Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant did not file a response.The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court wrote that consistent with Crawley, it holds that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

The attorney appointed to represent Defendant moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Defendant has not filed a response.   The Fifth Circuit reviewed counsel’s brief, and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein and granted the motion to withdraw. The court concurred with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. The court held that Defendant’s restitution order does not present a nonfrivolous issue for appeal because he is liable for the same restitution amount regardless of the ultimate recipients. View "USA v. Fults" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted Petitioner a partial certificate of appealability (“COA”) after the district court dismissed his federal habeas corpus petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). In his state habeas proceedings, Petitioner procedurally defaulted on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He contends that the default stemmed from ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel and should therefore be excused.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that Petitioner had not shown that habeas counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, he has not shown cause for the default. The court explained that it is true that the opinion of a court-appointed psychiatrist does not always exonerate counsel of any duty to investigate further. But considering all the circumstances, Petitioner’s habeas attorneys did not have a duty to investigate more than they did. Further, Petitioner’s counsel, in stark contrast, did investigate by requesting a medical evaluation. And, again, his attorneys were not mounting a defense at trial but instead were determining whether they could acquiesce to Petitioner’s desire to waive habeas relief and dismiss them. View "Mullis v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment convicting and sentencing Defendant on six charges involving child pornography. The court held that no reasonable suspicion is necessary to conduct the sort of routine manual cell phone search at the border that occurred here.Defendant and two others crossed the international bridge to Presidio, Texas, in a recreational vehicle (RV) that was towing a passenger car behind it. Upon reaching the port of entry into the United States, the RV was sent to secondary inspection. Defendant was placed in a holding cell. He admitted to owning the contraband. He also provided the passcode to unlock his cell phone to a Homeland Security Investigations special agent. The agent manually scrolled through various apps. As a result, he found what he believed to be child pornography in the photo section of Defendant’s phone. Defendant was indicted on six charges involving child pornography. He subsequently moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his devices. After a hearing, the district court refused to suppress the child pornography. Defendant was found guilty on all six counts and sentenced to 720 months imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. He filed a timely notice of appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the border search exception is a “longstanding, historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a warrant be obtained” for a search. Courts have allowed a variety of border searches without requiring either a warrant or reasonable suspicion. The extent of the privacy intrusion, however, will depend on the methodology employed by the government agent. The court held that no reasonable suspicion is necessary to conduct the sort of routine manual cell phone search at the border that occurred here. View "USA v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that government agents searched his cell phone at the border without a warrant on at least five occasions and that agents copied data from his cell phone at least once. Plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the respective heads of each entity in their official capacity (collectively, the government), challenging the searches, as well as ICE and CBP policies regarding border searches of electronic devices. In the district court, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction preventing the government from searching his cell phone at the border without a warrant. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial threat he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. The court reasoned that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the ICE and CBP policies authorize warrantless searches. Further, the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified complaint are evidence of a pattern of warrantless searches of Plaintiff’s cell phone. However, Plaintiff has no additional evidence to establish that he will be stopped by border agents in the future and that the agents will search his cell phone without a warrant. View "Anibowei v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, after waiving his right to appeal in his plea agreement, did not file a direct appeal of his 2015 Texas conviction. His 2017 application for state postconviction relief from that 2015 sentence was denied in 2018. In 2019, he filed this Section 2254 petition, which was denied as untimely. Petitioner contends the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez, and its extension in Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013), excuse his untimeliness.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Petitioner did not have a constitutional right to counsel in his state postconviction proceeding. Further, the court held that Martinez established a narrow, equitable exception to procedural default; it has no applicability to the statutory limitations period prescribed by AEDPA. View "Moody v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

A federal jury convicted a former law enforcement officer (Defendant) of multiple counts of falsifying government documents, obstruction of justice, perjury, and property conversion. Defendant was sentenced to 160 months in prison. He appealed his convictions and sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant’s two document-falsification counts were supported by sufficient evidence. First, Defendant argued that his misrepresentations on the forms were immaterial to the DEA’s administration. The court disagreed, citing the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1519, which contains no “materiality” element. Moreover, the prosecution produced evidence that Defendant knowingly gave the DEA false information, concealing that he seized the informant’s truck outside of his jurisdiction and that he instructed the informant to purchase the truck. An expert testified at trial that, had it known these details, the DEA would not have approved the seizure. Additionally, the court explained that the record is replete with evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant used the confiscated property for his own use. Defendant also contested both enhancements by pointing to Section 1B1.5(c). Even if the district court erred in applying these two enhancements, the error was harmless. The district court carefully explained that it would have imposed the same 160-month sentence for the same reasons even if it erred in calculating Defendant’s offense level. View "USA v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He challenged his sentence on several grounds, particularly the district court’s imposition of a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The linchpin of this case is whether Defendant’s repeated instances of being a felon in possession of a firearm were relevant conduct justifying the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court thoroughly analyzed the factors for relevant conduct— similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity—and concluded the evidence weighed in favor of the Government. Here, Defendant was sentenced to 70 months—well below the 10-year statutory maximum. The district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, in its analysis. Further, the court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines do not generally prohibit double counting. The Guidelines permit the district court to consider a defendant’s prior felony convictions in calculating both his offense level under Section 2K2.1(a) and his criminal history category. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in calculating Defendant’s sentence on this basis. View "USA v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant, his wife, and another were indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The parties jointly owned Seven Arts Pictures Louisiana, LLC (Seven Arts), through which they purchased a dilapidated mansion at 807 Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans with the goal of converting it into a film postproduction facility. To offset the costs of the project, Seven Arts applied for film infrastructure tax credits offered by the State of Louisiana. The Government alleged that the parties “submitted fraudulent claims for tax credits, mostly by (1) submitting false invoices for construction work and film equipment or (2) using “circular transactions” that made transfers of money between bank accounts look like expenditures related to movie production.” The jury convicted Defendant on all charged counts. Defendant moved for a new trial as well as for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial but partially granted his motion for acquittal. Specifically, the court entered judgments of acquittal for Hoffman on five counts of wire fraud.   The Fifth Circuit held that the panel does not agree with the judgment that should be rendered in this case. Judge Jolly would affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety. Chief Judge Richman would dismiss the appeal, concluding the notice of appeal was not timely. Judge Dennis would remand for an evidentiary hearing and resentencing. The net effect is that the sentence imposed by the district court stands, and the case is not remanded to the district court. The district court’s judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court. View "USA v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions of possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated their convictions. The court held that the jury could not reasonably conclude, based on the available evidence, that either Defendant had possession of the marihuana with intent to distribute. The court explained that Defendant’s statement that he rearranged the bundles while showing more than mere presence does not establish an adequate nexus sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find possession. The co-Defendant’s statements that he “just helped” and “understood” he was in possession after the Agent explained the charges to him are similarly insufficient for a reasonable jury to find he possessed the marihuana. Further, the court found that it would be unreasonable for the jury to infer Defendant had possession with intent to distribute based on his statement to the Agent that he “just helped.” Second, Defendant’s statement made to DEA Agents after the Agent explained the charges against him was not a confession. View "USA v. Campos-Ayala" on Justia Law