Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A grand jury charged Defendant and co-Defendant with three offenses: conspiracy to deal methamphetamine; possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine; and conspiracy to deal marijuana. Defendant filed a motion seeking an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court granted the second request, however, the order did not divulge the grounds for the new trial. The government had timely appealed the new trial grant. A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the order granting a new trial, reinstated as to Count Two and the jury’s verdict on that count (possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine). The court further remanded for sentencing on that conviction. The court explained this is not one of the “exceptional cases” in which a judge had the discretion to vacate the jury’s verdict by ordering a new trial. Far from being a case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the verdict, the great weight of the evidence supports this one. The court wrote, that the district court set aside the verdict because, in its view, little evidence showed that Defendant knowingly possessed an illegal substance. But a trinity of evidence supported the knowledge element. The court explained that it is true that the “district judge, unlike us, was there throughout the trial.” But because the jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of evidence, it was an abuse of discretion to erase it. View "USA v. Crittenden" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally possessing an unregistered firearm, specifically a “destructive device,” under the National Firearms Act (“NFA”). Appealing his conviction, Defendant argues that the NFA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case and that the evidence is insufficient to support conviction.   The determinative issue on appeal was whether an explosive-containing device falls within the NFA when it is susceptible of both innocent and destructive uses and not clearly designed as a weapon. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction. The court explained that in this case, the government’s only evidence challenging Defendant’s testimony that his bamboo stick device was used to scare beavers and destroy their dams (and wasn’t very good even at that) was the conclusion testimony of an ATF expert. Thus, the court wrote, in light of the government’s wholly conclusory case that the bamboo device was designed as a weapon or that it had no benign or social value, the conviction cannot stand. The evidence was insufficient to prove that the bamboo stick was an illegal explosive device “designed” as a weapon. View "USA v. Harbarger" on Justia Law

In exchange for Defendant’s guilty plea on the superseding indictment’s principal drug-dealing charge (“Count 1”), the Government dismissed all other charges. The parties stipulated to a recommended prison sentence of 240 months. The district court followed the parties’ sentencing recommendation and dismissed all remaining counts in the superseding indictment “on the motion of the United States. Some months later, the Government discovered the procedural snag at the heart of this case: the superseding indictment to which Defendant pleaded guilty had been returned by a grand jury whose term had expired. At a plea hearing in which Defendant indicated satisfaction with his trial counsel’s performance and familiarity with the “grand jury mess-up[]” that had occurred in his initial case, Defendant pleaded guilty in accordance with the new plea agreement. The district court then imposed the 144-month sentence the parties agreed to and noted for the record the key terms of the provision quoted above.   Without conducting a hearing, the district court accepted a magistrate’s recommendation that Defendant’s Section 2255 motion be denied. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the expired grand jury’s untimely superseding indictment in Defendant’s first criminal case was null and void when jeopardy would have otherwise attached at Defendant’s jury trial and, accordingly, could not have placed Defendant in actual legal jeopardy within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because the failure of Defendant’s trial counsel to advise Defendant of a meritless double jeopardy argument was neither deficient nor prejudicial, the district court was correct to deny Defendant’s habeas corpus petition. View "USA v. Slape" on Justia Law

Defendant the owner of a home health agency was convicted of Medicare fraud. On appeal, she complained that her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated. Turns out, Defendant’s pretrial counsel was also representing one of the Government’s star witnesses. The Fifth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Defendant’s lawyer’s conflict of interest—a conflict the Government knew about— adversely affected his representation, and the district court answered: yes.The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that as the Government admits, it never offered Defendant a plea deal while she was represented by her conflicted pretrial counsel, or after. So there is no rejected plea deal to measure Defendant’s harm against. The court explained the constitutional right to counsel is “perhaps the central feature of our adversarial system,” as it “helps make real the Constitution’s other criminal procedure promises. The court wrote that the Government’s proposed remedy— to keep the convictions intact but remand for new plea negotiations— wouldn’t neutralize the taint of the constitutional violation. View "USA v. Sheperd" on Justia Law

