Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were a class of people who had been charged with misdemeanor and felony crimes in Dallas County and who were allegedly unconstitutionally incarcerated pretrial solely because they were financially unable to post required bail. While the case was arguably moot, the Fifth Circuit determined it had the discretion to determine whether a federal court should have proceeded to the merits of plaintiffs’ bail “reform” lawsuit in the first place.The court explained that Younger requires federal court abstention when three criteria are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. Finding all three prongs of Younger were met, the court overruled ODonnell I, ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 882F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), holding against abstention in this matter. As an alternate holding, the court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs' case was moot. View "Daves v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one drug conspiracy count for each predicate drug. It also convicted Defendant of two additional counts for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and carisoprodol. The district court sentenced him to 151 months imprisonment, the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. On direct appeal, Defendant argued that errors in the district court’s jury instructions require his retrial. In the alternative, Defendant argued that the district court miscalculated his Sentencing Guidelines offense level.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if idiosyncratic portions of the jury charge lacked clarity on Section 841(a)’s mens rea requirement, the adequate Section 846 mens rea instruction filled any gap by clearly requiring that the jury find that Defendant have understood the illegitimate nature of his conduct. Further, any error in Section 841(a) instruction was harmless. Moreover, the court wrote that here, the trial court’s remarks explained relevant, available inferences in conditional language but did not dictate that the jury reach any specific outcome. The trial court also emphasized to the jury that they should “not assume from anything I may have done or said during the trial that I have any opinion” concerning the case and that the jury must “arrive at your own verdict.” The court found that a review of the remainder of the trial record reveals no evidence of bias on the part of the trial judge. View "USA v. Ajayi" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Sergeant had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity in the alley. First, Defendant’s location and timing provide a strong foundation for finding reasonable suspicion. Second, Defendant’s emergence and subsequent actions similarly give rise to reasonable suspicion. Third, Defendant’s inconsistent and nonsensical answers to the Sergeant’s questions gave rise to reasonable suspicion. Further, the court explained that even if the Sergeant and officer realized in the course of the seizure that Defendant was not the individual in the photograph, there remained numerous articulable and suspicious facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to extend the seizure, namely Defendant’s actions and statements before the photograph’s arrival as well as his suspicious answers in response to questions generated by the picture itself. View "USA v. Roper" on Justia Law

Defendant, a criminal noncitizen with a burglary conviction and two subsequent illegal-reentry convictions, was convicted of illegal reentry for a third time. The district court characterized his burglary conviction as an aggravated felony. The district court also characterized his two prior illegal-reentry convictions as aggravated felonies under a statutory provision stating that illegal reentry is itself an aggravated felony when committed by someone previously deported following an aggravated felony conviction. The designation “aggravated felony” is significant because it subjects the alien to a maximum prison sentence of 20 years. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court mischaracterized his past offenses because, under an intervening Supreme Court case, his predicate burglary conviction no longer qualifies as an aggravated felony. He insists the district court erred in sentencing him under Section 1326(b)(2).   The Fifth Circuit reformed the judgment to reflect that Defendant was convicted and sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2) and affirmed the judgment as reformed. The court explained that Defendant was correctly sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2) because he was previously removed “subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.” Defendant’s first illegal reentry, for which he was sentenced under Section 1326(b)(2), was an aggravated felony under Section 1101(a)(43)(O). View "USA v. Huerta-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal prisoner, appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1). Defendant offered four reasons for his Section 3582(c)(1) motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant’s first three arguments are not cognizable bases for compassionate release and the fourth does not have merit.   Defendant argued that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective and that the Government breached his plea agreement. But because these claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, they are not cognizable under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c). Second, Defendant argued that he should get a sentence reduction because the First Step Act reduced the statutory minimums applicable to his offenses. But Congress did not make those reductions retroactive. And a prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a compassionate release motion because such changes are neither extraordinary nor compelling. Third, Defendant briefly suggested that an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines favors his early release. Defendant did not adequately present this argument to the district court, however, so it is forfeited   Defendant’s fourth and final argument is the only one that states a possibly cognizable basis for compassionate release—namely, that COVID-19 constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. To support this argument, Defendant suggested that his prior COVID-19 infection and general ill health place him at greater risk from COVID-19 relative to the broader population. The court wrote it has repeatedly denied relief in cases where prisoners sought compassionate release due to fear of communicable disease, even when those prisoners were in poor health. View "USA v. McMaryion" on Justia Law

