Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two people were killed while unclogging a machine at Darling Ingredients, Inc., a chicken rendering plant. When the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) investigated, it found that the plant’s “lockout/tagout” procedures did not “clearly and specifically outline” how to safely work on the machine, so it cited the plant’s owner. Darling challenged the citations before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.  After the trial, the ALJ ruled in favor of OSHA, finding that (1) Darling did violate Section 147; (2) the violation was a repeat; (3) it was serious; and (4) Darling waived any “independent employee misconduct” defense. Darling appealed all of these decisions, save for the serious classification.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Darling’s argument is flawed for a couple of reasons. First, there are steps that a worker can take besides waiting around. Second, doing nothing is doing something; if waiting was the right thing to do, there is no reason that Darling’s procedure could not say that. The court concluded that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of noncompliance, namely that Darling failed to “clearly and specifically outline the . . . rules and technique to be utilized for the control of hazardous energy. The court concluded that the ALJ’s determination that Darling had knowledge of its Section 147 violations is supported by the law and substantial evidence. View "Darling Ingredients v. OSHC" on Justia Law

This ERISA case concerns the National Football League’s retirement plan, which provides disability pay to hobbled NFL veterans whose playing days are over but who are still living with debilitating, often degenerative injuries to brains and bodies, including neurotrauma. The claimant, former NFL running back Michael Cloud, suffered multiple concussions during his eight-year career, leaving him physically, neurologically, and psychologically debilitated. After the Social Security Administration found him entitled to disability benefits, Cloud went back to the NFL Plan and sought reclassification to a higher tier of benefits. Cloud was awarded a higher tier but not the highest tier. Cloud again filed a claim to be reclassified at the most generous level of disability pay. The NFL Plan denied reclassification on several grounds. Cloud sued the NFL Plan. The district court ordered a near doubling of Cloud’s annual disability benefits. The district court awarded top-level benefits under the Plan instead of remanding for another round at the administrative.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court wrote that it is compelled to hold that the district court erred in awarding top-level benefits to Cloud. Although the NFL Plan’s review board may well have denied Cloud a full and fair review, and although Cloud is probably entitled to the highest level of disability pay, he is not entitled to reclassification to that top tier because he cannot show changed circumstances between his 2014 claim for reclassification and his 2016 claim for reclassification—which was denied and which he did not appeal. View "Cloud v. NFL Player Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

On August 31, 2020, N&W Marine Towing (N&W) filed in federal district court a verified complaint in limitation, Case No. 2:20-cv-2390 (the Limitation Action), pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act) and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. The Limitation Act provides that once a shipowner brings a limitation action “all claims and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in question shall cease.” The district court issued a Stay Order. Wooley, Turn Services (Wooley’s employer), and Royal Caribbean Cruises (RCC) (the owner of the Majesty of the Seas) all filed claims against N&W in the Limitation Action. N&W and Wooley cross-appeal. Seeking to remain in federal court. On cross-appeal, Wooley contends that the outcome of the case was correct, but if this court were to determine that N&W was properly joined, then Wooley contends the district court erred in denying his motion to remand. The main issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing an improperly joined, nondiverse defendant when the only independent jurisdictional basis for removal was admiralty jurisdiction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, like in Flagg, the Louisiana state court here would have had no choice but to dismiss Wooley’s claims against N&W because of the district court’s Stay Order. The district court could have retained jurisdiction over claims against RCC had RCC remained in the case. However the federal court could not retain jurisdiction over claims against a nondiverse defendant (N&W) without some other basis for federal jurisdiction over those claims. View "Trey Wooley v. N&W Marine Towing" on Justia Law

Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center (LaFHAC) sued Azalea Garden Properties, LLC (Azalea Garden), alleging that Azalea Garden discriminated on the basis of race and disability at its apartment complex in Jefferson, Louisiana, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court dismissed LaFHAC’s disability claim but allowed its disparate impact race claim to proceed, subject to one caveat: The district court certified a permissive interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the “predictably will cause” standard for FHA disparate-impact claims remains viable after Inclusive Communities Project Inc. v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019).   The Fifth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dismiss LaFHAC’s claims without prejudice. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case. Along the same lines, the court wrote that it cannot consider the district court’s certified question. The court explained that LaFHAC has plausibly alleged a diversion of resources, as it shifted efforts away from planned projects like its annual conference toward counteracting Azalea Garden’s alleged discrimination. But “an organization does not automatically suffer a cognizable injury in fact by diverting resources in response to a defendant’s conduct.” The court wrote that LaFHAC failed to plead an injury because it failed to allege how its diversion of resources impaired its ability to achieve its mission. Thus, the court held that because LaFHAC has not alleged a cognizable injury, it lacks standing to bring the claims it alleges in this action. View "LA Fair Housing Action v. Azalea Garden" on Justia Law

Savion Hall, an inmate at Midland County Jail, suffered severe breathing issues that were known to prison officials. The jail contracted with Soluta, Inc., a private company, for medical services, but Soluta employees failed to provide standard medical care to Hall and fabricated his medical reports. Eventually, Hall required urgent medical attention, but when he asked Daniel Stickel, a prison guard, for help, Stickel followed set protocol: Hall was only supposed to receive “breathing treatments” every four hours; because less than four hours had elapsed since Hall’s last treatment, Stickel sent him back to his cell. Eventually, Hall was seen by a doctor, who called Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”). Hall died in the hospital. Plaintiffs, various relatives and representatives of Hall’s estate appealed the dismissal of his constitutional claims against Midland County and Stickel.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that municipalities such as Midland County cannot be held liable unless plaintiffs can show “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” The court explained that there are no allegations that anyone other than the Soluta employees was aware, or should have been aware, of the nurses’ failure to provide adequate medical care. The court reasoned that this implies that neither Soluta nor Midland County4 knew of the “policy” of failing to follow the proper medical procedures. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded deliberate indifference predicated on a delay in medical treatment. View "Robinson v. Midland County, Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a devout Rastafarian who vowed to “let the locks of the hair of his head grow,” a promise known as the Nazarite Vow. During his brief stint in prison, Plaintiff was primarily housed at two facilities, and each facility respected Plaintiff’s vow. With only three weeks left in his sentence—Plaintiff was transferred to RLCC. Plaintiff explained that he was a practicing Rastafarian and provided proof of past religious accommodations. And Plaintiff also handed the guard a copy of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections. The guard threw Plaintiff’s papers in the trash and summoned RLCC’s warden. When the Warden arrived, he demanded Plaintiff hand over documentation from his sentencing judge that corroborated his religious beliefs. Guards then carried him into another room, handcuffed him to a chair, held him down, and shaved his head. Plaintiff brought claims under RLUIPA and Section 1983. He also pleaded state law claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Louisiana constitution. The district court agreed with Defendants and held that those claims were moot. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that while Sossamon I RLUIPA’s text suggests a damages remedy, recognizing as much would run afoul of the Spending Clause. Tanzin doesn’t change that—it addresses a different law that was enacted under a separate Congressional power with “concerns not relevant to [RLUIPA].” Accordingly, the court held because Sossamon I remains the law, Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages against the defendant-officials in their individual capacities under RLUIPA. View "Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Verona Police Department twice arrested L.B. for his connection to violent shootings. Both times, however, he was released while his charges were pending. Just five months after his second arrest, L.B. drove to Annie Walton’s house and opened fire—killing Annie Walton and injuring her grandson, Aliven Walton. Annie Walton’s wrongful death beneficiaries (collectively, Plaintiffs ) believe the City of Verona and the Verona Chief of Police, J.B. Long, are responsible for the shooting at Annie Walton’s home, so they sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. At summary judgment, the district court initially dismissed all claims. But Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, and the district court reversed course—finding the City of Verona was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs and the City of Verona subsequently filed interlocutory appeals.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction and reversed the district court’s finding against the City regarding sovereign immunity. The court explained that Long had no special duty to protect Plaintiffs besides his general duty to keep the public safe as the City’s Chief of Police. The court explained that the only evidence that demonstrates Long had knowledge of any connection between L.B. and Plaintiffs comes from Long’s investigative file, where there is a copy of a trespassing complaint that Annie filed against L.B. in 2016. Accordingly, the court held Long did not owe a duty to protect Plaintiffs from L.B.’s drive-by shooting. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their negligence claims or their MTCA claims against the City. View "Walton v. City of Verona" on Justia Law

