Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claims arising out of the threatened foreclosure on two residential investment properties he owned. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Deutsche Bank was a mortgagee and could proceed with the foreclosure action; as a non-party mortgagor, and without any evidence showing plaintiff to be an intended third-party beneficiary, the court concluded that plaintiff lacked the requisite standing to bring suit to enforce the terms of the Pooling & Services Agreement that governed the assignment of the mortgagor's notes; and the requirement in Tex. Prop. Code 51.0001(3) that the current mortgagee provide the notice required the court also to consider defendants' argument that quasi-estoppel under Texas law precluded plaintiff from challenging GMAC's status as mortgage servicer. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Farkas v. GMAC Mortgage, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

McLane filed suit to recover certain debts owed by Table Rock for goods and services provided by McLane. McLane also sought to recover debts from Scot Wederquist, owner of a 40% interest in and treasurer of Table Rock, by virtue of a guaranty agreement. On appeal, McLane challenged the district court's holding that Wederquist was not personally liable under the guarantee agreement. The court concluded that the guaranty only secured credit extended by PFS to its affiliates. Because McLane was not an affiliate of PFS, the Table Rock Debts were not secured by the guaranty. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McLane Foodservice Inc. v. Table Rock Restaurants, L.L.C., et al" on Justia Law

After South Louisiana Ethanol filed for bankruptcy, CHS filed suit contending that South Louisiana Ethanol's option contract with Plaquemines constituted the assignment of a litigious right under Louisiana law, entitling CHS to redeem the litigious right by reimbursing Plaquemines for the cost of the option contract plus interest. The district court granted Plaquemines's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the sale fit within the statutory judicial-sale exception to redemption, as described by Bluefields S.S. Co. v. Lala Ferreras Cangelosi S.S. Co. and its predecessors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the law at issue did not apply to judicial sales. View "CHS, Inc. v. Plaquemines Holdings, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Muse, Nelson, and Weiss, and two others formed DGP. The five individuals were DGP’s limited partners; its general partner was MNW LLC, consisting of Muse, Nelson, and Weiss. DGP contracted to buy Gas Solutions and Prospect agreed to lend DGP 95% of the purchase price, subject to due diligence. The agreement prevented DGP from negotiating with other lenders. Prospect’s investigation raised concerns and it informed DGP that it would not make the loan. After DGP threatened to sue, Prospect agreed to pay DGP $3.295 million as reimbursement for DGP’s expenses and DGP agreed to assign Prospect its right to buy Gas Solutions. DGP assigned the purchase contract to DGP’s general partner, MNW, owned by Muse, Nelson and Weiss, who then sold Prospect their individual membership interests, transferring the contract to Prospect. Despite a mutual release, DGP sued Prospect alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with contract. Prospect counterclaimed alleging breach of the covenant not to sue. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Prospect and awarded attorneys’ fees in its award. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the covenants did not bind the individuals. Under an interpretation of the agreement giving effect to all its terms, Nelson and Muse breached the agreement by funding DGP’s lawsuits and violated the release and covenant not to sue.View "Dallas Gas Partners, L.P. v. Prospect Energy Corp" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform oil spill. On appeal, BP challenged the district court's decision upholding the Claims Administrator's interpretation of the settlement agreement between it and the class of parties injured in the oil spill and the district court's dismissal of its action for breach of contract against the Administrator and denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the balance of equities favored a tailored stay where those who experienced actual injury traceable to loss from the Deepwater Horizon accident continued to receive recovery but those who did not receive their payments until this case was fully heard and decided through the judicial process weighed in favor of BP. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and instructed the district court to expeditiously craft a narrowly-tailored injunction that allowed the time necessary for deliberate reconsideration of significant issues on remand. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of BP's suit against the Claim Administrator. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against North American after the moving company severely damaged or loss some of plaintiff's items. Because plaintiff's claims arose out of the interstate shipment of her possessions, the Carmack Amendment, 29 U.S.C. 14706 et seq., provided the sole and exclusive remedy. The district court granted summary judgment for North America, determining that her claim for damages did not satisfy regulatory requirements. The court concluded that plaintiff's demand letter unequivocally requested that North American remit payment totaling $182,750.00 and constituted a written communication containing facts sufficient to identify the shipment, asserting liability, and making claims for the payment of a specified amount under 49 C.F.R. 1005.2(b). The plain language of the regulation's minimum filing requirements required nothing more. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for North America and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. N. Amer. Van Lines of Texas, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Anadarko appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Williams Alaska, arguing that Williams Alaska ignored the parties' agreements to pass through shipping credits on purchased oil. The court, construing the effect of the agreements in light of the contract and the parties' course of performance, concluded that the judgment for Williams Alaska could not stand; the agreements required Williams Alaska to remit any Quality Bank credits it received for the crude oil purchased under the contract; the court rejected Williams Alaska's contention that the obligation to remit the credits expired upon the termination of the agreement; Anadarko filed suit within the four-year statute of limitations and its suit was not time-barred; and Anadarko was entitled to interest on the unpaid Quality Bank credits from the time of breach. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Anadarko, remanding for further proceedings. View "Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute involving a Master Services Agreement (MSA) between BHP and Deep Marine. At issue on appeal was whether Underwriters could enforce BHP's contractual insurance, defense, and indemnity obligations to Deep Marine after Deep Marine's bankruptcy discharge. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo that the MSA required indemnification against liability and that Deep Marine will eventually be held liable, Underwriters still could not prevail because BHP's indemnification obligation runs only to Deep Marine; Deep Marine would not, and could not, incur any loss in the Duval action, so Underwriters could not seek indemnification from BHP; because BHP had agreed to continue providing Deep Marine with a nominal defense, Underwriters would not have a breach of contract claim against BHP; the additional insured and primary insurance requirements do not apply BHP's self-insurance; BHP's only obligation was an indemnification obligation to Deep Marine; unlike Underwriters, it had no secondary liability to injured tort victims, like Duval; and Duval had no claim against BHP and, therefore, tender under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) was improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Duval v. Northern Assurance Co." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Conoco for breach of the Offer Letter and breach of its obligations under a severance plan (the Plan). The court concluded that plaintiff waived any challenge to the Trustee's application of the common law presumption of integration or Texas's parol evidence rule; plaintiff's arguments regarding his change in title were unpersuasive; plaintiff's "at will" employment argument relied on outdated and out-of-context Texas authority and was unpersuasive; the waiver was not invalid and unenforceable on account of fraud in the inducement; plaintiff ratified an alleged fraud, thereby preserving the validity and enforceability of the waiver regardless by submitting a claim to Conoco Human Resources but then continuing to work at Conoco; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), civil enforcement provision "completely preempts" plaintiff's state law claims against Conoco and the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's first motion for remand; the district court correctly denied plaintiff's renewed motion for remand; plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees; and plaintiff waived his claim for breach of the Offer Letter, pertaining to a substantial reduction in his post-merger job position and responsibilities, for failure to plead with specificity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Clayton v. ConocoPhillips Co., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against State Farm, alleging that State Farm was intentionally engaging in delaying tactics to avoid paying on insurance policies. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to any breach of contract claim. Because plaintiff established, as a matter of law, that State Farm had no arguable or legitimate basis for certain periods of delay, she was entitled to present her compensatory damages claim to a finder of fact upon remand. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment as to plaintiff's bad faith claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "James v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co." on Justia Law