Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a criminal noncitizen with a burglary conviction and two subsequent illegal-reentry convictions, was convicted of illegal reentry for a third time. The district court characterized his burglary conviction as an aggravated felony. The district court also characterized his two prior illegal-reentry convictions as aggravated felonies under a statutory provision stating that illegal reentry is itself an aggravated felony when committed by someone previously deported following an aggravated felony conviction. The designation “aggravated felony” is significant because it subjects the alien to a maximum prison sentence of 20 years. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court mischaracterized his past offenses because, under an intervening Supreme Court case, his predicate burglary conviction no longer qualifies as an aggravated felony. He insists the district court erred in sentencing him under Section 1326(b)(2).   The Fifth Circuit reformed the judgment to reflect that Defendant was convicted and sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2) and affirmed the judgment as reformed. The court explained that Defendant was correctly sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2) because he was previously removed “subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.” Defendant’s first illegal reentry, for which he was sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2), was an aggravated felony under Section 1101(a)(43)(O). View "USA v. Huerta-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal prisoner, appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1). Defendant offered four reasons for his Section 3582(c)(1) motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant’s first three arguments are not cognizable bases for compassionate release and the fourth does not have merit.   Defendant argued that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective and that the Government breached his plea agreement. But because these claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, they are not cognizable under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c). Second, Defendant argued that he should get a sentence reduction because the First Step Act reduced the statutory minimums applicable to his offenses. But Congress did not make those reductions retroactive. And a prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a compassionate release motion because such changes are neither extraordinary nor compelling. Third, Defendant briefly suggested that an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines favors his early release. Defendant did not adequately present this argument to the district court, however, so it is forfeited   Defendant’s fourth and final argument is the only one that states a possibly cognizable basis for compassionate release—namely, that COVID-19 constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. To support this argument, Defendant suggested that his prior COVID-19 infection and general ill health place him at greater risk from COVID-19 relative to the broader population. The court wrote it has repeatedly denied relief in cases where prisoners sought compassionate release due to fear of communicable disease, even when those prisoners were in poor health. View "USA v. McMaryion" on Justia Law

Appellants are serving, respectively, a 1,111-month sentence and a 738-month sentence for multiple robberies and violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Appellants brought successive 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motions, alleging United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), rendered their Section 924(c) convictions invalid. The district court dismissed their motions for lack of jurisdiction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants contend that even under the ‘more likely than not’ standard, their claims survive and should proceed to the merits. But they failed to prove it is more likely than not that the jury convicted them of Section 924(c) offenses based on predicate conspiracy offenses. Appellants next note each Section 924(c) count states that Appellants “did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in relation to the commission of a crime of violence, namely: a robbery, which obstructed, delayed, and affected commerce, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, as alleged” in the immediately preceding, multiplicitous Hobbs Act counts. The court found that the verdict form could have been more clearly expressed. However, the court explained that on considering the trial record as a whole, including the oral jury instructions, the trial evidence, and the minimally useful post-conviction record, the jury convicted Appellants of actual robbery, not mere conspiracy. Accordingly, the court found that Appellants have not carried their burden to prove that it is more likely than not the jury convicted them of Section 924(c) offenses based on conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. View "USA v. Diggs" on Justia Law

