Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Comar filed suit against vessel-owning LLCs after the LLCs decided to terminate an agreement with Comar in which Comar would manage the vessels on behalf of the LLCs. JPMorgan and Allegiance provided the financing for the vessel purchases and intervened to defend their preferred ship mortgages. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan and Allegiance. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that breach of the management agreements did not give rise to maritime liens; the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Allegiance and JPMorgan; and the court did not reach whether the district court’s alternate holding that Comar was a joint venturer and therefore foreclosed from asserting a maritime lien was erroneous. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error in concluding that the termination-fee provision is unenforceable; the district court’s award to Comar is plausible in light of the record and not clearly erroneous; the district court did not clearly err in finding that Comar acted in bad faith when arresting the vessels and did not rely on legal advice in good faith; the district court did not clearly err in denying lost-profit and lost-equity damages; and the court concluded that the district court did not commit any other errors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Comar Marine, Corp. v. Raider Marine Logistics" on Justia Law

Ben Lack was employed as a draftsman at Marshall Hunn's architectural design firm. After Lack resigned from his position from a project for Hunn's client, Dan Wilson Homes, Dan Wilson hired Lack to complete the project. Hunn filed suit alleging that Lack and Wilson secretly agreed to cut Hunn out of the business relationship. The district court granted summary judgment to Lack and Wilson on many claims and ruled in favor of them on the remaining claims. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Lack and Wilson never made the alleged secret agreement and Hunn's legal theories lack merit. View "Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes Inc." on Justia Law

Zastrow appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 961–1968, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that defendants’ alleged predicate acts amount to or constitute a threat of continuing racketeering activity; even if plaintiff had produced evidence of a pattern of racketeering activity, he has not demonstrated the existence of an enterprise; and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of contract claim dressed in civil RICO garb. The court also concluded that because plaintiff has alleged that Mercedes Greenway refused to sell him parts after he testified in support of some clients' discrimination claims, he has stated a claim for retaliation under section 1981. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's RICO claim and his section 1982 claim, but vacated as to the section 1981 claim, remanding for further proceedings. View "Zastrow v. Houston Auto Imports Greenway" on Justia Law

This case involves multiple causes of action based on allegations of bribery to procure construction sites. Plaintiff alleged that he and his company GRG were punished for refusing to participate in the corruption of municipal authorities. On appeal, the court concluded that GRG has met its summary judgment burden with respect to its Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., claims and has sufficiently supported those elements of its claims for tortious interference with business relations that the district court ruled on. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing HISD from liability for RICO and federal constitutional violations and state law claims; affirmed the judgment dismissing Defendant Marshall from liability for constitutional violations; reversed and remanded for further proceedings the summary judgment dismissing the RICO claims against the non-HISD defendants insofar as they allege injury covering the remainder of the 2009 job-order contract period; and reversed and remanded or further proceedings the summary judgment dismissing the claim against the non-HISD defendants for tortious interference with prospective business relations and the civil conspiracy claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. View "Gil Ramirez Group, L.L.C. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

This case arose from a complicated series of transactions often called “fronting arrangements” in the insurance industry. Lincoln was awarded $16.5 million on its tortious interference claims against CSi and Alpha. The case involved the diversion of funds from a reinsurance arrangement involving insurer Lincoln and a claims administrator, U.S. Auto. Numerous issues were raised on appeal. The court affirmed: (1) the judgment entered against CSi and Alpha; (2) the grant of summary judgment on Lincoln’s conversion claims; (3) the denial of Lincoln’s cross-motion for summary judgment on its fiduciary duty claims; and (4) the denial of the motion to alter the judgment to include ZVN. The court also held that Lincoln forfeited the right to appeal the dismissal of its claims against Doug Maxwell asserting alter ego liability. The court reversed: (1) the refusal to alter the judgment to include Lincoln General’s breach of contract claim against U.S. Auto; (2) the grant of summary judgment on all the fiduciary duty claims that Lincoln appealed, including the claims for aiding and abetting; and (3) the tortious interference claim against Jim Maxwell. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Auto Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a crew member aboard a supply vessel that was mud-roped to the Deepwater Horizon and was off-loading drilling mud on the night of the 2010 blowout, filed suit claiming that he sustained physical injuries when the explosion rocked the vessel and threw him against a bulkhead. On appeal, BP challenged the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff where the district court, over BP's objection, enforced a putative settlement agreement against BP in plaintiff's favor. The court held that the parties formed a binding settlement agreement; the district court correctly excused plaintiff’s failure to sign the release document where BP's refusal to send plaintiff the release excused that failure; but the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether plaintiff fraudulently induced BP into entering the settlement agreement. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order in part, but vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Young v. BP" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, BP appealed three settlement awards, related to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, that it paid to nonprofits through its Court-Supervised Settlement Program. On appeal, BP argued that the Claims Administrator improperly interpreted the Settlement Agreement. The awards were based on the Claims Administrator’s determination that nonprofits may count donations and grants as “revenue” under the terms of the Agreement (the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation). As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it has jurisdiction over this appeal under the collateral order doctrine and that BP's appeals were timely. On the merits, the court concluded that BP failed to show that the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation violates the plain language of the Agreement. The court held that the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation does not alter the class definition in violation of Rule 23 or Article III. Finally, the court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of review of the individual awards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

