Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, after waiving his right to appeal in his plea agreement, did not file a direct appeal of his 2015 Texas conviction. His 2017 application for state postconviction relief from that 2015 sentence was denied in 2018. In 2019, he filed this Section 2254 petition, which was denied as untimely. Petitioner contends the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez, and its extension in Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013), excuse his untimeliness.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Petitioner did not have a constitutional right to counsel in his state postconviction proceeding. Further, the court held that Martinez established a narrow, equitable exception to procedural default; it has no applicability to the statutory limitations period prescribed by AEDPA. View "Moody v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

A federal jury convicted a former law enforcement officer (Defendant) of multiple counts of falsifying government documents, obstruction of justice, perjury, and property conversion. Defendant was sentenced to 160 months in prison. He appealed his convictions and sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant’s two document-falsification counts were supported by sufficient evidence. First, Defendant argued that his misrepresentations on the forms were immaterial to the DEA’s administration. The court disagreed, citing the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1519, which contains no “materiality” element. Moreover, the prosecution produced evidence that Defendant knowingly gave the DEA false information, concealing that he seized the informant’s truck outside of his jurisdiction and that he instructed the informant to purchase the truck. An expert testified at trial that, had it known these details, the DEA would not have approved the seizure. Additionally, the court explained that the record is replete with evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant used the confiscated property for his own use. Defendant also contested both enhancements by pointing to Section 1B1.5(c). Even if the district court erred in applying these two enhancements, the error was harmless. The district court carefully explained that it would have imposed the same 160-month sentence for the same reasons even if it erred in calculating Defendant’s offense level. View "USA v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He challenged his sentence on several grounds, particularly the district court’s imposition of a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The linchpin of this case is whether Defendant’s repeated instances of being a felon in possession of a firearm were relevant conduct justifying the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court thoroughly analyzed the factors for relevant conduct— similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity—and concluded the evidence weighed in favor of the Government. Here, Defendant was sentenced to 70 months—well below the 10-year statutory maximum. The district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, in its analysis. Further, the court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines do not generally prohibit double counting. The Guidelines permit the district court to consider a defendant’s prior felony convictions in calculating both his offense level under Section 2K2.1(a) and his criminal history category. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in calculating Defendant’s sentence on this basis. View "USA v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant, his wife, and another were indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The parties jointly owned Seven Arts Pictures Louisiana, LLC (Seven Arts), through which they purchased a dilapidated mansion at 807 Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans with the goal of converting it into a film postproduction facility. To offset the costs of the project, Seven Arts applied for film infrastructure tax credits offered by the State of Louisiana. The Government alleged that the parties “submitted fraudulent claims for tax credits, mostly by (1) submitting false invoices for construction work and film equipment or (2) using “circular transactions” that made transfers of money between bank accounts look like expenditures related to movie production.” The jury convicted Defendant on all charged counts. Defendant moved for a new trial as well as for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial but partially granted his motion for acquittal. Specifically, the court entered judgments of acquittal for Hoffman on five counts of wire fraud.   The Fifth Circuit held that the panel does not agree with the judgment that should be rendered in this case. Judge Jolly would affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety. Chief Judge Richman would dismiss the appeal, concluding the notice of appeal was not timely. Judge Dennis would remand for an evidentiary hearing and resentencing. The net effect is that the sentence imposed by the district court stands, and the case is not remanded to the district court. The district court’s judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court. View "USA v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions of possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated their convictions. The court held that the jury could not reasonably conclude, based on the available evidence, that either Defendant had possession of the marihuana with intent to distribute. The court explained that Defendant’s statement that he rearranged the bundles while showing more than mere presence does not establish an adequate nexus sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find possession. The co-Defendant’s statements that he “just helped” and “understood” he was in possession after the Agent explained the charges to him are similarly insufficient for a reasonable jury to find he possessed the marihuana. Further, the court found that it would be unreasonable for the jury to infer Defendant had possession with intent to distribute based on his statement to the Agent that he “just helped.” Second, Defendant’s statement made to DEA Agents after the Agent explained the charges against him was not a confession. View "USA v. Campos-Ayala" on Justia Law

