Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of five counts of sex trafficking. He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that there is insufficient evidence to support one count of his conviction, and that the prosecutor made an improper remark in her closing argument.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that under the Speedy Trial Act the federal government must file an information or indictment against the defendant “within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges” otherwise the charges must be dismissed. Defendant argues that the Speedy Trial Act clock must include his detention by state authorities as the state charges were a “ruse” to avoid its reach in that State and federal authorities cannot “collude” to detain a defendant “solely for the purpose of bypassing the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.” Here, the court held that the state had a legitimate and independent reason to detain Defendant and was not holding him primarily as a ruse for the federal government’s eventual arrest, Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act. Further, Defendant was unable to show that the length of the delay was prejudicial. View "USA v. Mearis" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in Texas state court of the felony offense of injury to a child, in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 22.04(a)(3). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (NTA), charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien who, at any time after admission, was convicted of a crime of child abuse. After a hearing, the IJ denied Petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal, ordered him removed, and denied his request for voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, denied his requests for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure, and ordered his removal. Petitioner then submitted a petition for review to the Fifth Circuit.   The Fifth Circuit denied in part Petitioner’s petition. Petitioner’s motion to terminate “squarely presented” the issue of the statute’s divisibility. Thus, the court held that the BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioner’s claim that the IJ impermissibly ruled on the divisibility issue. Further, based on Section 22.04(a)’s text, relevant state court cases, Texas’ pattern jury instructions, and the record of prior conviction itself, the court held that Section 22.04(a) is divisible as to victim class. Because the statute is divisible, the court applied the modified categorical approach to see which offense, under Section 22.04(a), is the crime of conviction. In so doing, the court looked to Petitioner’s indictment and the judicial confession entered on his guilty plea. Reviewing those documents, it is apparent that Petitioner was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, causing bodily injury to a child. View "Monsonyem v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1349. He was sentenced to one year and one day of imprisonment and ordered to pay $229,717.30 in restitution.   The government served Petitioner with a notice to appear, charging him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Specifically, the government invoked Section 1101(a)(43)(M) & (U), alleging that Petitioner was convicted of “an offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” and “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in section 101(a)(43)(M) of the Act.” Petitioner applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).   Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA found no error in the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition in part and dismissed in part.   The court explained Pursuant to Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” Section 1101(a)(43)(M) defines an “aggravated felony” as “an offense that—(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000,” and § 1101(a)(43)(U) extends the definition of “aggravated felony” to “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.” Here, Petitioner’s order of restitution for $229,717.30—which reflects the amount owed within the judgment for his fraud conspiracy conviction— provides clear and convincing evidence of the losses to his victims. View "Osei Fosu v. Garland" on Justia Law

A certificate of appealability to the Fifth Circuit was granted on two issues: 1.) Was Defendant’s sentence enhanced under the unconstitutional residual clause found in 18 U.S.C. Section 16(b)? and 2.) Is Defendant entitled to collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255? The Fifth Circuit held that Defendant’s Section 2255 motion is not barred by AEDPA’s res judicata provision and the motion was properly authorized under Section  2255(h)(2). The court reasoned that the court denied Defendant’s request for authorization to file his motion. That means he never actually filed the underlying motion. And it also means that AEDPA’s absolute bar on previously presented claims is inapplicable. Further, the court held that Section  2255(h)(2) requires the court to conclude that Defendant’s underlying claim relies on “[1] a new rule of constitutional law, [2] made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that [3] was previously unavailable.” Turning to the merits question, the court held that Defendant’s Section 2255 motion is timely. The court next found that Defendant procedurally defaulted his void-for-vagueness claim. And he cannot excuse that default because he cannot show either (A) cause and prejudice or (B) actual innocence. Thus, the court found no reversible error in the district court's judgment because Defendant failed to preserve his void-for-vagueness claim. And there’s no persuasive reason to excuse that default. View "USA v. Vargas-Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The probation officer determined that Defendant was a career offender under Section 4B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines because the instant offense, as well as Defendant’s prior convictions for possession with intent to distribute amphetamine and conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, qualified as controlled substance offenses. The district court overruled Defendant’s objection to the career-offender enhancement and sentenced him to 188 months of imprisonment.   