Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During Winter Storm Uri in 2021, Pioneer Natural Resources invoked a force majeure clause to excuse its failure to deliver natural gas to MIECO, L.L.C., as per their contract. MIECO sued for damages, arguing that Pioneer improperly invoked the clause. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer, ruling that the force majeure clause was correctly invoked and did not require Pioneer to show that the storm made performance literally impossible. The court also held that Pioneer’s “gas supply” referred only to gas it regularly produced from the Permian Basin, not substitute gas available on the spot market.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially reviewed the case. The court found that the force majeure clause was unambiguous and did not require Pioneer to purchase available spot market gas. It rejected MIECO’s argument that a force majeure event must render performance literally impossible and that “Seller’s gas supply” included spot market gas. The court granted summary judgment for Pioneer, dismissing MIECO’s breach of contract claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case on appeal. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the force majeure clause, agreeing that it did not require performance to be literally impossible and that “Seller’s gas supply” referred only to gas produced from the Permian Basin. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred by not addressing whether Pioneer exercised due diligence to overcome the storm’s impact. The appellate court held that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding whether Pioneer made reasonable efforts to avoid the adverse impacts of the storm. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve these factual disputes. View "Mieco, L.L.C. v. Pioneer Natural Resources USA, Incorporated" on Justia Law

John Craig First purchased an agricultural combine from Rolling Plains Implement Company, which was manufactured by AGCO Corporation. First was told the combine was part of AGCO’s Certified Pre-Owned Program, had roughly 400 hours of use, and had never been to the field. However, these representations were false; the combine was not certified and had over 1,200 hours of use. After experiencing numerous issues with the combine, First discovered in 2019 that it had an extensive repair history and over 900 hours of use. He then filed a lawsuit against Rolling Plains, AGCO Corporation, AGCO Service, AGCO Finance, and other related entities.Initially, First filed his lawsuit in the District Court of Oklahoma County, but it was removed to federal court in Oklahoma, which dismissed the case without prejudice and transferred it to the Northern District of Texas. First amended his complaint multiple times, asserting claims of fraud, breach of warranty, and failure of essential purpose. The district court dismissed the fraud claims against AGCO Corporation, AGCO Service, and AGCO Finance for lack of particularity and granted summary judgment in favor of AGCO Finance on the warranty claims. The case proceeded to trial on the remaining claims, where the jury found that First knew or should have known of the fraud by April 13, 2017, and awarded him $96,000 in damages. However, the district court entered judgment in favor of Rolling Plains based on the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It vacated the district court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of Rolling Plains, finding insufficient evidence to support the jury’s selected date for the statute of limitations. The case was remanded for retrial on when First’s cause of action accrued. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of fraud claims against AGCO Corporation, AGCO Service, and AGCO Finance, and upheld the summary judgment in favor of AGCO Finance on the warranty claims. View "First v. Rolling Plains Implement Co." on Justia Law

Ascension Data & Analytics, Rocktop Partners, and Rocktop Holdings II (collectively, "Ascension") entered into a contract with Pairprep, Inc. for data extraction services. The contract was terminated due to an alleged data breach and Pairprep's failure to extract reliable data. Ascension then contracted with another vendor, Altada Technologies Solutions, but that contract was also terminated early due to Altada's financial crisis. Ascension initiated arbitration proceedings against Pairprep to recover remediation costs incurred as a result of the data breach. Pairprep counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and violation of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act. The arbitration panel rejected Ascension's defenses and granted Pairprep a monetary award.Ascension filed an application in the Northern District of Texas to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that Pairprep's counterclaims were barred by res judicata due to a previous dismissal of identical claims against Altada. Pairprep filed an application to confirm the arbitral award in a Texas state court, which was granted. The district court dismissed Ascension's application for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied its motion for preliminary injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Badgerow v. Walters, which held that a district court must have an independent jurisdictional basis to consider applications to confirm, modify, or vacate arbitral awards under the Federal Arbitration Act. The court found that Ascension had not established an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, as the parties were not diverse and Ascension did not identify any federal law entitling it to relief. Therefore, the court concluded that the dispute over the enforceability of the arbitral award must be litigated in state court. View "Ascension Data v. Pairprep" on Justia Law

The case involves Jennifer Sugg, a student who was dismissed from her Certified Registered Nurse Anesthesiology (CRNA) program at Midwestern University after failing several required courses. Sugg sued Midwestern University and EmergencHealth (EH), alleging breach of contract and fraud. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all causes of action, and Sugg appealed.Sugg enrolled in Midwestern's CRNA program in 2016. She failed a course in her first semester and was placed on academic leave. After retaking the course and receiving a passing grade, she was placed on academic probation due to her low GPA. Sugg later failed her first clinical rotation course and was dismissed from the program. She appealed the decision, and the dismissal was overturned so she could retake the course. However, after failing another course, she was dismissed again. Sugg appealed this decision as well, but it was upheld by the university's Promotion and Graduation Committee and the Dean of the College of Health Sciences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Midwestern University did not breach the contract as it followed its guidelines and dismissed Sugg based on her academic performance. The court also found that Sugg failed to show that the university's decision was a substantial departure from accepted academic norms. Regarding the claims against EH, the court found that EH did not interfere with Sugg's contract with Midwestern University and did not make any false or misleading statements. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Sugg v. Midwestern University" on Justia Law

