Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Texas abortion providers filed suit against the State seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of amendments to Texas's law regulating abortions. At issue is H.B. 2’s physician admitting privileges requirement as applied to a McAllen and an El Paso abortion facility, as well as H.B. 2’s requirement that abortion facilities satisfy the standards set for ambulatory surgical centers (ASC) facially and as applied to the McAllen and El Paso abortion facilities. In regards to the facial challenge to the admitting privileges requirement, the district court erred by granting unrequested relief. In doing so, the district court also ran afoul of the holding and mandate in Abbott II, and the principles of res judicata. In regards to the facial challenge of the ASC requirement and the ASC requirement in the context of medication abortions, res judicata bars these claims. On the merits, the ASC requirements are rationally related to a legitimate state interest and have not been shown to have an improper purpose or impose an undue burden.The court affirmed in part and modified in part the district court’s injunction of the admitting privileges and ASC requirements as applied to McAllen, as follows: (1) The State is enjoined from enforcing section 135.51 - .56 and 135.41 of the ASC regulations against the abortion facility in McAllen when that facility is used to provide abortions to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley, until such time as another licensed abortion facility becomes available to provide abortions at a location nearer to the Rio Grande Valley than San Antonio; (2) The State is enjoined from enforcing the admitting privileges requirement against Dr. Lynn when he provides abortions at the abortion facility located in McAllen to women residing in the Rio Grande Valley. The remainder of the injunction as to the McAllen facility is vacated. Because H.B. 2 does not place a substantial obstacle in the path of those women seeking an abortion in the El Paso area, the court held that the district court erred in sustaining plaintiffs’ as applied challenge in El Paso. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ equal-protection and unlawful-delegation claims. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey" on Justia Law

The Avakians purchased a house with a loan secured by a properly executed deed of trust. The property was their homestead, where they lived together. Citibank refinanced the loan. Unlike the original loan, the refinancing note only listed Norair as the debtor. Citibank required that the Avakians execute another deed of trust. Norair signed the Citibank deed of trust. The next day, Burnette signed an identical deed of trust. The deeds of trust did not mention each other, and did not refer to signature of counterpart documents. Citibank recorded them as separate instruments. The Avakians received a loan modification. Around the time of Norair’s death, Burnette received notice that Citibank was taking steps to foreclose. After Norair’s death, Burnette sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Burnette, finding that, because the two were living together when they signed the Citibank deeds of trust, the instruments were invalid. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under Mississippi law, a deed of trust on a homestead is void if it is not signed by both spouses, but the Mississippi Supreme Court would likely hold that a valid deed of trust is created when husband and wife contemporaneously sign separate, identical instruments. View "Avakian v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

By statute and constitutional provision, Mississippi prohibits same-sex couples from marrying and does not recognize those marriages entered into by same-sex couples which have been validly performed and are recognized elsewhere, Miss. Const. art XIV, 263A; Miss. Code. 93-1-1(2). In October 2014, two same sex couples and the Campaign for Southern Equality, a non-profit advocacy group, challenged the bans as violating the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Mississippi from enforcing the marriage bans, but stayed the effect of its own order for 14 days to permit the state to seek a further stay of the injunction pending an appeal. The Fifth Circuit granted Mississippi’s emergency motion to stay the injunction pending appeal, noting considerations of intra-circuit uniformity and the avoidance of confusion; that it will hear arguments on bans in Texas and Louisiana within one month; and that the Supreme Court granted a similar stay while the issue of Utah’s marriage ban was pending before the Tenth Circuit. View "Campaign for So. Equal. v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Berezowsky and Rendon, both Mexican nationals, met in Mexico in 2008. Berezowsky learned that she was pregnant and the couple became engaged. Their relationship deteriorated. Berezowsky moved to her parents’ home in Texas, and cut off communication with Rendon. Rendon made repeated attempts to gain information about his unborn child, but received no response. Berezowsky gave birth to P in 2009 in Texas. A month later, Rendon learned his child’s name, sex, and date of birth through a private investigator. At least 12 different courts in the U.S. and Mexico have been involved in the ensuing custody dispute. Both parties have obtained orders by default, which the other party has subsequently appealed. Both parties continued to escalate their efforts. In 2012, Berezowsky filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court held that P had been wrongfully removed from Mexico and ordered his immediate return. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss. Berezowsky failed to meet her burden of establishing that Mexico was P’s place of habitual residence.View "Berezowsky v. Ojeda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. 11607(b)(3), against defendant for the return of their child. The parties settled and plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys' fees and necessary expenses. The court found that the settlement order was sufficient to create a duty on the district court to order an award of necessary fees and expenses under section 11607(b)(3)'s fee-shifting provision. The court concluded that the district court functioned within its broad discretionary powers in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing and deferred to the district court's determination that $39,079.13 was a reasonable award for the necessary expenses incurred by plaintiff in obtaining the return of her child. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Salazar v. Maimon" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood filed suit against the State for declaratory judgment and to enjoin provisions of 2013 Texas House Bill No. 2 (H.B. 2). H.B. 2 pertains to the regulation of surgical abortions and abortion-inducing drugs. Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location where the abortion is provided; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of both provisions were unconstitutional and granted, in substantial part, the requested injunctive relief. A motions panel of this court granted a stay pending appeal, and the Supreme Court upheld the stay. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the physician-plaintiffs had standing on behalf of their patients, as well as standing to assert their own rights. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standards under rational basis review and erred in finding that the admitting-privileges requirement amounts to an undue burden for a large fraction of women that it affects. The court also concluded that the district court erred in holding that H.B. 2's rejection of the off-label protocol from fifty to sixty-three days LMP (last menstrual period) facially imposes an undue burden on the abortion rights of certain women. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for the State, except that the admitting privileges requirement may not be enforced against abortion providers who timely applied for admitting privileges under the statute but are awaiting a response from the hospital. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law