BP and the Economic Property Damages Class entered into a Settlement Agreement in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. At issue is the district court's order approving the Final Rules Governing Discretionary Court Review of Appeal Determinations for claims processed through the Settlement Program. After determining that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, the court concluded that the parties preserved their right to appeal from the district court under the settlement agreement. The court followed its sister circuits' decisions in similar cases involving consent decrees to hold that, where a settlement agreement does not resolve claims itself but instead establishes a mechanism pursuant to which the district court will resolve claims, parties must expressly waive what is otherwise a right to appeal from claim determination decisions by a district court. In this case, the parties have preserved their right to appeal. Finally, the court concluded that the Final Rules violate the right for parties to appeal claim determinations to this court where the district court failed to provide for the docketing of its orders regarding requests for review. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Lake Eugenie Land v. BP" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a contract dispute between Amerijet and Zero Gravity where Amerijet operated parabolic flights for Zero Gravity and provided maintenance services. On appeal, Amerijet challenged the district court's anti-suit injunction and petitioned for a writ of mandamus setting aside the district court's order reopening this case after the parties purportedly settled their dispute. Amerijet argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it erred in setting aside Amerijet's voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The court affirmed the injunction and denied the petition, concluding that a pre-removal answer meeting the requirements of state law suffices to preclude voluntary dismissal under Rule 41. View "Amerijet Int'l v. Zero Gravity Corp." on Justia Law

Arch Specialty Insurance Company appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company. In 2006, Amerisure issued a Texas Commercial Package Policy to Admiral Glass & Mirror Co. The policy afforded coverage in excess of any coverage afforded by a controlled insurance program policy. Arch issued an Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“OCIP”) policy to Endeavor Highrise, LP and its contractors and subcontractors for bodily injury and property damage arising out of construction of the Endeavor Highrise. Admiral was a subcontractor insured under the OCIP policy. Endeavor sued Admiral and others for faulty work. Amerisure tendered the lawsuit to Arch as the primary insurer. Prior to Arch accepting the defense, Amerisure incurred $23,879.27 in defense fees. In April 2012, Arch withdrew from defense of the Endeavor lawsuit asserting that attorneys’ fees, defense costs, and settlements of $2,000,000.00 from defending Admiral and other subcontractor defendants exhausted policy limits. Amerisure took over the defense and incurred additional fees and costs of $114,957.14 before settling the claims against Admiral. In total, Arch paid a settlement of $1,555,000.00 and defense costs of $159,543.15 under the general coverage limit of the OCIP, and paid settlements totaling $1,472,032.61 and defense costs of $527,967.36 under the products-completed operations coverage of the OCIP policy. Amerisure sued Arch in Texas state court for breach of contract, contending that Arch wrongfully refused to defend and indemnify Admiral. Amerisure argued on appeal that the term “expenses” in the Supplementary Payments provision did not include attorneys’ fees and other costs of defense. It also argued that, even if “expenses” includes defense costs, the effect of the statement “All other terms and conditions of this Policy remain unchanged” read together with the language that the duty to defend expires when “we have used up the [policy limits] in the payment of judgments or settlements” means that the policy limits are eroded only by payment of “judgments or settlements,” not defense costs. For its part, Arch argued that “expenses” included defense costs and that the endorsement controlled over any contrary language such that it converts this policy into an eroding policy. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Arch, concluding that the endorsement transformed the policy into an “eroding limits” policy. The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment regarding the duty to indemnify, reversed the district court’s judgment regarding the duty to defend, and rendered judgment for Arch. View "Amerisure Mutual Ins. Co. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law