The case involves Mid Valley Pipeline Company, an interstate pipeline company, and the Board of Mississippi Levee Commissioners. In 1949, the Levee Board granted Mid Valley a permit to construct and maintain two pipelines across a levee in Mississippi. The permit was not limited to a term of years and could be revoked by the Levee Board if Mid Valley failed to comply with any of the permit's conditions. In 2005, Mid Valley was instructed to relocate its pipelines, which it did at a cost of over $700,000. In 2020, the Levee Board informed Mid Valley that it would be charging an annual pipeline crossing fee and would revoke all existing permits for pipelines not currently paying the fee. Mid Valley did not respond to these notices.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment in favor of the Levee Board, dismissing Mid Valley's claim that the imposition of the annual fee and the revocation of the permit violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. The court reasoned that the 1949 permit was not a contract.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the 1949 permit was not a contract. The court noted that under Mississippi law, a contract requires mutual assent, among other elements. The court found that the permit was a unilateral grant of permission by the Levee Board, and there was no evidence of mutual assent to form a contract. Therefore, the Levee Board's actions did not violate the Contract Clause. View "Mid Valley Pipeline v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

In this case, a Delaware statutory trust, NB Taylor Bend, DST (Taylor Bend), borrowed $13 million from Prudential Mortgage Capital Company, LLC (Prudential) to acquire property in Lafayette County, Mississippi. Patrick and Brian Nelson, who were guarantors of the loan, signed an Indemnity and Guaranty Agreement (the Guaranty) in December 2014, personally guaranteeing the loan. After the loan documents were executed, Prudential assigned the loan to Liberty Island Group I, LLC (Liberty), which in turn assigned the loan to North American Savings Bank, FSB (NASB). By May 2020, Taylor Bend struggled to find tenants for the property due to the COVID-19 pandemic and informed NASB of their financial problems. In May 2021, NASB declared Taylor Bend to be in default after the borrower continually failed to make timely loan payments. NASB then filed an action against the Nelsons in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, asserting claims for breach of the Guaranty, for recovery of the loan balance, and for declaratory judgment.The district court entered partial summary judgment for NASB, holding the Nelsons “breached the [G]uaranty and thus owe[d] to [NASB] the amount remaining due on the subject loan.” The court determined that the Guaranty was “freely assignable” and that Prudential adequately assigned all of its rights and interests to Liberty, which in turn assigned all of its rights and interests to NASB, including those conferred by the Guaranty. The court also concluded that the defenses raised by the Nelsons were “unavailable given the borrower’s absence from this litigation.” The court also granted Brian’s motion for summary judgment against Patrick, ruling that the indemnity agreement between the brothers was valid and binding and that Patrick was contractually required to indemnify Brian for “any and all obligations arising out of or relating to this litigation.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Guaranty was properly assigned from Prudential to Liberty and from Liberty to NASB. NASB could therefore properly bring its claims for breach of guaranty and declaratory judgment against the Nelsons to recover the loan deficiency. Moreover, under Mississippi law, Patrick may not interpose equitable defenses that were available only to Taylor Bend to defeat his liability under the Guaranty. The court also held that the deficiency judgment awarded to NASB pursuant to the Guaranty need not be reduced by the third-party sale of the Apartments to Kirkland. NASB had no duty to mitigate its damages under either Mississippi law or the terms of the Guaranty. View "North American Savings Bank v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The case involves Kholkar Vishveshwar Ganpat, an Indian citizen, who contracted malaria while working as a crew member on a Liberian-flagged ship managed by Eastern Pacific Shipping Pte., Limited (EPS), a Singaporean company. Ganpat alleges that EPS failed to adequately provision the ship with antimalarial medication for its voyage to Gabon, a high-risk malaria area in Africa. Ganpat's illness resulted in gangrene, amputation of several toes, and a 76-day hospitalization. He filed a lawsuit against EPS in the United States, seeking relief under the Jones Act and the general maritime law of the United States. He also asserted a contractual claim for disability benefits.The district court initially deferred making a choice-of-law ruling. However, after discovery, the court ruled that the law of the United States (the Jones Act and general maritime law) governs Ganpat’s tort claims and claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. EPS appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's assessment of the Lauritzen-Rhoditis factors, which are used to determine whether maritime claims are governed by the law of the United States or the conflicting law of a foreign nation. The appellate court found that none of the factors that the Supreme Court has deemed significant to the choice-of-law determination in traditional maritime shipping cases involve the United States. The court concluded that Ganpat’s maritime tort and contract claims should be adjudicated under the substantive law of Liberia, the flag state of the ship on which Ganpat was working when he contracted malaria. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Ganpat v. Eastern Pacific Shipping" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between BMC Software, Inc. (BMC) and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) over a Master Licensing Agreement (MLA) and an Outsourcing Attachment. BMC, a software company, and IBM, an information technology company, directly compete in developing and selling mainframe software. However, IBM also provides necessary outsourcing services to BMC and its customers, including AT&T. In 2008, IBM and BMC entered into an MLA and an Outsourcing Attachment, which were amended in 2013 and 2015. The dispute centers around the 2015 amendment, particularly three provisions that govern IBM's use of BMC's software.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court awarded summary judgment to IBM on the claim for breach of Section 1.1 of the 2015 amendment, but denied IBM's motion for summary judgment on BMC’s Section 5.1 breach-of-contract claim. The court concluded that Section 5.4 of the 2015 amendment unambiguously prevented IBM from “displacing” BMC products with IBM software. The court granted partial summary judgment to BMC because IBM “displaced BMC Customer Licenses with IBM products when it implemented Project Swallowtail at AT&T.” After a bench trial, the district court awarded BMC approximately $1.6 billion in damages.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's interpretation of Section 5.4 of the 2015 amendment. The court held that “other valid business reasons” under Section 5.4 supported IBM’s service in effecting AT&T’s switchover, which partially included IBM software. The court concluded that IBM did not breach Section 5.4 by agreeing to provide IT services to perform this task. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed. View "BMC Software v. IBM" on Justia Law