Louisiana oil and gas law authorizes the state Commissioner of Conservation to combine separate tracts of land and appoint a unit operator to extract the minerals. Plaintiffs own unleased mineral interests in Louisiana that are part of a forced drilling unit. BPX is the operator. Plaintiffs alleged on behalf of themselves and a named class that BPX has been improperly deducting post-production costs from their pro rata share of production and that this practice is improper per se. The district court granted BPX’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ per se claims, holding that the quasi-contractual doctrine of negotiorum gestio provides a mechanism for BPX to properly deduct postproduction costs. Plaintiffs filed this action as purported representatives of a named class of unleased mineral owners whose interests are situated within forced drilling units formed by the Louisiana Office of Conservation and operated by BPX. BPX removed this action to the district court based on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. BPX sought dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ primary claim. The district court granted BPX’s motion to dismiss. The district court certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).The Fifth Circuit wrote that no controlling Louisiana case resolves the parties’ issue. Accordingly, the court certified the following determinative question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court: 1) Does La. Civ. Code art. 2292 applies to unit operators selling production in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3)? View "Self v. B P X Operating" on Justia Law

Driftwood LNG and Driftwood Pipeline (jointly “Driftwood”) want to convert natural gas produced in the United States into liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) for export to international markets. That undertaking involves building an LNG production and export terminal and a pipeline that will connect to existing interstate pipeline systems; the terminal would be located on the Calcasieu River in Louisiana. Numerous federal and state agencies are involved in the approval and permitting process for projects such as Driftwood’s. One of those agencies— the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”)—granted Driftwood one of the requisite permits. Petitioners Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club petition for review of that permit, alleging that the Corps’s decision violated the governing statute and was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that the record reveals thorough analysis and cooperation by the Corps and other agencies and a lucid explanation of why the Corps was permitting a departure from the default hierarchy. The court wrote that the approval process spanned several years and involved detailed analysis by (and often the cooperation of) FERC, the Corps, the EPA, the National Marine Fisheries Services, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and LDEQ, among others. The administrative record is over 24,000 pages and provides more than enough insight into the agencies’ deliberations. Moreover, the court explained that both the Corps and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (which issued Driftwood a Coastal Use permit) imposed conditions on Driftwood to ensure that it did not dredge and use contaminated material. View "Healthy Gulf v. US Army Corps of Eng" on Justia Law

A group of Doctors sued the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services (together, the “Agencies”), claiming an FDA ad intended to deter people from off-label use of ivermectin to treat COVID-19. Each Doctor says that FDA’s messaging interfered with their own individual medical practice.The Doctors argue that FDA’s ad and similar public statements violated FDA’s enabling act (“Act”) and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court held that sovereign immunity protects the Agencies and the Officials, and it dismissed the suit. The Fifth Circuit reversed.The Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors can use the APA to bypass sovereign immunity and assert their ultra vires claims against the Agencies and the Officials. The ad was plausibly agency action, because it publicly announced the general principle that consumers should not use ivermectin to treat the coronavirus, and the Doctors fall within the Act’s zone of interests.The Doctors’ pure APA claim cannot go forward because the ad does not determine legal rights and thus lacks the finality. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors’ first theory was enough to allow this suit to proceed. View "Apter v. Dept of Health & Human Svc" on Justia Law