Appellants are serving, respectively, a 1,111-month sentence and a 738-month sentence for multiple robberies and violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Appellants brought successive 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motions, alleging United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), rendered their Section 924(c) convictions invalid. The district court dismissed their motions for lack of jurisdiction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants contend that even under the ‘more likely than not’ standard, their claims survive and should proceed to the merits. But they failed to prove it is more likely than not that the jury convicted them of Section 924(c) offenses based on predicate conspiracy offenses. Appellants next note each Section 924(c) count states that Appellants “did knowingly use and carry a firearm during and in relation to the commission of a crime of violence, namely: a robbery, which obstructed, delayed, and affected commerce, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, as alleged” in the immediately preceding, multiplicitous Hobbs Act counts. The court found that the verdict form could have been more clearly expressed. However, the court explained that on considering the trial record as a whole, including the oral jury instructions, the trial evidence, and the minimally useful post-conviction record, the jury convicted Appellants of actual robbery, not mere conspiracy. Accordingly, the court found that Appellants have not carried their burden to prove that it is more likely than not the jury convicted them of Section 924(c) offenses based on conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. View "USA v. Diggs" on Justia Law

Defendants, in concert with a co-conspirator, became involved in an armored car robbery at a bank automated teller machine (ATM) scheme masterminded by the co-conspirator. The scheme involved staking out ATMs to identify when armored car drivers would replenish the cash inside and then robbing the armored car at the time of delivery by shooting and killing the driver. As the result of the Wells Fargo ATM robbery and the attempted robbery of the Amegy ATM, the surviving Defendants were charged and prosecuted for aiding and abetting robbery, attempted robbery, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing death of a person. In one consolidated case, after a two-week jury trial, the Defendants were each convicted on all counts. On appeal, the Defendants each raise multiple issues challenging their convictions and sentences. Specifically, all four Defendants argue that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)’s elements clause and thus cannot support their convictions under Count Four.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendants’ convictions as to Count four and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. The court explained that the Supreme Court has recently held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. Accordingly, the court wrote it must vacate Defendants’ convictions on Count Four. Because Defendants’ sentences on the remaining counts are not “interrelated or interdependent” on Count Four, resentencing is unnecessary. View "USA v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity. In the plea agreement, Defendant and the government agreed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), that a sentence of 360 months imprisonment was appropriate. However, Defendant also filed a sentencing memorandum arguing that the district court should depart or vary downwards by 60- months from the agreed-upon 360-month sentence to account for five years that Defendant was detained in administrative segregation prior to his plea. The district court accepted Defendant’s plea, which bound the district court under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) to sentence Defendant to the agreed-upon sentence. The district court sentenced Defendant at the same hearing to the 360-month term of imprisonment specified in the plea agreement. Before doing so, the district court denied Defendant’s request for the 60-month downward variance. On appeal, Defendant argued that his 360-month sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to properly “account for the five years of solitary confinement” that Defendant endured before his rearraignment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that at the sentencing hearing, the district court noted Defendant’s motion for a downward variance based on his time spent in administrative segregation and denied the motion because of “the defendant’s role in the offense.” Given Defendant’s involvement in attempted and completed murders in the course of the racketeering conspiracy, the court wrote that it cannot say that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Moreover, Defendant’s argument on appeal ignores that he got the benefit of his bargain with the government. View "USA v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence following his guilty-plea conviction of felon in possession of a firearm. He argued that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), which applies only when a defendant’s firearm “had an altered or obliterated serial number,” because there is no evidence that his rifle ever had a serial number.   The Fifth Circuit agreed and vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded. The court explained that it agreed that Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) does not apply when there is no evidence that the firearm ever had a serial number. The text of Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) is clear that it only applies when the firearm “had an altered or obliterated serial number.” U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). And in ordinary parlance, something cannot be “altered or obliterated” if it never existed in the first place. Consequently, to apply an upward enhancement under the provision, the government must present evidence showing that Defendant’s rifle once had a serial number. Because there was no such evidence, the court held that the district court erred in applying a four-level enhancement under Section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). View "USA v. Sharp" on Justia Law