Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, on behalf of a putative class of students, sued Southern Methodist University (“SMU”) for refusing to refund tuition and fees after the university switched to remote instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit reversed that decision in light of King v. Baylor University, 46 F.4th 344 (5th Cir. 2022), which was issued after the district court’s ruling and which teaches that Hogan adequately pled a breach-of-contract claim. Alternatively, the district court held that Texas’s Pandemic Liability Protection Act (“PLPA”) retroactively bars Plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief and is not unconstitutionally retroactive under the Texas Constitution. That latter ruling raises a determinative-but-unsettled question of state constitutional law, which the court certified to the Texas Supreme Court: Does the application of the Pandemic Liability Protection Act to Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution? View "Hogan v. Southern Methodist Univ" on Justia Law

A disabled public school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies. Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student. The victim’s mother sued the school district under Title IX and various school officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. In her Section 1983 claim against the school officials, she alleged liability under the so-called “state-created danger” doctrine. The district court denied that motion and stayed proceedings on the Title IX claim pending this interlocutory appeal of the Section 1983 ruling.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. The court explained that the Circuit has never adopted a state-created danger exception to the sweeping “no duty to protect” rule. And a never-established right cannot be a clearly established one. As for whether to adopt the state-created danger theory of constitutional liability moving forward, the court was reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process for two reasons: (1) the Supreme Court’s recent forceful pronouncements signaling unease with implied rights not deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition; and (2) the absence of rigorous panel briefing that grapples painstakingly with how such a cause of action would work in terms of its practical contours and application, vital details on which the court’s sister circuits disagree. Rather than break new ground, the court ruled instead on a narrower ground, one that follows the court’s unbroken precedent. View "Fisher v. Moore" on Justia Law

Texas allows illegal aliens who satisfy residency requirements to pay that in-state, lower tuition. A Texas university student group of out-of-state students, the Young Conservatives of Texas Foundation (YCT), sued officials at the University of North Texas, arguing that Texas’ tuition scheme violated federal law. The district court agreed and barred the university from charging out-of-state tuition.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the injunction. The court reasoned that Section 1623(a), the statute expressly preempts state rules that grant illegal aliens benefits when U.S. citizens haven’t received the same. No matter what a state says, if a state did not make U.S. citizens eligible, illegal aliens cannot be eligible. Section 54.051(d)—the one and only section challenged here—does not grant those benefits. It does nothing more than set the tuition price for nonresident students, citizens or not. It takes no stance on whether illegal aliens are eligible for a cheaper price. Section 1623(a) has nothing to say about a rule like that. Therefore, Section 54.051(d) is not expressly preempted by Section 1623(a). The court ultimately held that because the district court awarded a permanent injunction by relying on its erroneous preemption analysis, it abused its discretion. View "Young Conservatives v. Smatresk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Austin Independent School District (“AISD”) on behalf of her minor son, A.H., alleging that AISD violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983by employing an individual assigned to help A.H. accommodate his disabilities, but who instead verbally harassed him and threw a trash can at him, hitting him and causing injury. After the incident, the parties settled all of A.H.’s Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) claims outside of court but agreed that Plaintiff still had the right to file a separate action containing A.H.’s claims arising under Section 504, the ADA, and Section 1983. Heston then brought these claims in a suit filed in 2018. The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (“IDEA”) administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded it to the district court for further consideration in light of Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023). Since Plaintiff appealed and the Parties’ briefed the case, the Supreme Court decided Luna Perez, concluding that the IDEA does not require administrative exhaustion “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for compensatory damages.” This constitutes a “modification in controlling legal principles . . . rendering a previous determination inconsistent with the prevailing doctrine.” View "Heston v. Austin Indep" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this pro se action in federal district court alleging, as relevant here, that the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) violated her children’s rights under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000ff, et seq. The district court dismissed the GINA claims because Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring those claims on her own behalf and because Plaintiff—who is not a licensed attorney—could not proceed pro se on behalf of her children. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in holding that she cannot represent her children in federal court.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the GINA claims and remanded. The court held that an absolute bar on pro se parent representation is inconsistent with Section 1654, which allows a pro se parent to proceed on behalf of her child in federal court when the child’s case is the parent’s “own.” 28 U.S.C. Section 1654. The court explained this condition would be met if federal or state law designated Plaintiff’s children’s cases as belonging to her. The court remanded because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider whether Plaintiff’s children’s claims under the GINA belong to Plaintiff within the meaning of Section 1654. View "Raskin v. Dallas Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of William Marsh Rice University d/b/a Rice University (hereinafter, “Rice” or “the University”) dismissing his claims under Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”) as well as his state law breach-of-contract claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim but reversed its summary judgment in favor of the University with respect to Plaintiff’s Title IX claims and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff has not alleged any breaches of the University’s Code or associated policies. Moreover, as the district court accurately observed in evaluating Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim, the Code expressly provides that “[t]he procedures used . . . by SJP are not those used in court cases and are not intended to create contractual rights[.]” In the absence of contractual rights and the University’s intent to be bound, the court held that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim. Moreover, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the University on the grounds that the record clearly indicates that material fact issues remain in dispute as to whether Plaintiff has successfully advanced a Title IX claim against the University. View "Doe v. William Marsh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges that when she was fourteen years old, she was brutally sexually assaulted by another student in a stairwell at Cypress Creek High School, following an abusive relationship with the same student. After suffering severe injuries and weathering subsequent harassment, Plaintiff says that instead of investigating her assault and providing her with academic or other appropriate support, Cypress Creek recommended that she drop out of school. After doing so—and never returning to any high school—Plaintiff sued the school district under Title IX, arguing that it was deliberately indifferent both to the risk of her sexual assault and in response to her abusive relationship, sexual assault, and subsequent related harassment and bullying on school property.   The district granted Cypress Creek’s motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that because the district court correctly concluded that the District was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s risk of sexual assault, the court affirmed that portion of the judgment.   However, the totality of the circumstances, including the District’s lack of investigation, awareness of the pre-assault abusive relationship, failure to prevent in-person and cyberattacks from the assailant and other students post-assault, and failure to provide any academic or other appropriate support to Plaintiff culminated in exactly what Title IX is designed to prevent—the tragedy of Plaintiff dropping out of school. A reasonable jury could find that the District violated Title IX based on these facts. Accordingly, the court reversed that portion of the judgment. View "Roe v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep" on Justia Law