Three children who are natives of Mexico appealed the district court's finding under the Hague Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11, that they were being wrongfully retained in the United States and should be returned to their mother. While the appeal was pending, USCIS granted the children asylum. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the children, who are not parties, have standing to appeal where their well-being was at stake. On the merits, the court concluded that no jurisdictional defect arose from the fact that the director of child and family services was not the actual physical custodian of the children; the absence of ORR as a party was not a meaningful defect; and the Hague Convention was a proper mechanism for the recovery of the children. Accordingly, the district court did not lack jurisdiction to enter the order that the children be returned to their mother. Because the children's fundamental interests are at stake in the district court proceedings and no respondent is making an effort to represent those interests, the court remanded to the district court to appoint the children a guardian ad litem. The district court did not clearly err by failing to account for the mostly retrospective harm allegedly suffered by the children, or the conclusions of the psychologist, which were based on the children's belief that the same conditions would be present upon their return. Finally, the court concluded that an asylum grant did not remove from the district court authority to make controlling findings on the potential harm to the child. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Sanchez v. R.G.L." on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit seeking a permanent injunction against the enforcement of two amendments to the laws of Texas concerning abortions (H.B. 2). Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location where the abortion is provided; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of the legislation were unconstitutional and granted the requested injunctive relief. The State appealed and filed an emergency motion to stay the district court's permanent injunction. The court concluded that the State has made a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits in regards to the hospital-admitting privileges provision. There was a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail in its argument that Planned Parenthood failed to establish an undue burden on women seeking abortions or that the hospital-admitting-privileges requirement created a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The court also concluded that the State has made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, at least in part, as to its appeal of the injunction pertaining to medication abortions. Accordingly, the court stayed the injunction pertaining to medical abortions with certain exceptions. The State has made an adequate showing as to the other factors considered in determining a stay pending appeal. The court granted the motion for stay pending appeal. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chevron alleging that it terminated him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted summary judgment for Chevron. Under the mixed-motive framework, plaintiff was assumed to have established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation. At issue was the second step of the framework requiring that Chevron articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. The court concluded that Chevron failed to meet its burden and establish as a matter of law that it would have fired plaintiff despite its retaliatory motive where, inter alia, Chevron's evidence of plaintiff's history of attendance and performance-related deficiencies was insufficient to establish that it would have fired plaintiff. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her secondary employer, Keppel Amfels, alleging that it violated the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), by discouraging her primary employer, staffing agency Perma-Temp, from seeking her reinstatement after an FMLA-authorized maternity leave. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to create a fact issue that Keppel Amfels's actions went beyond what the relevant FMLA statutory regulatory provisions allowed, her claims failed regardless of whether intent was an element of her claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Keppel Amfels. View "Cuellar v. Keppel Amfels, L.L.C." on Justia Law