Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The probation officer determined that Defendant was a career offender under Section 4B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines because the instant offense, as well as Defendant’s prior convictions for possession with intent to distribute amphetamine and conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, qualified as controlled substance offenses. The district court overruled Defendant’s objection to the career-offender enhancement and sentenced him to 188 months of imprisonment.   Defendant argued that the district court erred in treating his instant and prior conspiracy convictions as controlled substance offenses. He asserted that even if Lightbourn was previously binding for the proposition that Section 4B1.2’s inchoate-offense commentary is subject to deference, that is no longer the case because Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), fundamentally altered the deference afforded to the Guidelines commentary under Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that it cannot say Kisor unequivocally overruled the court’s precedent holding that Section 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement includes inchoate offenses like conspiracy. The court reasoned that mere “hint” from the Court as to how it might rule in the future is not enough to circumvent the rule of orderliness and disregard circuit precedent. View "USA v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Four Defendants were involved in an armored car robbery at a bank automated teller machine. Defendants were each convicted of aiding and abetting robbery, attempted robbery, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing the death of a person. Defendants each raised multiple issues challenging their convictions and sentences and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendants failed to show that any potential error affected their substantial rights.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in shackling Defendant. The court reasoned that even taking as true Defendant’s assertion that the jury saw his shackles when he was removed from the courtroom, this was a brief and inadvertent exposure. Therefore, Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. He does not present any evidence showing that he was actually prejudiced.Next, the district court did not abuse its discretion in temporarily removing Defendant from the courtroom following his outburst. The court explicitly warned Defendant more than once to cease his disruptive conduct lest he be removed.Moreover, the court found that one of the Defendant’s outbursts falls short of the rare circumstances in which a codefendant’s disruption results in incurable prejudice such that a mistrial is required. Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the co-defendant’s motion to sever because the charges against the co-defendant do not differ dramatically from those against his codefendants. View "USA v. Hill, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5)(A), which makes it unlawful for aliens illegally in the country to possess firearms. But he insisted the district court erred at sentencing by applying Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which imposes an elevated base offense level if the offense involved a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine.” Defendant further contended that the United States failed to prove that (1) the firearm and magazine were compatible, and (2) the firearm could fire multiple rounds without reloading.The Fifth Circuit vacated the District Court’s ruling and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that the “compatibility” requirement comes straight from the text of the Guidelines: a firearm must be capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. Here, the United States introduced zero evidence (let alone a preponderance) proving that the large-capacity magazine was compatible with Defendant’s firearm. Next, the court rejected the district court’s invitation to rely on proximity as a cure-all. The court reasoned that though it is true the Guidelines’ commentary states that an elevated base offense level comes into play under Section 2K2.1 when a large-capacity magazine is either “attached” or “in close proximity” to a qualifying firearm, both derive from the Guidelines’ unambiguous requirement that the firearm be capable of accepting the magazine. View "USA v. Luna-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully re-entering the United States following removal. The district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court miscalculated his advisory Guidelines range by deferring to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ commentary rather than applying the Guidelines themselves.   Defendant argued that (A) after Kisor, courts should not defer to the Guidelines’ commentary unless the Guidelines themselves are ambiguous. He then argued that (B) Application Note 3 to Section 2L1.2 conflicts with the unambiguous Guidelines by requiring courts to “double-count” certain prior convictions when calculating the guidelines range. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Defendant’s conviction for illegal reentry. The court held that the district court properly calculated Defendant’s guidelines range, and his double-counting objection lacks merit.   The court reasoned that Application Note 3 to Section 2L1.2 is not in tension with the Guidelines. Rather, application Note 3 merely describes what the Guidelines’ text and structure would unambiguously require even in its absence. Further, Defendant cites no precedent supporting his argument that “double-counting” is per se incompatible with the Guidelines and the Guidelines’ text and structure do not support Defendant’s argument. View "USA v. Cordova-Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The indictment also alleged Defendant had suffered a prior serious violent felony conviction based on a prior Texas conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for which Defendant served more than 12 months in prison. Based on Defendant's prior conviction, the district court determined that his statutory sentencing range was ten years to life in prison. Defendant appealed the application of the recidivist enhancement.The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence, finding that the district court plainly erred. Under Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), an offense requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act if it criminalizes reckless conduct. The Texas aggravated assault statute at issue, Texas Penal Code Sec. 22.02(a)(1) and (2), allows for a defendant to be convicted based on reckless conduct.The court also found that the error affected Defendant's substantial rights because there was a reasonable probability that, but for the district court’s error, Defendant would have received a lesser sentence. View "USA v. Stoglin" on Justia Law

