Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012 the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Eight states and the Governors of two states, led by Texas, have challenged DACA’s validity. In ruling on competing motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the DACA Memorandum violates procedural and substantive requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court vacated the DACA Memorandum and remanded to DHS for further consideration but temporarily stayed that vacatur as it applies to current DACA recipients. The district court further ruled that DHS may continue to accept new and renewal DACA applications but enjoined DHS from approving any new DACA applications.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in part but remanded to the district court rather than DHS in light of a final rule promulgated by DHS in August 2022. The court explained that it affirmed the district court’s judgment with regard to the procedural and substantive provisions of the DACA memorandum.   There is evidence that if DACA were no longer in effect, at least some recipients would leave, and their departure would reduce the State’s Medicaid, social services and education costs for those individuals and their families who depart with them. Especially with the benefit of special solicitude, Texas has established that rescinding DACA would redress its harm. Accordingly, Texas has demonstrated standing based on its direct injury. Further, the court held that because DACA did not undergo notice and comment, it violates the procedural requirements of the APA. View "State of Texas v. USA" on Justia Law

Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act prohibits health care programs that receive federal funds from discriminating against patients on the basis of sex. Section 1557 incorporates Title IX’s definition of prohibited sex discrimination. The Secretary of HHS has authority to issue regulations to implement Section 1557.In May 2016, HHS issued a rule interpreting Section 1557’s prohibition of “discrimination on the basis of sex.” Plaintiffs claimed the rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by defining “sex discrimination” inconsistently with Title IX. Initially, the district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction and ultimately granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs but denied permanent injunctive relief. Significant litigation followed.In this case, HHS argues that any challenge to the 2016 Rule is now moot because the district court already vacated the parts of the rule that violated the APA, and because the 2020 Rule rescinded the 2016 Rule. The Fifth Circuit agreed. View "Franciscan Alliance v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Midship Pipeline Company, L.L.C. challenged part of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order directing an administrative law judge to determine the “reasonable cost” for Midship to complete remediation activities at Sandy Creek Farms in Oklahoma.The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the FERC, finding that the matter was ripe for appeal. Further, the Fifth Circuit determined that the FERC order directing an administrative law judge to determine the “reasonable cost” of remediation activities was ultra vires because the FERC lacked authority under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) to do so. Thus, the court held that the FERC's action was ultra vires and vacated that portion of the Commission's order. The court remanded the remaining portion of the order to the FERC for further proceedings. View "Midship Pipeline v. FERC" on Justia Law

The State of Texas sought to enjoin the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo from holding live-called and electronic bingo. The district court granted the injunction and the Fifth Circuit upheld it under its prior decisions.   In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 955 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2020), overruled by No. 20- 493, 2022 WL 2135494 (2022), the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court wrote that the Supreme Court granted the Pueblo’s petition and rejected Texas’s contention that Congress has allowed all of the state’s gaming laws to operate as surrogate federal law enforceable on the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Reservation.   Under the Court’s interpretation of the Restoration Act, “if a gaming activity is prohibited by Texas law”—that is, absolutely “banned in Texas”—then “it is also prohibited on tribal land as a matter of federal law.” But if the gaming activity is merely regulated by Texas law—that is, “by fixing the time, place, and manner in which the game may be conducted”—then it’s only “subject to tribal regulation” and “the terms and conditions set forth in federal law, including [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] to the extent it is applicable.” View "State of TX v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC, d/b/a Triton Distribution (“Triton”) and Vapetasia, LLC (“Vapetasia”) sought to market flavored nicotine-containing e-liquids for use in open-system e-cigarette devices. Petitioners needed to submit premarket tobacco product applications as required by 21 U.S.C. Section 387j—which the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) deemed applicable to e-cigarette tobacco products. FDA denied the requested marketing authorizations, finding that Petitioners failed to offer reliable and robust evidence (such as randomized controlled trials or longitudinal studies) to overcome the risks of youth addiction and show a benefit to adult smokers. Petitioners sought review of those marketing denial orders (“MDOs”), and prior to the consolidation of the two cases. Petitioners argued that the FDA lacks the authority to impose a comparative efficacy requirement and that FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by “requiring” scientific studies.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court explained that Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”) in an active effort to protect public health. Relevant here, the Deeming Rule subjected e-cigarette manufacturers to the TCA’s prior authorization requirement—manufacturers of “new tobacco product[s]” must submit premarket tobacco product applications (“PMTAs”). The court held that the FDA’s consideration of the lack of cessation as a risk and comparing that risk between new tobacco products and old tobacco products “fall[s] squarely within the ambit of the FDA’s expertise and merit[s] deference.”  As such, the court cannot say that FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by disagreeing with Petitioners as to the significance of the evidence they presented. View "Wages and White Lion Investmen v. FDA" on Justia Law

