Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA” or “the Act”), Plaintiff appealed the district court’s entry of judgment, after a jury trial, in favor of Defendant Spring Independent School District (“Spring ISD”). Plaintiff asserted that the district court gave the jury improper instructions and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. He also contends that he is entitled to front pay and attorney’s fees in addition to compensatory damages because he was the “prevailing party.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the jury's instructions were not erroneous, and the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Plaintiff failed to properly raise his asserted errors in the district court and therefore did not preserve them for appeal, and, in any event, his arguments lack any basis in case law and are inconsistent with the text of USERRA. The court explained that Plaintiff acknowledged, as he must, that USERRA provides employers with an affirmative defense, yet contends, without supporting authority, that the court should disregard the statute here. But the text of USERRA clearly provides employers with a mixed-motive defense. There is no carve-out for constructive discharge claims. Thus, it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury on the defense, and it was proper for the jury to answer Questions 4 and 5. View "Garcia-Ascanio v. Spring Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment of his claims against Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana (“Safeco”) for violating Section 541 and Section 542 of the Texas Insurance Code.   The Fifth Circuit explained that in 2017, the Texas legislature amended Section 542, raising an important issue of Texas insurance law as to which there is no controlling Texas Supreme Court authority, and the authority from the intermediate state appellate courts provides insufficient guidance. Thus, the court certified the following question of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: In an action under Chapter 542A of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, does an insurer’s payment of the full appraisal award plus any possible statutory interest preclude recovery of attorney’s fees? View "Rodriguez v. Safeco" on Justia Law

The Treasury Department administers the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. The Fund supports financial institutions that serve low-income clients and communities. To be eligible for funding, a financial institution must apply for and receive certification. As part of its certification application, the institution must show that it serves either (1) an Investment Area or (2) a Targeted Population. OnPath Federal Credit Union submitted a certification application. Its application stated that OnPath did not serve an Investment Area but that it did serve a Targeted Population. The Inspector General of the Treasury Department subsequently started an audit of OnPath. Based on the Inspector General’s report, the Fund determined that “as a result of [OnPath] submitting invalid information in its . . . Certification Application, the . . . awards made to [OnPath] constitute improper payments.” OnPath brought an action to challenge the agency’s findings and its demand for repayment. The district court denied OnPath’s motion to supplement the administrative record. The district court then granted summary judgment to the agency, rejecting OnPath’s arbitrariness challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act. OnPath appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the agency here did not abuse its discretion by requiring repayment under these circumstances. The court explained that when n application for federal funding contains materially false information, it’s reasonable for the federal agency to want the money back. And that is so even if it turns out that the recipient might’ve been eligible to receive the funds on some other basis not presented in the application. View "OnPath Fed Crdt Un v. US Dept of Trea" on Justia Law

At issue in this case are three such Texas laws: Texas Election Code sections 61.003, 61.010, and 85.036 (collectively, the “electioneering laws”). Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that she was unconstitutionally censored under the electioneering laws when she voted in 2018 and that the statutes unconstitutionally “chilled” her right to free speech by criminalizing political expression within polling places. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, upheld section 61.010 as constitutional, but concluded that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Both sides appealed, contesting jurisdictional issues as well as the merits.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding denying Texas’s Secretary of State and Attorney General sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed those defendants for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed that Plaintiff has standing to bring her claims against the remaining two Defendants. The court also affirmed the district court’s holding that section 61.010 is constitutional. However, the court reversed and rendered the district court’s holding that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are unconstitutional and instead uphold all three electioneering laws. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of nominal damages. View "Ostrewich v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that government agents searched his cell phone at the border without a warrant on at least five occasions and that agents copied data from his cell phone at least once. Plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the respective heads of each entity in their official capacity (collectively, the government), challenging the searches, as well as ICE and CBP policies regarding border searches of electronic devices. In the district court, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction preventing the government from searching his cell phone at the border without a warrant. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial threat he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. The court reasoned that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the ICE and CBP policies authorize warrantless searches. Further, the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified complaint are evidence of a pattern of warrantless searches of Plaintiff’s cell phone. However, Plaintiff has no additional evidence to establish that he will be stopped by border agents in the future and that the agents will search his cell phone without a warrant. View "Anibowei v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Texas and Missouri filed suit seeking to compel DHS to employ the $2.75 billion Congress allocated “for the construction of [a] barrier system along the southwest border” before those funds expire. The district court dismissed Texas for “claim splitting,” held that Missouri did not have standing to sue, and denied the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The states appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to "expeditiously consider the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction." The court explained Texas should not have been dismissed for claim splitting because Texas’s Article III standing confers federal jurisdiction. In terms of causation, Texas needs only to have alleged facts showing the Federal Defendants’ conduct is a cause-in-fact of the injury that the State asserts. Here, Texas claimed that border barriers (i) reduce illegal entries in areas where constructed, and (ii) increase the rate at which illegal aliens are detected and apprehended.However, the court declined to order the states' requested remedy, instead remanding the case to the district court. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