A Louisiana jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder. In this habeas proceeding, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel erred by failing to contact an eyewitness who would’ve supported his defense. He has twice been denied state postconviction relief. He sought federal habeas relief for a second time. The district court held the petition untimely and dismissed it with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded so that the district court can rule on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the first instance. The court explained that courts of appeals may reach an abandoned timeliness defense when the waiver or forfeiture results from a mistake—but not when the state’s decision to focus exclusively on the merits of the habeas claim is based on a deliberate judgment call. And that is especially so where timeliness is complex, but the merits are straightforward. But rather than decide the merits of Petitioner’s claim in the first instance, the court concluded that remanding the case back to the district court is appropriate. View "Ficher v. Bickham" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to assaulting, resisting, or impeding various officers or employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 111(a)(1) and (b). Defendant appealed the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a primary issue, in this case, is whether a court may apply Section 3C1.1 when a defendant obstructs another person’s arrest, which in this case is that of Defendant’s brother. The court wrote that when Defendant assaulted the agent, he violated Section 111 and triggered the base offense level in Section 2A2.4. Then, when Defendant physically prevented the agent from arresting another member of Defendant’s group, he obstructed the administration of justice in an offense that was closely related to his instant offense of conviction. In other words, there is a sufficient nexus between Defendant’s relevant conduct and his conviction for the assault of a federal officer. It is, therefore, plausible, in light of the record as a whole, for the district court to have found that Defendant’s conduct is properly categorized as an obstruction of justice under Section 3C1.1. View "USA v. Mendoza-Gomez" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of raping a 17-year-old girl, assaulting a 16-year-old girl with a hammer, and raping and murdering a 20-year-old woman. The present appeal involves only Petitioner’s conviction for raping the 17-year-old girl. Petitioner directly appealed his rape conviction in state court and almost succeeded in getting a new trial: The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Petitioner next filed a habeas petition in federal district court, raising thirteen claims. The district court denied Petitioner’s petition but granted him a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on all thirteen claims. Petitioner timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the state court could’ve reasonably found the Ake claim unpreserved. Petitioner’s trial counsel withdrew his Ake motion, so the trial court never ruled on it. Petitioner must thus show that every fair-minded jurist would conclude that this is the extraordinary instance where an unpreserved claim was stronger than the preserved claims and that appellate counsel’s failure to press the unpreserved Ake claim was tantamount to providing no appellate counsel at all. Here, Petitioner cannot come close to that showing.  Further, the court wrote that Petitioner cannot surmount AEDPA’s relitigation bar. Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, every fair-minded jurist would not think that the absence of an expert for an insanity defense is per se error. Finally, the court held that law and justice do not compel issuance of the writ in the absence of factual innocence, and Petitioner can’t make the required showing. View "Crawford v. Cain" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Mississippi prisoner # 145868, was arrested on December 21, 2006. Eight months later, he was indicted by a grand jury on charges of aggravated assault with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In January 2009, he was tried in state court, and a jury found him guilty on both counts. Sentenced as a habitual offender, he received two concurrent life sentences without the possibility of parole. Petitioner unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief in state court. After exhausting state-court review, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court granted. The State appealed that ruling.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and rendered judgment in favor of the State on Petitioner’s petition for federal habeas relief. The court considered Petitioner’s federal habeas claims that his conviction violated his right to a speedy trial and that his public defenders provided ineffective assistance of counsel. While two state courts rejected these claims, the federal district court disagreed and held that relief was warranted. The court held that the lack of deference to the state court’s determination constituted “an improper intervention in state criminal processes,” such that the district court erred in granting Petitioner’s habeas application on the speedy-trial issue. View "Russell v. Denmark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence because Department officials gave him credit for time served in pre-trial detention but only for one (rather than both) of his two consecutive sentences. That was the right thing to do under the law, then in effect. But Plaintiff was entitled to the more generous provision in effect at the time his sentence was entered. As a result, he served over a year longer than he should have. After his release, Plaintiff brought suit against various Louisiana officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, among other claims. This appeal concerns only one of those claims: Plaintiff’s claim against the head of the Department, Secretary James LeBlanc (“Defendant”). Defendant appealed the denial of qualified immunity, arguing that his conduct wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that while the right to timely release is clearly established, Plaintiff does not show how Defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Plaintiff contends that Defendant was objectively unreasonable because he failed to assign the task of calculating release dates to an attorney. But nothing in the Constitution requires that such actions be undertaken by a member of the bar. View "Taylor v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law