Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty by jury of conspiring with intent to distribute cocaine and distributing a detectable amount of a substance containing cocaine base. Defendant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which requires the Government must show that a defendant knew that the conspiracy involved a minimum quantity of the controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced to 480 months imprisonment on the first count and 240 months on the second.Defendant appealed on several sentencing-related issues: (1) the district court imposed a “trial penalty” in sentencing him; (2) the district court erred in determining the quantity of drugs attributable to him, (3) the propriety of the jury charge and verdict form; and (4) the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The judge's comments referring to various codefendants' cooperative efforts did not indicate the court imposed a trial penalty. Further, a participant in a drug conspiracy is responsible for all drug quantities with which he was “directly involved,” as well as for quantities “involved in transactions carried out by other participants. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence that Defendant “knew or should have known [the drug amount that] was involved in the conspiracy[.]” View "USA v. Hill" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder by a Texas jury and sentenced to death. He later filed an application in district court for habeas relief. In an earlier appeal, because his initial counsel had a conflict of interest, the Fifth Circuit remanded for appointment of additional counsel and further development of potential claims of ineffective trial counsel. An amended application was filed, but the district court rejected all the new claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied Petitioner’s motion for a Rhines stay. The court explained that as to the four claims for which the district court granted a COA, Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s actions in investigating, compiling, and presenting mens rea and mitigating evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As to the remaining claims for which the court granted a COA, the court found that Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the expert witness’s testimony, and Petitioner’s request for a Rhines stay is plainly meritless in this context.   The court explained that the expert’s testimony was not so unreasonable, as the expert also testified that Petitioner was still an adolescent and that his brain would not be fully developed until his mid-twenties, helping to explain his psychological condition. Further, the expert opined that Petitioner “has the potential to develop a sense of self and the potential for rehabilitation and some type of spiritual conversion.” Viewed as a whole, it was not deficient of trial counsel to believe this testimony would help Petitioner. View "Mendoza v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the terms of his supervised release arguing that there is an impermissible conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement and written judgment. In the presentence report, the probation officer recommended various mandatory and standard conditions of supervision. The probation officer also recommended a special condition, as Defendant was a legal alien permanent resident, but his arrest would have rendered him subject to deportation proceedings. The district court imposed a guidelines sentence of imprisonment for 95 months with three years of supervised release. The court orally adopted the special conditions recommended in the presentence report and orally informed Defendant that he must be legally authorized to reenter the country, as is reflected in the written judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the work-authorization condition in the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement of his sentence and that the written judgment should be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement of Defendant’s sentence and its written judgment. The work-authorization condition does not broaden the restrictions in Defendant’s supervised release already in place under the oral pronouncement. The court wrote that the purported “conflict” is then best described as an ambiguity— one that can be resolved by looking to entire record to determine the sentencing court’s intent in imposing the condition. The court explained that the record makes sufficient reference to Defendant’s immigration history to discern the district court’s efforts to ensure that Defendant complied with the relevant immigration laws. View "USA v. Pelayo-Zamarripa" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, Defendant was sentenced to a 168–month term of imprisonment followed by a 15–year term of supervised release. During Defendant’s term of supervised release, the district court modified a number of the special conditions imposed. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to modify his supervised release conditions and contesting the substantive reasonableness of the conditions imposed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(e)(2) to modify conditions of supervised release and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning these conditions. The court explained that a district court cannot modify an unlawful condition under Section 3583(e)(2) if the illegality of that condition is the basis for modification, regardless of whether it was the defendant or government who brought the motion challenging the conditions. In the case at hand, however, Defendant’s appeal fails because the government did not move for modification solely on the basis of illegality, and the district court did not premise its ruling on the illegality of the special condition.   Next, Defendant contended that even if the district court’s ruling was not based on the illegality of a condition, the district court still lacked authority to modify his conditions of supervised release because there was not a “change in circumstance” that precipitated the modification nor was there a “compelling cause” for the modification. The court explained that it has found no cases requiring a “change in circumstance” or “compelling cause” to modify a condition of supervised release. View "USA v. Caillier" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged with importation of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 952(a). Her lawyer told her that if she pleaded guilty, it was “very likely” that she would be deported. She nonetheless entered the plea. Defendant then learned that her offense did not just possibly make her deportable, it automatically did so. She then moved to withdraw her plea, alleging that if she had known the full scope of the immigration consequences of her plea, she would not have entered it. The district court denied Defendant’s motion and sentenced her. Defendant appealed. At issue is whether a lawyer’s warning of “very likely” deportation satisfies the right to effective assistance of counsel.