutes at issue; the ALJ likewise refused to consider whether the multi-million-dollar CMP was arbitrary or capricious; and HHS's Departmental Appeals Board agreed with the ALJ. Reviewing de novo, the court concluded that the CMP order was arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise unlawful for at least four independent reasons: 1) based on the Encryption Rule; 2) based on the Disclosure Rule; 3) the ALJ erroneously insisted that the Government can arbitrarily and capriciously enforce the CMP rules against some covered entities and not others; and 4) based on the penalty amounts. Because the Government has offered no lawful basis for its civil monetary penalties against M.D. Anderson, the court vacated the CMP order and remanded for further proceedings. View "University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. United States Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied petitions for review by the State of Texas and Sierra Club, challenging the EPA's action designating Bexar County, Texas as in nonattainment and three neighboring counties as in attainment with the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).After determining that venue is proper in the Fifth Circuit, the court held that the relevant statutory language in the Clean Air Act grants EPA discretionary authority to make the changes it "deems necessary." The court also held that EPA's interpretation and implementation of the statute is reasonable. In this case, because Bexar County was not compliant with the 2015 NAAQS when EPA promulgated its designation, the court concluded that the Clean Air Act and the Administrative Procedure Act allowed the change. In regard to the three counties, the court concluded that EPA has not arbitrarily reversed its interpretation of "contribution" and EPA did not fail to articulate a rational connection between the facts in the record and its decision not to designate the disputed counties as nonattainment. In this case, EPA used a permissible, multi-factor analysis to determine that the contributions of Atascosa, Comal, and Guadalupe Counties to Bexar County's ambient ozone levels were insufficient to merit a nonattainment designation. View "Texas v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law