Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting illegal aliens for financial gain. At his original sentencing, the district court applied an enhancement for intentionally or recklessly creating a risk of death or serious bodily harm to another person and then sentenced Defendant to twenty-seven months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, and the Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence.   Relying on the new evidence, the district court again applied the enhancement and sentenced Defendant to the same sentence that he had received before. Defendant appealed, arguing both that the district court exceeded this court’s mandate by agreeing to hear new evidence and that the new evidence introduced by the Government is still insufficient to warrant the imposition of the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding that Carales-Villalta binds the court and is dispositive here. Moreover, even under Defendant’s preferred approach, the district court did not err in hearing additional evidence related to the Section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement on remand. Further, the court has previously held that transporting aliens in a manner that significantly hinders their ability to exit the vehicle quickly creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. In other words, on resentencing the Government proved an aggravating factor that was not considered by this court during Defendant’s first appeal. The presence of that aggravating factor is dispositive here, as its presence is sufficient for the application of Section 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement. View "USA v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit explained that because Petitioner could have raised all his present claims in a Section 2255 motion, he may not raise them in a Section 2241 petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Section 2241 relief.   The court explained that Section 2255 provides for a one-year statute of limitations. All of the pieces that comprise Petitioner’s claim were in place well before that period expired. Congress had amended the statute at issue. The Supreme Court had decided the cases on which he relies. Because a Section 2255 motion could have accommodated the challenge, a Section 2241 petition is foreclosed. View "Hammoud v. Ma'at" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his guilty plea conviction for attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2113(a). Defendant contends that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) by improperly involving itself in plea negotiations and that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Defendant, now represented by counsel, asserts that the district court violated Rule 11(c)(1) by participating in plea negotiations before the parties reached an agreement. Second, he contends that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was violated during the plea-bargaining process.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding that Defendant failed to show reversible error. The court held that the district court’s participation in negotiations here was far less egregious than that in other cases requiring reversal under the harmless error standard. Here, Defendant indicated that he understood the plea agreement, that it was voluntarily entered, and that his decision to plead guilty was based on conversations between himself, standby counsel, and the prosecution. These facts fall short of demonstrating manifest injustice.   Further, the court concluded, that Defendant was not deprived of his right to self-representation. From April 29, 2020, the date Defendant elected to proceed pro se, to January 8, 2021, the date of the plea discussions at issue. The court could not say Defendant was deprived of his right to self-representation by virtue of his exclusion from this one conference. At all times, Defendant maintained “actual control” over the plea negotiations. View "USA v. Mamoth" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death. He did not appeal or pursued state habeas relief. However, he subsequently filed for a Certificate of Appealability with the Fifth Circuit on several grounds. The Fifth Circuit rejected two of the grounds based on current precedent. However, the Fifth Circuit granted the Certificate of Appealability on the following issues:(1) Did Petitioner's state habeas counsel render inadequate assistance by conceding that Petitioner was competent to waive review?(2) Can the court reach that conclusion based on evidence consistent with Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022)?(3) If Petitioner's state habeas counsel rendered inadequate assistance, was the inadequate assistance a cause external to Petitioner? View "Mullis v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s imposition of fifteen conditions of supervised release in the written judgment, arguing the conditions are discretionary and conflict with those orally pronounced at sentencing.The question in this case was whether Defendnat had an opportunity to object to the conditions. Under current law, district courts are required to pronounce orally any condition of supervised release that is not required to be imposed under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(d). Here, the fifteen challenged conditions in the written judgment were not mandatory under Sec. 3583(d). Thus, the district court was required to pronounce those fifteen conditions at Martinez’s sentencing hearing, which it failed to do. The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded so that the court could remove the challenged conditions. View "USA v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because he was detained without probable cause for driving while intoxicated. He brought suit under Section 1983, seeking damages from the officers who submitted an affidavit and incident reports to a magistrate to support his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The district court determined that fact issues precluded summary judgment, specifically, whether the officers made false statements that Plaintiff was “operating a motor vehicle” in violation of Texas law.