Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on allegations that defendants illegally extradited him from Pennsylvania to Louisiana and impermissibly extended his state sentence by thirty years. Plaintiff's claims arose from a records clerk's reversion of his release date to the 2052 date, rather than the 2023 date, on the grounds that he had stopped serving his state sentence when he escaped from prison and that his state and federal sentences were intended to run consecutively.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's sentence-based claims, but reversed and remanded with respect to the extradition-based claims. The court held that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not present a jurisdictional hurdle that would require a remand of this case to state court. The court explained that Heck implicates a plaintiff's ability to state a claim, not whether the court has jurisdiction over that claim. As to plaintiff's claim regarding his sentence enhancement, the court concluded that a claim for speedier release is actionable by writ of habeas corpus, and a section 1983 damages action predicated on the sentence calculation issue is barred by Heck because success on that claim would necessarily invalidate the duration of his incarceration. The court also concluded that the district court never analyzed whether plaintiff's extradition-based claims were barred by Heck, and the district court should have considered whether his extradition-based claims survived Heck in the first instance. Furthermore, the district court should consider the qualified immunity, absolute immunity, and limitations ruling issues on remand. The court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colvin v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion on April 21, 2021 and substituted the following opinion.After petitioner was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death, on federal habeas corpus review, the district court granted him relief. The Fifth Circuit court then affirmed the grant of relief, petitioner was retried, and petitioner was resentenced to death. Petitioner again sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, but the district court denied relief on all claims.The Fifth Circuit denied petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on the issue of whether the admission of testimony from a defense expert was fruit of the poisonous tree where petitioner has not identified any clearly established Supreme Court precedent extending Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), to his incriminating statements to his own expert; whether the State's peremptory strike of a black juror violated petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), where the prosecutor gave six reasons for striking the juror and petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the determination as objectively unreasonable; whether the State suppressed evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), where he failed to establish cause for defaulting his Brady claim; and (4) whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and habeas counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), where he failed to prove either the deficiency prong and/or prejudice prong of Strickland and thus could not overcome the procedural bar. View "Guidry v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of murder. Petitioner asserts that the State used race-based peremptory strikes during jury selection in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The court concluded that the state appellate court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in deciding petitioner's Batson claim by considering the jury panelists' voir dire answers among all the circumstances in deciding whether a prima facie case under Batson was shown. In this case, petitioner identifies no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing that holistic consideration may not include the remarks of panelists on whom a peremptory strike was exercised. Nor does petitioner identify any evidence in the state court proceedings showing an unreasonable determination of fact by the state courts.Moreover, circuit precedent holds that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under the Batson framework is a factual finding entitled to the section 2254(e)(1) presumption of correctness. The court concluded that the district court correctly stated the law in that regard. However, that presumption is not dispositive here because petitioner's habeas claim independently fails both under section 2254(d) and on de novo review. Finally, regardless of section 2254(d) and (e), petitioner must establish entitlement to habeas relief on the merits by showing, as relevant here, a violation of the constitutional right defined in Batson. In this case, petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case, and thus his claim for federal relief is foreclosed. View "Seals v. Vannoy" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas petition on the merits and concluded that petitioner failed to obtain permission from a three-judge panel of this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3). Because petitioner never sought or obtained that permission, the district court had no jurisdiction to accept the second-or-successive petition—much less to consider the merits of it. Furthermore, the district court erred by deciding the petition on the merits. Even if the court previously authorized a successive application under section 2244(b), petitioner still could not appeal the district court's merits determination without a certificate of appealability (COA). In this case, petitioner is not entitled to a COA. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction and denied the COA application as moot. View "Davis v. Sumlin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief to petitioner who was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child—his 7 year old daughter—and sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment. Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to investigate and challenge a juror who demonstrated impartiality during voir dire. The court concluded that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was not unreasonable in concluding that the juror was not biased and counsel's performance was not deficient. Furthermore, even if the juror were biased, the state court did not unreasonably conclude that her presence on the jury did not change the outcome of the trial where the evidence of petitioner's guilt is overwhelming. View "Canfield v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering plainly constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(D). Section 1101(a)(43)(D) defines "aggravated felony" to include those offenses that are "described in section 1956 of Title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) . . . if the amount of funds exceeded $10,000." The court concluded that this provision applies here because petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), and the funds involved well exceeded $10,000. The court need not decide petitioner's contention that section 1101(a)(43)(U) requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court found petitioner's remaining contentions were either meritless or unexhausted. Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part his petition for review. View "Maniar v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ramirez was the target of a drug trafficking investigation, and wiretaps were placed on his phones, providing access to voice and text conversations. Torres was a member of the Latin Kings, and purportedly a methamphetamine supplier for Ramirez. Torres and nine co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) and 846.During the first and second days of Torres's trial, the government presented the testimonies of multiple witnesses. On the second day, the last government witness finished at 7:09 P.M. Defense counsel informed the court that Torres intended to testify, expressing that it would take “several hours” to complete direct examination. Torres took the stand at 7:13 P.M. After approximately 50 minutes of direct examination, the judge declared an overnight recess and dismissed the jury. The court instructed Torres: You are to talk to no one about your testimony. The judge told defense counsel: You may not speak to him. Now that he’s started his testimony, you may not consult with him anymore.Convicted, Torres was given a within-Guidelines sentence of 240 months of imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Torres’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was barred from speaking with his attorney during an overnight recess. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied the motions for authorization to file a successive federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244 and for a stay of execution. Movant was convicted of capital murder for killing his aunt and sentenced to death. The court concluded that, even if movant establishes a prima facie showing under section 2244(b)(2), he fails to demonstrate that either claim is within the one-year period of limitations provided in section 2244(d). Furthermore, while the one-year time limitation may be equitably tolled, movant makes no argument that equitable tolling is warranted here. The court also concluded that, because the necessary factual predicate for movant's false and misleading testimony claim could have been discovered through due diligence more than a year ago, this claim is also untimely. View "In Re: Jones" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part Defendants McClaren, Keelen, Fortia, Scott, and Allen's convictions for numerous crimes related to their participation in a New Orleans street gang. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever McClaren and Scott's trials; the district court did not clearly err in its Batson determinations; challenges to co-conspirator testimony rejected; Allen, Fortia, and Keelen's convictions for RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) affirmed; Fortia, Keelen, and Allen's VICAR convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(3) affirmed; Fortia, Keelen, McClaren, and Scott's convictions for engaging in a drug-trafficking conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. 846 affirmed; and the victim's murder was sufficient to demonstrate Fortia's ratification of the drug and RICO conspiracies.The court affirmed Keelen, McClaren, and Scott's sentence under 21 U.S.C. 846, but vacated Fortia's conviction and remanded for resentencing; reversed Keelen's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(j); affirmed McClaren and Scott's convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(o); concluded that defendants are not entitled to a new trial because of the admission and use of the plea agreement documents; affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for a new trial; and affirmed Scott and McClaren's sentences. View "United States v. McClaren" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and upheld the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm discovered during a stop and frisk. The court concluded that reasonable suspicion supported the stop and frisk where defendant was encountered in a high-crime area, and in light of defendant's connection to the stolen vehicle and his interaction with others in and around the vehicle. In this case, the officers were reasonable in suspecting that at least some of the people around and inside the vehicle had been involved in the aggravated robbery. Furthermore, the officers' need to proceed cautiously was obvious in light of them being outnumbered and unable to secure all six people because they had only four sets of handcuffs.The court also concluded that defendant's detention did not exceed the permissible scope of the investigatory stop where the officers' actions were reasonable under the circumstances and the stop was not converted into an arrest prior to defendant being frisked. Finally, the court concluded that the police department's local policy does not affect the constitutionality of the officers' conduct. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law