Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was indicted for intentionally causing the death of another by setting her on fire during a robbery. The jury found him guilty of capital murder, as alleged in the indictment. Appellant challenged the validity of his conviction and sentence in a state habeas proceeding, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. Appellant filed an application for a certificate of appealability and appealed the district court's denial of his motion to recuse.   The Fifth Circuit denied the application for a certificate of appealability and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse. The court explained that Appellant cited no governing legal authority recognizing the right to delay his briefing until the final day of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. On the contrary, it is firmly established that a district court has “the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” The district court noted that Appellant’s counsel might be acting contrary to Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires counsel to certify that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Given the district court’s explanation, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to recuse. Accordingly, the court held that these do not debatably give rise to a claim for relief. View "Johnson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to drug offenses and assaulting or impeding U.S. Border Patrol agents. The district court sentenced him within the guidelines range to a total of 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $225 special assessment. Although Defendant’s presentence report (“PSR”) listed no conditions of supervised release, the district court, at sentencing, specifically imposed “the standard and mandatory conditions of supervision … including the conditions that the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the term of supervision.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the well-grounded and legally-sound procedure for imposing “standard” and “mandatory” conditions of supervised release listed in a court’s standing order is: 1. The probation officer should either include the court’s standing order in or append it to the PSR, or preferably both. 2. Defense counsel must review and explain the conditions in the court’s standing order with the defendant before sentencing. 3. The district court must (a) confirm with the defendant that he or she saw the standing order and had the opportunity to review it with defense counsel; (b) ask the defendant whether he or she has any questions about the conditions listed in the standing order; (c) orally pronounce that it is imposing the conditions detailed in a specific standing order, and (d) provide the defendant with an opportunity to object. Nonetheless, in this case, the district court did not plainly err in imposing the standard and mandatory conditions detailed in the court-wide standing order and two special conditions. View "USA v. Baez-Adriano" on Justia Law

Defendant, a rap artist as well as a convicted felon, owned a company that hired a videographer to film Defendant throughout his life for eventual use in a music video. One day, an anonymous 911 caller reported several men with “Uzis” and other guns walking down a residential street in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Police arrived, detained Defendant, the videographer, and others. Police seized a memory card from the videographer, as well as several firearms from the nearby area. There was a video on the memory card of Defendant holding a firearm.The district court reasoned that Gaulden had a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the videos on the memory card, although he lacked a Fourth Amendment interest in the memory card itself. The court also found the warrant fatally defective. Accordingly, the court suppressed the footage of Defendant in possession of the firearms.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Defendant's right to Fourth Amendment protection turns on whether he has a constitutionally protected property interest or a judicially conferred reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched or seized. To the extent Defendant can have a distinct property interest in the video footage, he never proved that he acquired such a right. Defendant himself did not testify and there was no written contract giving Defendant ownership of the video footage. And Defendant's company, not Defendant himself, hired the videographer. Thus, Defendant did not have an established property interest in the footage.The court also held that Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the footage. View "USA v. Gaulden" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to transport and transporting undocumented immigrants resulting in serious bodily injury and death. He appealed a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2L1.1(b)(8)(A) for involuntarily detaining a migrant through threat or coercion.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here Defendant did not continue to drive in order to prevent L.G.G.G. from escaping—he continued to drive in order to avoid apprehension. That Defendant’s continued driving was not for the purpose of detaining L.G.G.G. is buttressed by his prior instruction to L.G.G.G. and A.M.A. to exit the vehicle and run should they be pulled over by law enforcement. L.G.G.G. was involuntarily detained, but he was not involuntarily detained through threat or coercion. The district court erred by applying this enhancement to Defendant’s conduct. However, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show that the error was plain. Because Defendant’s claim of plain error failed the second prong of the relevant text, the court declined to examine the remaining prongs. View "USA v. Buendia" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography involving the sexual exploitation of minors. He was sentenced to 60 months in prison on each count, to run concurrently. The district court also imposed a life term of supervised release. Defendant was released from prison in August 2010. And he successfully completed his sex offender treatment. Since his release, he has maintained a clean record and complied with his registration requirement. The government appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant’s request to terminate his obligation to register as a sex offender.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s request. The court held that the unambiguous language of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act deems Defendant a tier II sex offender and that status demands that his registration continues. The court explained that because he was convicted of distribution of child pornography, Defendant’s crime falls under Section 20911(3)(B)(iii), and so he is a tier II sex offender. Consequently, he “shall” register for 25 years from the date of his release from prison. Furthermore, he is not entitled to any reduction of the required registration period under SORNA. 34 U.S.C. Section2 0915(b) (providing reduction for tier I and tier III sex offenders, but not tier II). View "USA v. Nazerzadeh" on Justia Law

