Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prisoner, DefendanDefendant, a prisoner, brought an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. His claims rest on the argument that his sentence for the latter offense should have been adjusted to reflect the 13 months he had already spent in prison for his first conviction. Defendant brought this 2255 petition in the Northern District of Texas, faulting his trial counsel for failing to adequately advocate for “back time” at sentencing and faulting his appellate counsel for not raising the issue on appeal. The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied. The district judge (the same judge who sentenced Defendant in the Northern District) adopted the recommendation, dismissed the claims, and denied a certificate of appealability.   The Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and affirmed. The court explained that it is true that the Sentencing Guidelines call for credit for time served if there are two related offenses. Both parties agree the offenses are related here. Yet the Guidelines are not obligatory, and the judge in the Northern District of Texas instead sentenced Defendant under U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.3(d). Thus, Defendant’s sentences were treated as concurrent from the day of the second sentencing but did not account for the 13 months of back time. None of this means that Defendant’s lawyers were constitutionally deficient. Defendant’s trial counsel argued for the application of U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.3(b) in a memorandum and noted the argument in open court; he was not constitutionally obliged to do more. Defendant’s appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to raise the issue because the district court did not contravene any binding case law. View "USA v. Massey" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty, with a plea agreement, to one count of misprision of a felony, to wit: wire fraud. Because of the substantial assistance that he provided the government, the district court sentenced him below the guidelines range to six months of imprisonment. The district court also ordered Defendant to pay $40,254,297.72 in restitution, jointly and severally, with other defendants, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). Defendant appealed the district court’s restitution order. The government moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by Defendant’s appeal waiver; that motion was carried with the case, and the case was fully briefed on the merits.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the restitution order and remanded for the district court to conduct further fact-finding and to adjust the award if necessary. The court held that Defendant’s appeal fits within an exception to his appeal waiver. The court explained that Defendant’s argument that the district court awarded restitution for losses caused by conduct not encompassed by his offense of conviction or by conduct specified in his guilty plea and for losses that predate his involvement with RDAG is a statutory-maximum challenge. Further, the court left it to the district court on remand to make any additional factual findings necessary to determine the amount of restitution statutorily authorized by the MVRA and to enter a new restitution order in that amount. View "USA v. Reinhart" on Justia Law

Defendant’s sentence was enhanced by enhancement provisions in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Powell appeals, arguing that following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, a conviction for Texas robbery-by-threat is no longer a predicate offense under that act. Defendant argued that Garrett cannot stand post-Taylor.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements cause. Taylor thus expressly addresses offenses that criminalize attempts that may be undertaken without a use or threat of force. The court explained that in other words, Taylor does not reach the crime at issue here and cannot be said to clearly overturn Garrett. Thus, Taylor does not undermine or contravene Garrett’s conclusion that Texas robbery-by-threat constitutes a violent felony. View "USA v. Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Because he is not competent to stand trial, though, the government requested to involuntarily medicate him, and the district court granted the motion.   The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that the government had satisfied the conditions for involuntary medication set out in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003). However, the court wrote that the district court should also have analyzed whether any statutory religious-freedom protections apply to Defendant. The court vacated and remanded for the district court to consider that issue. The court held that the government psychiatrist’s medical opinion is sufficient evidence that involuntary medication will “significantly further” the government’s interest. And “whatever the strength of that evidence,” Defendant “provides no reason to question its accuracy.” Thus, the court agreed with the district court that the government has provided enough evidence to satisfy the second prong. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s entry of an order of forfeiture as part of his criminal sentence for his drug and money laundering conspiracy offenses.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there are two paths available to defendants who plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement but who later seek to allege that ineffective lawyering caused a mistaken, involuntary, or unknowing guilty plea. Defendants can either file a collateral attack on the guilty plea under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255,3 or, before the imposition of sentence, move to withdraw the guilty plea under Rule 11. However, the court explained that but what a defendant “may not do is pick and choose which portions he wishes to abide by and which he wishes to appeal.” Thus, the court explained that if Defendant wishes to pursue relief from his sworn stipulation that his Florida condo and credit union money was forfeitable, he must do so through a Section 2255 motion challenging the entire guilty plea. The result, if successful, would be for all parties to start over. View "USA v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Johnson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and separately moved to recuse the district judge to whom that petition was assigned. On appeal, The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability, explaining that each of his arguments had already been considered and rejected by binding precedent. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to recuse.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Defendant petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the panel opinion stands for the proposition that a district court has the power to shorten the one-year statute of limitations. The court explained that the opinion stands for no such thing. It holds only that the district court’s case-management order is not a ground for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. Section 455(a). Especially probative for that holding is the fact that the district court ultimately granted Johnson the extension he sought. The court explained that its conclusion that the district court was not required to recuse says nothing about the hypothetical issue of whether a district court would commit legal error if it did order a post-conviction habeas petitioner to file his petition before the deadline provided by the statute of limitations. View "Johnson v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 168 months in prison and ordered him to pay his victims $46,000 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was not competent to enter the plea and challenged the court's restitution order.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Regarding competency, the court relied on Defendant's admission that he only began to exhibit competency concerns during the PSR interview. There is no authority to find that erratic statements made in a PSR interview can somehow retroactively undermine Defendant's competency to plead guilty. Further, the district court did not commit reversible error in failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte.In terms of Defendant's restitution argument, the court held that he failed "to show that there is a reasonable probability that such error resulted in his accountability for damages he did not cause or that the district court would have imposed a lower restitution amount but for any error." View "USA v. Teijeiro" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the production of child pornography. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s application of a sentence enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e) based on his prior conviction for fondling a child, also referred to as lustful touching of a child.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court concluded that the Mississippi statute relates to “abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward,” as defined under section 2251(e) because the statute proscribes conduct that: (1) involves a child; (2) is sexual in nature; (3) is abusive; and (4) involves physical contact. The Mississippi statute only criminalizes conduct involving a child under the age of 18, so the first element is met. Moreover, because the statute also proscribes conduct involving “handling, touching or rubbing,” it meets the generic definitions of “abuse” and “contact” as well. Accordingly, the court held that there is no ambiguity as to the enhancements’ application; the rule of lenity is inapplicable. View "USA v. Northington" on Justia Law

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) bars an individual from possessing a firearm if he is an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. Patrick Daniels is one such “unlawful user”—he admitted to smoking marihuana multiple days per month. But the government presented no evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of arrest, nor did it identify when he last had used marihuana. Still, based on his confession to regular usage, a jury convicted Defendant of violating Section 922(g)(3). The question is whether Defendant’s conviction violates his right to bear arms. The answer depends on whether Section 922(g)(3) is consistent with the nation’s “historical tradition of firearm regulation.”   The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction and render a dismissal of the indictment. The court explained that the nation’s history and tradition may support some limits on an intoxicated person’s right to carry a weapon, but it does not justify disarming a sober citizen based exclusively on his past drug usage. Nor do more generalized traditions of disarming dangerous persons support this restriction on nonviolent drug users. Thus, the court held that as applied to Defendant, then, Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment. View "USA v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of enticement of a minor, travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and transfer of obscene material to a minor. A total offense level of 41 and a criminal history category of I yielded a guideline imprisonment range of 324 to 405 months. The district court adopted the Pre-Sentence Report and sentenced him to 405 months in prison, a life term of supervised release, a $300 special assessment ($100 for each count), and a $15,000 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act special assessment ($5,000 for each count). Defendant appealed, raising multiple challenges to his sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to Defendant’s conviction. However, the court vacated the district court’s judgment as to that special assessment. The court explained that Defendant does not identify any case law establishing that his conduct on two different days should constitute a single occasion of abuse or establishing that the prohibited sexual acts must continue for a certain period of time or occur on a certain number of occasions to constitute a pattern. Therefore, the court held that the commission of distinct sexual assaults constitutes “separate occasions,” whether on the same or different days, for purposes of Section 4B1.5(b)(1). View "USA v. Sadeek" on Justia Law