Appellants, two police officers, arrested Plaintiff, a student, at a school basketball game. The district court denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding a dispute of material fact regarding the events surrounding Plaintiff's arrest. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s decision.The Fifth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The issues raised by Plaintiff create factual disputes that meet the required threshold to overcome Appellant's qualified immunity defense at this stage. View "Byrd v. Cornelius" on Justia Law

Two former students of Tulane University, on behalf of a putative class of current and former students, sued the University for failing to provide a partial refund of tuition and fees after Tulane switched from in-person instruction with access to on-campus services to online, off-campus instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court agreed with Tulane that the student's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the claim is not barred as a claim of educational malpractice because the Students do not challenge the quality of the education received but the product received. Second, the court rejected Tulane’s argument that the breach-of-contract claim is foreclosed by an express agreement between the parties because the agreement at issue plausibly does not govern refunds in this circumstance. And third, the court concluded that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Tulane breached an express contract promising in-person instruction and on-campus facilities because Plaintiffs fail to point to any explicit language evidencing that promise. But the court held that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged implied-in-fact promises for in-person instruction and on-campus facilities. Moreover, the court found that the Students’ alternative claim for unjust enrichment may proceed at this early stage. Finally, genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs saw and agreed to the A&DS preclude reliance on the agreement at this stage. Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim of conversion. View "Jones v. Admin of the Tulane Educ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a person of color and of mixed heritage, reported to school administrators that she was harassed by her peers on the basis of her race and national origin during her sixth-grade year in the Austin Independent School District. Plaintiff alleged that she was told to "go back where [she] came from" and that, in some cases, the harassment involved physical shoving. There were also incidents in which Plaintiff responded physically to verbal threats and name-calling, resulting in the school requesting she be transferred. Through her parents, Plaintiff sued the District for failure to address the harassment under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's 1983 claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the district on Plaintiff's Title VI claim.While the Fifth Circuit took issue with some of the district court's findings, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court ultimately reached the correct result. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's 1983 claim and the court's grant of summary judgment on the Title VI claim. View "Menzia v. Austin Indep School Dist" on Justia Law