Defendant argued that the district court erred in treating his instant and prior conspiracy convictions as controlled substance offenses. He asserted that even if Lightbourn was previously binding for the proposition that Section 4B1.2’s inchoate-offense commentary is subject to deference, that is no longer the case because Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), fundamentally altered the deference afforded to the Guidelines commentary under Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that it cannot say Kisor unequivocally overruled the court’s precedent holding that Section 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement includes inchoate offenses like conspiracy. The court reasoned that mere “hint” from the Court as to how it might rule in the future is not enough to circumvent the rule of orderliness and disregard circuit precedent. View "USA v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Four Defendants were involved in an armored car robbery at a bank automated teller machine. Defendants were each convicted of aiding and abetting robbery, attempted robbery, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing the death of a person. Defendants each raised multiple issues challenging their convictions and sentences and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendants failed to show that any potential error affected their substantial rights.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in shackling Defendant. The court reasoned that even taking as true Defendant’s assertion that the jury saw his shackles when he was removed from the courtroom, this was a brief and inadvertent exposure. Therefore, Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. He does not present any evidence showing that he was actually prejudiced.Next, the district court did not abuse its discretion in temporarily removing Defendant from the courtroom following his outburst. The court explicitly warned Defendant more than once to cease his disruptive conduct lest he be removed.Moreover, the court found that one of the Defendant’s outbursts falls short of the rare circumstances in which a codefendant’s disruption results in incurable prejudice such that a mistrial is required. Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the co-defendant’s motion to sever because the charges against the co-defendant do not differ dramatically from those against his codefendants. View "USA v. Hill, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5)(A), which makes it unlawful for aliens illegally in the country to possess firearms. But he insisted the district court erred at sentencing by applying Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which imposes an elevated base offense level if the offense involved a “semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine.” Defendant further contended that the United States failed to prove that (1) the firearm and magazine were compatible, and (2) the firearm could fire multiple rounds without reloading.The Fifth Circuit vacated the District Court’s ruling and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that the “compatibility” requirement comes straight from the text of the Guidelines: a firearm must be capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. Here, the United States introduced zero evidence (let alone a preponderance) proving that the large-capacity magazine was compatible with Defendant’s firearm. Next, the court rejected the district court’s invitation to rely on proximity as a cure-all. The court reasoned that though it is true the Guidelines’ commentary states that an elevated base offense level comes into play under Section 2K2.1 when a large-capacity magazine is either “attached” or “in close proximity” to a qualifying firearm, both derive from the Guidelines’ unambiguous requirement that the firearm be capable of accepting the magazine. View "USA v. Luna-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully re-entering the United States following removal. The district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court miscalculated his advisory Guidelines range by deferring to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ commentary rather than applying the Guidelines themselves.   Defendant argued that (A) after Kisor, courts should not defer to the Guidelines’ commentary unless the Guidelines themselves are ambiguous. He then argued that (B) Application Note 3 to Section 2L1.2 conflicts with the unambiguous Guidelines by requiring courts to “double-count” certain prior convictions when calculating the guidelines range. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Defendant’s conviction for illegal reentry. The court held that the district court properly calculated Defendant’s guidelines range, and his double-counting objection lacks merit.   The court reasoned that Application Note 3 to Section 2L1.2 is not in tension with the Guidelines. Rather, application Note 3 merely describes what the Guidelines’ text and structure would unambiguously require even in its absence. Further, Defendant cites no precedent supporting his argument that “double-counting” is per se incompatible with the Guidelines and the Guidelines’ text and structure do not support Defendant’s argument. View "USA v. Cordova-Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The indictment also alleged Defendant had suffered a prior serious violent felony conviction based on a prior Texas conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for which Defendant served more than 12 months in prison. Based on Defendant's prior conviction, the district court determined that his statutory sentencing range was ten years to life in prison. Defendant appealed the application of the recidivist enhancement.The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence, finding that the district court plainly erred. Under Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), an offense requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act if it criminalizes reckless conduct. The Texas aggravated assault statute at issue, Texas Penal Code Sec. 22.02(a)(1) and (2), allows for a defendant to be convicted based on reckless conduct.The court also found that the error affected Defendant's substantial rights because there was a reasonable probability that, but for the district court’s error, Defendant would have received a lesser sentence. View "USA v. Stoglin" on Justia Law

Defendant was the passenger of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. During the stop, the officer became suspicious, removed the men from the car, and found a firearm in a jacket on the rear floorboard of the vehicle. Initially, Defendant was charged in state court, but when it was later discovered he was an illegal alien, he was charged with a federal firearms offense.The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress the finding that Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search. Defendant subsequently pled guilty.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress a firearm, albeit on substantive grounds. The court noted that the standing question was a difficult one, that it decided to leave for another day to address. However, because the search was a valid protective sweep, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. View "USA v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law