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when defense counsel tells an alien client that a conviction will have serious immigration consequences, including “very likely” deportation, that defendant has received sufficient advice to make an informed plea decision, as required by the Sixth Amendment. The court explained that there is some ambiguity about what specific words Defendant’s lawyer used when explaining to her the immigration consequences of the plea. But the district court’s factual finding—which is reviewed only for clear error—suggests the following bottom line: Defendant’s lawyer put her on notice of the risk of serious immigration consequences, including deportation. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea. View "USA v. Armendariz" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for knowingly possessing “material”— a cell phone—that contained child pornography. Even though the phone had thousands of such images, the indictment specifically described only four. Defendant pleaded guilty under a plea agreement. After sentencing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay restitution to several individual victims whose likenesses appeared in some images from Defendant’s phone. But these images were among those that the indictment did not specifically describe. Defendant argued that restitution is available only to victims who appeared in the four images specified in the indictment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the indictment charged Defendant with a crime, but Defendant has identified no rule or statute that would require the indictment to also include descriptions of all the images or all the victims. The court explained that, on the contrary, the indictment tracks the statute’s language: “Specifically, Defendant possessed one Motorola Moto G Stylus android cellular phone that contained the following described image files visually depicting a prepubescent minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct . . . .” The object of the possession in the indictment is clearly the “Motorola Moto G Stylus,” not any of the images. The court wrote that the statute criminalizes possession of material containing child pornography. The phone was that “material,” no matter whether it contained one image or twenty thousand. Thus, the court concluded that there was no error with the district court’s finding and amount of restitution. View "USA v. Bopp" on Justia Law

Louisiana challenged the district court’s grant of habeas relief to an inmate who had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 2009. The district court held that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel prejudiced the defense. The State argued that the district court applied the incorrect standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and that the district court improperly granted habeas relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in reviewing an ineffectiveness claim, the court must weigh the evidence that was unaffected by the alleged error, along with the evidence that was affected by the error and the degree to which it was affected, and then assess whether the petitioner “has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.”   Here, the State argued that because a jury might have found that Petitioner shot at law enforcement vehicles during the police chase, it would have imputed specific intent to kill the victim. The court wrote that it agreed with Petitioner that this theory is not supported by Louisiana law. Further, the court explained that the three key pieces of evidence, at the very least, create a “reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Accordingly, the court concluded that Petitioner has carried his burden of proving there is a reasonable probability that his convictions and death sentence were prejudiced as a result of his counsel’s deficient performance. View "Neal v. Vannoy" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds: (1) that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of his vehicle, and (2) that Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search of his home and truck during the stop. Defendant also appealed his sentencing, arguing that the district court erred in relying on the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) to sentence him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) rather than any evidence required by Shepard v. United States 544 U.S. 13 (2005).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress but reversed the district court’s application of the ACCA, vacated his sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Shepard-documents do not conclusively show that Defendant’s predicate offenses occurred on three separate occasions. Thus, the district court’s error affected a substantial right, and the court wrote that it must vacate the sentence. Further, given the fact that Wooden was decided after the notice of appeal was filed, the court remanded the case for a full resentencing, at which time the Government may introduce any additional Shepard evidence into the record. View "USA v. Alkheqani" on Justia Law

Defendant a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of this 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion alleging breach of his plea agreement based on serious allegations against Assistant U.S. Attorneys and ineffective assistance of counsel.   The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s application of the procedural bar to the breach-of-plea agreement claim and reversed and remanded but affirmed its disposition of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court explained that further factfinding is necessary to decide whether Defendant was prejudiced. To show prejudice, “the petition must show ‘not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Here, the court explained that the government argues that Defendant cannot establish prejudice because the Louisiana USAO did not breach the plea agreement and because Defendant would have pled guilty even if he knew of the second indictment. The court reasoned that the district court is in the best position to determine the veracity of these claims. But the district court grounded its ruling on the cause and never addressed the arguments regarding prejudice. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to determine (1) whether Defendant or his counsel knew or should have known of the Texas indictment before Defendant’s sentencing and (2), if not, whether Defendant was prejudiced. View "USA v. Cuff" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of thirteen financial crimes. Defendant filed a series of pro se motions for compassionate release. This appeal arises from Defendant's third such motion. Defendant asked to be released based on the dangers posed by the pandemic, his close confinement with other prisoners, his age, and his preexisting heart condition. He also states that his wire fraud conviction was wrongful because it was predicated on a purely intrastate wire transmission and that a wrongful conviction is an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying relief. The motion was denied in a brief order shortly after being filed.   The Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for the district court to explain its reasons. The court explained that the district court’s order does not tell us that the court based its decision on Section 3553(a) factors. It states only that the court “considered Defendant’s motion and the applicable law” and determined that the motion should be denied. The court explained that, therefore, it has no reliable indication of the reason for the court’s decision to deny relief. View "USA v. Stanford" on Justia Law