This case revolves around a series of maritime accidents caused by the breakaway of a drillship, the DPDS1, owned by Paragon Asset Company, during Hurricane Harvey in Port Aransas, Texas. Paragon had hired two tugboats owned by Signet Maritime Corporation to keep the vessel moored to the dock during the storm. However, the DPDS1 broke from its moorings, collided with both Signet tugs, and ran aground in the Corpus Christi ship channel. It later refloated and collided with a research pier owned by the University of Texas.The district court found Paragon solely liable for the breakaway, applying maritime negligence law. It concluded that Paragon had unreasonably relied on inaccurate reports about the strength of its mooring system and failed to call for an evacuation when it was the prudent course of action. The court also found that Signet and Paragon were equally liable for the damages suffered by the University of Texas due to the failure of a third tug, supplied by Signet, to prevent the vessel's collision with the pier.Paragon appealed, arguing that the court should have applied a "towage law" standard of duty to Signet's services and contested the district court's rejection of a force majeure defense. Paragon also disputed the court's determination regarding which contract between the parties governed Signet's services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It found no error in the application of maritime negligence law, rejected Paragon's force majeure defense, and agreed with the lower court's determination that Signet's Tariff governed the services provided during Hurricane Harvey. View "Paragon Asset v. American Steamship" on Justia Law

GFS Industries, a Texas limited liability corporation, entered into an agreement with Avion Funding to receive $190,000 in exchange for $299,800 of GFS’s future receivables. GFS stated it had not filed, nor did it anticipate filing, any Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. However, two weeks after signing the agreement, GFS petitioned for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Western District of Texas and elected to proceed under Subchapter V, a 2019 addition to the Bankruptcy Code designed to streamline the Chapter 11 reorganization process for certain small business debtors. Avion filed an adversary complaint in GFS’s bankruptcy, claiming GFS obtained Avion’s financing by misrepresenting whether it anticipated filing for bankruptcy. Avion sought a declaration that GFS’s debt to Avion was therefore nondischargeable.The bankruptcy court agreed with GFS, ruling that in the Subchapter V context, only individuals, not corporations, can be subject to § 523(a) dischargeability actions. The court followed the reasoning of four bankruptcy courts and declined to follow the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Cantwell-Cleary Co. v. Cleary Packaging, LLC (In re Cleary Packaging, LLC), which held that the Subchapter V discharge exceptions apply to both individual and corporate debtors. The bankruptcy court ruled GFS’s debt to Avion was dischargeable and dismissed Avion’s complaint. Avion timely appealed to the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the interplay between § 523(a) and § 1192(2). The court found that § 1192 governs discharging debts of a “debtor,” which the Code defines as encompassing both individual and corporate debtors. The court also noted that other Code provisions explicitly limit discharges to “individual” debtors, whereas § 1192 provides dischargeability simply for “the debtor.” The court concluded that 11 U.S.C. § 1192(2) subjects both corporate and individual Subchapter V debtors to the categories of debt discharge exceptions listed in § 523(a). Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Avion Funding v. GFS Industries" on Justia Law