Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 2016 motion for post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The court concluded that defendant failed to brief claims concerning the effectiveness of his trial counsel and has therefore abandoned those claims. In regard to defendant's claim that trial counsel failed to advise him before he entered into the plea agreement that he could be subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA, defendant did not present this claim to the district court, and he neither sought nor obtained a certificate of appealability on the issue.In regard to defendant's sentencing, he contends that the collateral-review waiver does not bar his challenge to his sentence because he reserved his right to appeal a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. The government counters that waiver only reserved the right to appeal, not collaterally attack, a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. The court concluded that resolution of the waiver issue would be more difficult than resolving whether defendant's state convictions were serious drug offenses. Applying this alternative course, the court concluded that defendant's convictions under La. R.S. 40:966(A) for possession with intent to distribute are serious drug offenses for the purpose of sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Barlow" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's 240-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The court concluded that each of defendant's arguments that the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines fails because any supposed error was harmless. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court did in fact consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and defendant's contentions to the contrary lack merit. View "United States v. Rebulloza" on Justia Law

Kapordelis notified the prison medical unit that he broke his CPAP mask. After Kapordelis twice refused to leave the medical unit, an incident report was filed, including charges for destroying, altering, or damaging government property in excess of $100, 28 C.F.R. 541.3(b). Kapordelis contended that he did not deliberately break the mask. The prison's physician and a CPAP representative indicated that the mask was unlikely to break accidentally. The Discipline Hearing Officer sustained the charge and sanctioned Kapordelis with a loss of 27 days of good conduct time. Kapordelis administratively appealed, claiming that the broken part was the plastic “flexible spacebar,” which is “designed to bend when the mask is removed” and that replacing the spacebar “would likely cost less than $20.” Kapordelis’s administrative appeal was denied.Kapordelis filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241, asserting that his due process rights were violated because no evidence was presented that he intentionally destroyed his CPAP mask. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Kapordelis’s admission that the mask broke in his possession, coupled with the statements from the CPAP representative and the doctor, were sufficient to support the disciplinary conviction under the “some evidence” standard and there was “some evidence” to support the finding that Kapordelis caused damage in excess of $100. View "Kapordelis v. Myers" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Fifth Circuit reversed Davis’s convictions for health care fraud and conspiracy to commit health care fraud because the convictions were based on insufficient evidence. Davis had been incarcerated for approximately one year before the reversal. Davis sought a certificate of innocence arguing that she fulfilled the requirements in 28 U.S.C. 2513 (Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Statute) and, in the alternative, that the statute is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Nelson v. Colorado.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Davis’s motion. Under the Statute, Davis had to prove that she “did not commit any of the acts charged” and that she “did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about [her] own prosecution.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Davis did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she “did not commit any of the acts charged.” The 2018 decision “went no further than concluding that the government did not implicate Davis in the scheme with proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Nelson is inapplicable because it did not involve a request for compensation. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Contreras-Rojas appealed the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of illegal reentry, arguing that the enhancement of his sentence under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1) is unconstitutional because the fact of a prior conviction was neither found by a jury nor alleged in the indictment.The Fifth Circuit granted summary affirmance. The Supreme Court’s 1998 “Almendarez-Torres” decision held that a prior conviction is not a fact that must be alleged in an indictment or found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury for purposes of a statutory sentencing enhancement. The Fifth Circuit reiterated that “[i]n the future, barring new developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence, arguments seeking reconsideration of Almendarez-Torres will be viewed with skepticism.” View "United States v. Contreras-Rojas" on Justia Law