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under Texas law, the inquiry when determining whether a person caused a vehicle to move must take into account “the totality of the circumstances [regarding whether] the defendant took action to affect the functioning of his vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle’s use.” The court explained that the officers' allegedly false statements pertained to how far the vehicle moved rather than whether it moved at all. Even if a vehicle only moved six inches, that may be sufficient to establish the operation element. View "Garcia v. Orta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, sued District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983 alleging that Defendants violated her son’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by unlawfully detaining him for years. The complaint also contends that, at one point, the Sheriff held Defendant down and forced him to take unwanted medication. As to Clay County, Plaintiff argued that Sheriffs were final policymakers, making the county liable under Monell. Defendants sought summary judgment; Plaintiff responded with a motion for partial summary judgment.   After summary judgment, the following claims remained: the detention claim against the Sheriffs and Clay County; the forced medication claim against Clay County alone. The Sheriffs and Clay County appealed. The Fifth Circuit, in treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing, granted the petition for panel rehearing. The court dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.   The court explained that this is not a case about jailers following court orders that turned out to be unconstitutional. These Sheriffs held Plaintiff’s son in violation of a court order that followed Jackson’s commit-or-release rule. The court wrote that it cannot be that the initial detention order in a case overrides subsequent release orders and allows jailers to indefinitely hold defendants without consequence. Thus, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated Plaintiff’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and qualified immunity thus does not protect the Sheriffs. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of three counts of making false statements to a federally licensed firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(a)(6) and two counts of possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(4). Relevant on appeal is whether his convictions were supported by sufficient evidence.   The Fifth Circuit held they were not and reversed Defendant’s convictions and vacated his sentence. The court held that the district court reversibly erred because no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The court explained that no reasonable degree of deference could overcome the fact that Defendant never underwent an “adjudication” in the sense contemplated by Section 922(g)(4), and the record lacks anything that resembles judicial process. View "USA v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 666 for two counts of “bribery concerning a local government receiving federal benefits,” plus a conspiracy count under Section 371. The question here was whether federal-programs bribery under Section 666 requires a quid pro quo.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that it does, thus, vacating Defendant’s convictions and remanding. The court explained that because Section 666 requires a quo, there is a problem with the district court’s instructions to the jury. In its view, Section 666 did “not require quid pro quo bribery,” and because the statute does not explicitly distinguish between bribery and mere gratuities, the court did not instruct the jury that a quid pro quo was required. Defendant properly objected to this at that time, arguing that such an instruction was necessary under Section 666(a).   The district court gave no instruction as to the meaning of “intent to influence or reward,” or that it requires a quid pro quo and its definition of “corruptly” said nothing about a formal this-for-that. The lack of such a quid pro quo instruction rendered the jury instructions unclear, as the jurors were permitted to convict on an illegal gratuity theory that does not exist in Section 666.4 The court found that is enough to justify vacating Defendant’s conviction. View "USA v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

State troopers arrested Defendant after finding drugs in his car during a traffic stop. Morton also had three cell phones in the car. A state judge later signed warrants authorizing searches of the phones for evidence of drug crime. The warrants allowed law enforcement to look at photos on the phones. When doing so, troopers discovered photos that appeared to be child pornography. This discovery led to a second set of search warrants. The ensuing forensic examination of the phones revealed almost 20,000 images of child pornography. This federal prosecution for receipt of child pornography followed. Defendant argues the evidence discovered during those searches should be suppressed. Defendant principally tries to defeat good faith by invoking the third exception, which involves what are commonly known as “bare bones” affidavits.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that law enforcement is usually entitled to rely on warrants and none of the exceptions that undermine good-faith reliance on a judge’s authorization applies. The court wrote that the affidavits used to search Defendant’s phones are not of this genre. Each is over three pages and fully details the facts surrounding Defendant’s arrest and the discovery of drugs and his phones. They explain where the marijuana and glass pipe was discovered, the number (16) and location of the ecstasy pills, and the affiant’s knowledge that cellphones are used for receipt and delivery of illegal narcotics. The court explained that it decides only that the officers acted in good faith when relying on the judge’s decision to issue the warrants. View "USA v. Morton" on Justia Law