The jury convicted Petitioner and sentenced him to death. After a decade of federal proceedings, including extensive discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and granted him a new trial.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling granting Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and denied him a new trial. The court explained Petitioner “possessed, or by reasonable means could have obtained, a sufficient basis to allege [the ring-of-informants Brady] claim[s] in the first petition and pursue the matter through the [state] habeas process.”. Contrary to the district court’s view, Petitioner did not rebut the state court’s findings on this point at all, much less by clear and convincing evidence as required by the federal habeas statute. See 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(e)(1). Petitioner, therefore, has not shown cause to excuse the default of these claims. And because he has not shown cause, the court wrote, it need not consider prejudice. View "Prible v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Following a state trial court’s Judgment of Conviction based on guilty pleas and a much later Order of Sentence (collectively the judgment), Petitioner, under state law, could not take a direct appeal to a state court. Nor did he seek direct review by the Supreme Court of the United States.   He contends the judgment did not become final until the 90-day period expired because Mississippi law prohibited his seeking direct state-court review of his guilty-plea convictions and sentence and, therefore, he instead could have pursued direct review by the Supreme Court of the United States (finality issue).   The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on this finality issue, Petitioner did not assert in district court, or in his pro se motion to our court for the COA, that the judgment became final only upon the 90-day period’s expiration. The threshold question before the Fifth Circuit considering this finality issue is whether Petitioner preserved it.   The court held Petitioner’s judgment became final upon the 90-day period’s expiration; and, therefore, his petition was filed timely. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider Petitioner’s alternative equitable tolling issue, including whether to expand the COA.   In regards to whether Petitioner’s habeas petition was timely. The court explained that the first three steps of plain-error review are satisfied, thus the district court’s error requires reversal because it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. View "Wallace v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and his state habeas petition was also unsuccessful. Through state habeas counsel, Petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3599(a)(2), to assist him in preparing a petition for federal habeas relief. Petitioner identified specific attorneys he wanted to represent him. The district court granted Petitioner's motion for counsel, but appointed an attorney other than those requested by Petitioner. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion under Sec. 3599(a)(2), seeking to substitute his court-appoitned counsel. The district court rejected Petitioner's request, holding he had not offered a sufficient basis for substituting counsel because the court-appointed conflict-free counsel was competent to handle death-penalty matters. Petitioner appealed the court's interlocutory order.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The court noted that it routinely reviews challenges to the denial of a motion to substitute counsel on appeal from a final judgment. Thus, the judgment petitioner challenged did not trigger the court's jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. View "Tracy v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

In this sentencing appeal following a child pornography conviction, Appellant asked the Fifth Circuit to disturb the district court’s revocation judgment, claiming the judge (1) relied on unsworn statements by the prosecutor, and (2) announced conditions of supervised release that conflicted with the written judgment.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the record belies both claims. For one, ample evidence supported the prosecutor’s comments—precluding any legitimate claim of plain error. Second, the record reveals that the challenged discrepancy produced nothing more than ambiguity that is resolved by the district court’s clearly expressed intent: reimposition of the original conditions of supervised release. View "USA v. Porter" on Justia Law

Defendant made two social media posts indicating that he paid another man, who was positive for COVID-19, to lick every item at a local grocery store. Defendant did not actually pay the other man, but the posts "set off alarm bells" resulting in FBI agents being dispatched to the grocery store.Defendant was indicted and ultimately convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1038(a)(1) for orchestrating a hoax that simulated another crime. Defendant claimed on appeal that the biological-weapons statute did not extend to conduct such as licking items in a grocery store and that the terrorist-hoax statute is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. The Fifth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges, finding that although the biological-weapons statute does contain an implied exception for local crimes, Defendant's purported conduct was serious enough to place him within the purview of federal law enforcement, and threats like Defendant's are not protected by the First Amendment. View "USA v. Perez" on Justia Law

Appellee brought a retaliatory arrest claim against the Mayor and Chief of Police of Castle Hills, claiming that she was arrested for engaging in protected speech. However, Appellee acknowledges that there was probable cause for her arrest. Appellants asserted a qualified immunity defense. The district court denied Appellants' motion to dismiss.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying Appellant's motion to dismiss, finding Appellee failed to establish a violation of her constitutional rights in her retaliatory arrest claim because the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest. While probable cause to arrest does not necessarily preclude a retaliatory arrest claim, Appellee failed to establish any of these exceptions. View "Gonzalez v. Trevino" on Justia Law