Officers executing a search warrant at Wood’s residence found Sincleair, Wood, Ilczyszyn, and Markezinis, and Blackman sitting on a couch smoking methamphetamine. The officers discovered less than two ounces of methamphetamine in Wood’s residence; they found a firearm on a table near the couch but did not determine who owned it.Sincleair pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, without a plea agreement. The PSR held Sincleair accountable for conspiring with Kuhn and Wilbur to possess with intent to distribute 26,166.3 kilograms of methamphetamine and GHB. He was not held accountable for the methamphetamine seized from Wood’s residence because it could have been “double counting" what he received from Kuhn. The PSR recommended a two-level firearm possession enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1). Sincleair objected, arguing that his presence at Wood’s house was not related to the drug conspiracy to which he pleaded guilty--he was at Wood’s home to engage in drug use, not drug trafficking. The firearm was confirmed to be owned by and registered to Wood. A PSR addendum explained that the enhancement was appropriate because Sincleair was Ilczyszyn’s source of supply and was present for the drug transaction between Ilczyszyn and Wood.The district court adopted the PSR and sentenced Sincleair to 210 months' imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit vacated. If, on remand, the district court applies the firearm enhancement, “it should make the appropriate findings and state plainly the basis for its decision.” View "United States v. Sincleair" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing a firearm after a felony conviction. The court concluded that defendant's Texas robbery conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2(a)(2), and the district court properly applied USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The court explained that defendant misconstrues the fourth footnote in United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, which the court previously explained in an unpublished opinion which simply recognizes that the generic definition of robbery did not require a particular mens rea. Furthermore, defendant's reading of this footnote is at odds with the opinion's conclusion that Texas robbery and generic robbery substantially correspond. View "United States v. Adair" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress drugs found in a package he mailed via the United States Postal Service from Houston, Texas, to Hammond, Louisiana. Defendant argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and an unlawful seizure occurred, when the package was rerouted back to Houston, which took five days, before law enforcement took further investigative steps to confirm their suspicion. However, the court agreed with the district court that the U.S. Marshal's choice to reroute the package back to Houston was reasonable and prudent under the facts of this case. The court also agreed that the five days the package was in transit from Hammond back to Houston, as well as the two days it took to obtain the warrant after the package returned to Houston, were not unreasonably long under the circumstances. In this case, the package had extensive connections to Houston and the U.S. Marshal requested that the package be rerouted to Houston because he believed that there was no difference in the time it would take to obtain a warrant in Houston versus Hammond. View "United States v. Beard" on Justia Law

Martinez pleaded guilty to drug and gun crimes. He filed a notice of appeal. His attorney later filed an “Anders” motion to withdraw. Martinez did not object to his attorney’s view that an appeal would be frivolous.The Fifth Circuit addressed whether a conflict existed between “the oral pronouncement of the conditions of supervised release at sentencing and the written judgment setting forth those conditions” before dismissing the appeal. Martinez’s PSR recommended the “mandatory and standard conditions of supervision” plus a search condition. The district court confirmed that Martinez had reviewed the PSR and did not object, then announced that it was adopting the PSR. The subsequent written judgment included the 17 standard conditions listed in the Western District of Texas’s Order on Conditions of Probation and Supervised Release. The only conceivable pronouncement problem is that the district court did not cite the standing order when it orally imposed the “standard conditions.” That does not provide a basis for appeal. There is no notice problem. The PSR notified Martinez that “standard conditions” would likely be imposed. Given the longstanding existence of the standing order, defense counsel certainly knew that the standard conditions being imposed were listed in the standing order and included in the judgment form created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Gardner was indicted for possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. He retained counsel (Bailey) and pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. Three months later, Gardner’s initial PSR was filed. On the day of sentencing, Bailey orally moved for and obtained a continuance to file objections to the PSR. Days later, Gardner, pro se, moved to appoint new counsel, saying that Bailey previously told him that objections to the PSR had already been filed and that Bailey gave him inconsistent information as to the availability of audio or video footage of the search that led to his arrest. The court granted Bailey’s subsequent motion to withdraw and appointed new counsel, Bullajian, and subsequently granted Bullajian four continuances.Gardner then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging ineffectiveness by former counsel Bailey, who told him “that a motion to suppress would be filed after the entering of the plea.” The district court denied the motion to withdraw the plea without an evidentiary hearing, sentencing Gardner to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit vacated. Gardner alleged sufficient facts to require a hearing upon the motion to withdraw, and if granted, his motion to suppress. View "United States v. Gardner" on Justia Law