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were tenants at Arbor Court, a Houston apartment complex that received subsidies from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). After flooding that occurred during Hurricane Harvey, Arbor Court’s owner failed to maintain the property in decent, safe, and sanitary condition. Accordingly, HUD approved a transfer of the complex’s subsidy to a different property, offering Arbor Court tenants a choice between moving at no cost to the new property or receiving housing vouchers that they could use at new housing of their choice. After choosing the latter option, Plaintiffs sued HUD, seeking relocation assistance under the Uniform Relocation Act (“URA”). The district court dismissed the complaint.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs are not entitled to relocation assistance under the URA. The court explained, as required by statute, Plaintiffs have not pled that they moved from Arbor Court “as a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of such real property [i.e. Arbor Court] in whole or in part for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance.” Plaintiffs argued that under the applicable Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations, the Section 8(bb) subsidy transfer from Arbor Court to Cullen Park qualifies as “such other displacing activity.” However, this regulation merely defines the phrase “program or project.” It does not prescribe any “displacing activit[ies]” that cause one to become a “displaced person” under the URA. View "Jackson v. HUD" on Justia Law

In this case involving a dispute related to Texas liquor laws, the court previously certified the following two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas:1.) Does Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code Section 22.16(f) “continue[] to exempt a public corporation if that corporation sells some or all its shares to a non-exempt corporation, and, if so,2.) Whether the exempt corporation can acquire additional package store permits.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmatively answered both questions, resolving the appeal. Thus, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gabriel Invst v. Texas Alcoholic" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2021, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion in this case, upholding the district court's rejection of Plaintiff's challenge to an ATF rule determining that bump stocks are "machineguns" for purposes of the National Firearms Act (NFA) and the federal statutory bar on the possession or sale of new machine guns.However, after a majority of the eligible circuit judges voted in favor of hearing the case en banc, the court vacated its prior opinion so the entire court could hear the case. View "Cargill v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Texas Legislature limited beer-to-go sales to brewers and manufacturers that produced no more than 225,000 barrels annually “at all premises [they] wholly or partly owned.” Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. Sections 62.122(a) and 12.052(a).   The Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) ordered CANarchy to cease and desist after it determined that CANarchy’s facilities collectively exceeded the 225,000-barrel limit. CANarchy complied with the order but then filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 225,000- barrel threshold did not apply to barrels produced at leased premises. The district court agreed with CANarchy that “premises wholly or partly owned” do not include leased premises and granted it summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting Plaintiff’s motion for a declaratory judgment. The court held that “premises wholly or partly owned” do not include leased premises and granted it summary judgment.   The court wrote, “it is the Legislature’s prerogative to enact statutes; it is the judiciary’s responsibility to interpret those statutes according to the language the Legislature used, absent a context indicating a different meaning or the result of the plain meaning of the language yielding absurd or nonsensical results.” Here, the ordinary definition of “owned,” when applied to sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a) of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code, establishes that the 225,000-barrel production threshold set in those statutes encompasses only barrels produced at premises owned by the brewer, either in whole or in part, and not at premises leased by the brewer. View "CANarchy Craft Brewery v. Texas Alcoholic" on Justia Law