The National Marine Fisheries Service promulgated a rule requiring shrimp trawlers 25 feet or longer operating in offshore waters from North Carolina to Texas to install turtle excluder devices (TEDs), subject to a few preconditions. In 2012, NMFS proposed a more restrictive rule requiring TEDs for skimmer trawlers. The Final Rule required TEDs on all skimmer trawlers over 40 feet, including those that operate inshore. Louisiana’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) sued NMFS under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the Final Rule as arbitrary and capricious. Louisiana moved for summary judgment, focusing on the merits of its claims. NMFS opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court granted NMFS’s motion, holding that Louisiana had not carried its summary judgment burden to establish standing.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the record and procedural history of the case, the district court did not err in concluding that Louisiana failed to establish that it has standing to challenge the NMFS’s, Final Rule. The court reasoned that while the Final Rule’s EIS noted that the rule would adversely affect the shrimping industry across the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana failed to provide evidence, particularly substantiating the rule’s impact on its shrimping industry or, ergo, “a sufficiently substantial segment of its population.” Nor does Louisiana’s invocation of the “special solicitude” afforded States in the standing analysis rescue this argument, or for that matter, the State’s other arguments. View "Louisiana State v. NOAA" on Justia Law

Governor Abbott filed suit on January 4, 2022. He alleged that the military vaccine mandate is arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). He also alleged that all but one of the Government’s planned enforcement measures violates the Constitution. For relief, Governor Abbott sought an order declaring the vaccination requirement and the challenged enforcement measures unlawful, Guardsmen. He also requested costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other relief the court deems proper. Governor Abbott then moved for an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants from enforcing the vaccine mandate against members of the Texas militia not in federal service. The district court denied the motion. The Governor appealed under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1).   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Governor Abbott’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Government conceded that its erstwhile vaccine mandate is unnecessary to military readiness by repealing it. The question, therefore, is whether the President can punish non-federalized Guardsmen in Texas who refused to get COVID injections before the President and Congress deemed such injections unnecessary. The court held that the Constitution’s text, history, and tradition foreclose the President’s efforts to impose such punishments. View "Abbott v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Defendant Huntington Ingalls (formerly “Avondale”) as a shipyard electrician from February 1969 to June 1977. In March 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Following his diagnosis, he filed a state-law tort suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, alleging that Avondale, among other defendants, caused Plaintiff to contract mesothelioma by exposing him to asbestos in a negligent manner. Because Plaintiff primarily worked on United States Navy ships when he was exposed, Avondale removed the case to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute. Plaintiff never claimed benefits under the LHWCA, which provides a no-fault compensation remedy to injured workers. Avondale moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the claims are preempted.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held express preemption does not apply. Despite the clear proclamation of exclusivity in the LHWCA’s text that prohibits any liability “at law or in admiralty” for injuries covered by the Act, there is no express preemption here. The court wrote that its conclusion that conflict preemption does not apply is supported by the existence of concurrent jurisdiction and the acceptable incongruity inherent therein, the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of arguments resisting that regime, the LHWCA’s role of supplementing rather than supplanting state law, the limited category of claims at issue here, and the similarity between these claims and those the Supreme Court has already permitted in Hahn. View "Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls" on Justia Law