Defendants, in concert with a co-conspirator, became involved in an armored car robbery at a bank automated teller machine (ATM) scheme masterminded by the co-conspirator. The scheme involved staking out ATMs to identify when armored car drivers would replenish the cash inside and then robbing the armored car at the time of delivery by shooting and killing the driver. As the result of the Wells Fargo ATM robbery and the attempted robbery of the Amegy ATM, the surviving Defendants were charged and prosecuted for aiding and abetting robbery, attempted robbery, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing death of a person. In one consolidated case, after a two-week jury trial, the Defendants were each convicted on all counts. On appeal, the Defendants each raise multiple issues challenging their convictions and sentences. Specifically, all four Defendants argue that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)’s elements clause and thus cannot support their convictions under Count Four.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendants’ convictions as to Count four and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. The court explained that the Supreme Court has recently held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. Accordingly, the court wrote it must vacate Defendants’ convictions on Count Four. Because Defendants’ sentences on the remaining counts are not “interrelated or interdependent” on Count Four, resentencing is unnecessary. View "USA v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity. In the plea agreement, Defendant and the government agreed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), that a sentence of 360 months imprisonment was appropriate. However, Defendant also filed a sentencing memorandum arguing that the district court should depart or vary downwards by 60- months from the agreed-upon 360-month sentence to account for five years that Defendant was detained in administrative segregation prior to his plea. The district court accepted Defendant’s plea, which bound the district court under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) to sentence Defendant to the agreed-upon sentence. The district court sentenced Defendant at the same hearing to the 360-month term of imprisonment specified in the plea agreement. Before doing so, the district court denied Defendant’s request for the 60-month downward variance. On appeal, Defendant argued that his 360-month sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to properly “account for the five years of solitary confinement” that Defendant endured before his rearraignment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that at the sentencing hearing, the district court noted Defendant’s motion for a downward variance based on his time spent in administrative segregation and denied the motion because of “the defendant’s role in the offense.” Given Defendant’s involvement in attempted and completed murders in the course of the racketeering conspiracy, the court wrote that it cannot say that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Moreover, Defendant’s argument on appeal ignores that he got the benefit of his bargain with the government. View "USA v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence following his guilty-plea conviction of felon in possession of a firearm. He argued that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), which applies only when a defendant’s firearm “had an altered or obliterated serial number,” because there is no evidence that his rifle ever had a serial number.   The Fifth Circuit agreed and vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded. The court explained that it agreed that Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) does not apply when there is no evidence that the firearm ever had a serial number. The text of Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) is clear that it only applies when the firearm “had an altered or obliterated serial number.” U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). And in ordinary parlance, something cannot be “altered or obliterated” if it never existed in the first place. Consequently, to apply an upward enhancement under the provision, the government must present evidence showing that Defendant’s rifle once had a serial number. Because there was no such evidence, the court held that the district court erred in applying a four-level enhancement under Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). View "USA v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native citizen of Mexico who received lawful permanent resident status in the United States in 2003. In 2014, Petitioner was convicted by way of a guilty plea of an Aggravated Robbery in Texas. Petitioner was then deemed removable by an Immigration Judge ("IJ"). The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed, finding that Petitioner had been convicted of an "aggravated felony."The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), an “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” Section 1101(a)(43) of title 8 provides a list of offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies, which includes felony theft crimes, felony crimes of violence and attempts to commit these offenses. Petitioner argued that “since the Texas definition of a robbery encompasses an attempt to commit theft, it cannot categorically be defined as a theft offense, as an actual taking or exercise of control over the property of another is not needed for purposes of a conviction.However, the court held that, for Petitioner's purposes, it didn't matter if he was convicted of attempted theft or aggravated theft. The court explained that Petitioner is ineligible for asylum because his conviction qualifies as a non-political felony crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16(a). View "Rodriguez Gonzalez v. Garland" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for possessing a firearm while under a domestic violence restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section. 922(g)(8). On appeal, Defendant renewed his constitutional challenge to Section 922(g)(8). Defendant again acknowledged that his argument was foreclosed, and a prior panel of the Fifth Circuit agreed. But after Bruen, the prior panel withdrew its opinion, ordered supplemental briefing, and ordered the clerk to expedite this case for oral argument before another panel of the court. Defendant now contends that Bruen overrules our precedent and that under Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court explained that Section 922(g)(8) embodies salutary policy goals meant to protect vulnerable people in society. Weighing those policy goals’ merits through the sort of means-end scrutiny the court’s prior precedent indulged. The court previously concluded that the societal benefits of Section 922(g)(8) outweighed its burden on Defendant’s Second Amendment rights. But Bruen forecloses any such analysis in favor of a historical analogical inquiry into the scope of the allowable burden on the Second Amendment right. Through that lens, the court concluded that Section 922(g)(8)’s ban on the possession of firearms is an “outlier that our ancestors would never have accepted.”  Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional, and Defendant’s conviction under that statute must be vacated View "USA v. Rahimi" on Justia Law

According to the indictment, Defendant, a citizen of Switzerland and a partner in a Swiss wealth-management firm, and co-Defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland and an employee of a different Swiss wealth-management firm (together, “Defendants”), engaged in an international bribery scheme wherein U.S.-based businesses paid bribes to Venezuelan officials for priority payment of invoices and other favorable treatment from Venezuela’s state-owned energy company. A grand jury returned a nineteen-count indictment charging Defendants with various offenses stemming from their alleged international bribery scheme. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motions to dismiss was improper because the indictment adequately conforms to minimal constitutional standards. Further, the indictment did not violate co-Defendant’s due process rights. Moreover, the court wrote the district court’s conclusion that Section 3292 failed to toll the statute of limitations is erroneous. The court explained that the totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person in co-Defendant’s position would not have equated the restraint on his freedom of movement with formal arrest. View "USA v. Murta" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child sexual abuse material. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months of imprisonment followed by lifetime supervision and ordered Defendant to pay a total of $61,500 in restitution to seven victims depicted in Defendant’s materials. On appeal, Defendant sought to vacate the order of restitution, contending that it was imposed in violation of the proximate-cause requirements described in Paroline v. United States. The Government moved to dismiss the appeal on the theory that it is waived by the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.   The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss. The court explained that because it is clear that the district court considered the Paroline factors at sentencing and ordered restitution as authorized by Section 2259, the statutory-maximum exception does not apply. Nor did the district court merely rubber-stamp the conclusion. To the contrary, it gave meaningful consideration to whether the evidence showed that Defendant’s conduct proximately caused the victims’ loss. Accordingly, the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement bars this appeal. View "USA v. Alfred" on Justia Law