Defendant was the passenger of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. During the stop, the officer became suspicious, removed the men from the car, and found a firearm in a jacket on the rear floorboard of the vehicle. Initially, Defendant was charged in state court, but when it was later discovered he was an illegal alien, he was charged with a federal firearms offense.The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress the finding that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. Defendant subsequently pled guilty.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress a firearm, albeit on substantive grounds. The court noted that the standing question was a difficult one, that it decided to leave for another day to address. However, because the search was a valid protective sweep, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. View "USA v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant was a high-ranking member of the Juarez Cartel between 2000 and 2011. He was charged and convicted of three narcotics offenses, and given three life sentences. He appealed his convictions and sentences on various grounds.The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. The district court's empaneling of an anonymous jury was justified based on concerns over juror safety. Reviewing for plain error, the court also rejected Defendant's claims pertaining to the admission of extraneous evidence. prosecutorial misconduct. The court held that the record was insufficient to address Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and that his sentences were neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. View "USA v. Castillo-Rubio" on Justia Law

Officers of the Prentiss Police Department arrested Plaintiff for aggravated assault after he and others told the officers that Plaintiff had shot the victim. Plaintiff sued the officers and the City of Prentiss under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for arresting him without probable cause. He argued that the officers lacked probable cause because he told them that he shot the victim in self-defense. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims and awarded fees to the defendants.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued, first, that the Officer and Chief arrested him without probable cause and that they are not entitled to qualified immunity. Second, the Chief intentionally or recklessly omitted material statements in the warrant affidavit, resulting in a warrant lacking probable cause. Third, the City of Prentiss is liable under Monell. Fourth, he established a material fact issue on his state-law malicious-prosecution claim. Finally, Defendants are not entitled to attorneys’ fees.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment order and award of fees to Defendants. The court reasoned it is not enough to invoke the general principle that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless arrest without probable cause. Therefore, the Officer and Chief would be entitled to qualified immunity even if they lacked probable cause for the initial warrantless arrest. Further, the court concluded that Plaintiff cannot show want of probable cause therefore, his malicious-prosecution claim cannot succeed. Finally, Plainitff has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in granting attorneys’ fees. View "Loftin v. City of Prentiss, MS" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to possess methamphetamine after DEA agents executed a search warrant at his motel room, recovering more than 150 grams of methamphetamine. The indictment alleged two prior convictions to trigger a sentencing enhancement, one related to operating a methamphetamine lab and the other for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute.At trial, the government provided a detailed account of the Defendant's actions that led the DEA to obtain a search warrant, which was a controlled buy to a confidential informant. However, the officer witness who provided this testimony was not present and was merely recounting another officer's observations. Defendant was convicted.The Fifth Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction on Confrontation grounds. If the government intends to present out-of-court statements in an attempt to provide context for its investigation, use of the evidence must be “circumspect” and “limited.” Here, the witness's testimony was not limited or circumspect and provided prejudicial details that deprived him of his right to confront the witnesses against him. View "USA v. Hamann" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Petitioner initiated a postconviction proceeding in federal district court. The district court rejected all of Petitioner’s claims of trial error. Petitioner then sought a certificate of appealability.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied Petitioner’s habeas relief. The court held that while certain conduct by the prosecutor during the trial violated the Due Process Clause, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the violation. The court analyzed Petitioner’s collateral attack on his state criminal conviction under the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Here, at the outset of custodial interrogation following his arrest, the Ranger gave Petitioner the statutorily required warning that he “ha[d] the right to terminate the interview at any time.” Petitioner immediately invoked this right. The prosecutor subsequently relied on that invocation at trial as evidence of Petitioner’s sanity. The State pointed out that, although Miranda established a right to terminate custodial questioning, this was not one of the rights of which the Court held that suspects must be apprised before questioning begins.   The court concluded that the prosecutor violated the Due Process Clause when he used Petitioner’s invocation of his right to terminate custodial interrogation as evidence of sanity. However, the court further held that the fact that Petitioner’s due-process rights were violated does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to habeas relief. Here, he failed to demonstrate prejudice or that the constitutional violation had a substantial effect on the verdict. View "Engle v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law