A Texas jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of six, and he was sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment. Petitioner challenged his conviction both on direct appeal and through state habeas proceedings, but the Texas courts denied his requests for relief. The district court denied his subsequent federal habeas petition and his request for a certificate of appealability. The Fifth Circuit granted Defendants’ application for a certificate of appealability on one issue: whether trial counsel rendered unconstitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to expert and lay opinion testimony regarding the truthfulness of G.P., the complainant.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that G.P. testified at trial and told multiple people—including his mother and his pediatrician—about the assaults well within one year of their taking place. The jury could have convicted Petitioner on this testimony alone, which is detrimental to Petitioner’s prejudice argument. The jury was presented with other evidence supporting Petitioner’s conviction as well. Ultimately, the court found that it was unconvinced that every reasonable jurist would believe it reasonably likely that Petitioner would have been acquitted absent the challenged testimony. AEDPA’s demanding standard of review thus requires us to defer to the TCCA’s decision. View "Flores v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the robbery and murder of a pastor. After exhausting his state remedies, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 and sought investigative services under 18 U.S.C. Section 3599. The district court rejected his petition for relief, concluded that investigative services were not reasonably necessary, and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Petitioner then petitioned this court for a COA. We granted that petition on a single issue: Whether Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present at the penalty phase of the trial, two alleged accomplices’ participation in the robbery and murder.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Petitioner’s attempt to reframe his Sixth Amendment counsel ineffectiveness claim in federal court does not save it from the strictures of AEDPA review. The court explained that Petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have recommended a life sentence had his trial counsel investigated the co-conspirators’ involvement and presented evidence about the same at sentencing. He was not prejudiced, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim would fail even if it were not assessed under the rigorous standards of AEDPA Section 2254(d). View "Nelson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant is a medical doctor. He contracted with two hospitals, one in Mississippi and one in Alabama. He usually made $30,000 to $40,000 per month. Because he was a contractor, the hospitals did not withhold any wages for tax purposes— Defendant was solely responsible for satisfying his federal tax obligations. From 2006 through 2012, Defendant did not pay any income taxes or file any timely tax returns. A jury found him guilty of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7201. Defendant raised two claims on appeal: first, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for tax evasion under Section 7201; and second, that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if it was legitimate for Defendant to deduct IRS garnishments from his income, that does not explain why Defendant neglected to mention key assets on the form—such as the $50,000 gun collection and the corporate bank accounts that he used to pay personal expenses. Moreover, the prosecution presented evidence suggesting that he manipulated his wages to artificially depress his income at the time he submitted Form 433-A.   Further, even assuming that the district court was right to sustain the defense’s objection, Defendant offered no reason to believe that the questions incurably prejudiced the jury. Given the weight of evidence presented to the jury in this case, there is no “significant possibility” that these two questions had a substantial impact on the verdict. View "USA v. Crandell" on Justia Law

Defendant has two state convictions for indecent exposure to children. The government contends that those convictions “clearly” relate United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit “to the sexual exploitation of children,” so Defendant should be subject to the enhancement. Defendant countered that “sexual exploitation of children,” in this context, applies only to offenses relating to child pornography, so his sentence is not subject to the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e)’s use of the phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children” refers to any criminal sexual conduct involving children. Defendant’s convictions for indecent exposure to a child neatly fall within that broad category. View "USA v. Moore" on Justia Law

Defendants were among 24 individuals indicted on various charges in connection with their involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel. Defendants were jointly tried during a 10-day jury trial. One defendant was convicted on five counts, while another was convicted on 12 counts. Each received concurrent life sentences for all counts on which they were convicted. Defendants raised various challenges to their respective convictions and sentences on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentences that exceed their respective statutory maxima and remanded the case for resentencing on those counts only. The court explained that the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for either Count IV—Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments or Count V— Conspiracy to Possess Firearms in Furtherance of any Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking Crime is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. Sections1956(a)(2), 924o. The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for Counts VI, VIII, or X—all VICAR convictions—is 10 years. Nevertheless, both Defendants were sentenced to concurrent life terms of imprisonment on Counts IV and V, and one defendant also received concurrent life sentences for Counts VI, VIII, and X. These sentences all exceed their respective statutory maxima. Therefore, the life sentences imposed for Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, and X are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing on those counts only. View "USA v. Urquidi" on Justia Law