Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tarango Trucking, L.L.C. (“Tarango”) appeals from a judgment declaring that its insurer, Penn-America Insurance Company (“PennAmerica”), owes neither defense nor indemnity concerning third-party claims against Tarango concerning a fatal accident on its property.At the time of the accident, Tarango was insured under a commercial general liability policy issued by Penn-America (“the Policy”). Penn-America defended Tarango but reserved its right to contest coverage. Texas law governs the insurance issues in this diversity case. The Policy contains both a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify. PennAmerica must show that the plain language of an exclusion avoids coverage of all claims within the confines of the eight-corners rule. Penn-America argues that the Policy’s Auto Exclusion satisfies this burden. Because the Parking Exception is an exception to the Auto Exclusion, it is reasonable to interpret it as employing the same “arising-out-of” nexus as the Auto Exclusion.The Fifth Circuit held that the Parking Exception applies to bodily injury and property damage arising out of parking. Because the petition alleges some claims that arise out of parking and are potentially covered by the Policy, Penn-America must defend Tarango. The court also held that it was premature for the district court to decide the indemnity issue. View "Penn-America Ins v. Tarango Trucking" on Justia Law

After incurring a million-plus-dollar loss for sending gold coins to a thief who forged check payments and intercepted the shipment of those coins, Gage filed an insurance claim. The underwriters denied the claim citing a coverage exclusion for losses incurred “consequent upon” delivering insured property to any third party against payment by a fraudulent check.The Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Texas Supreme Court: Whether Gage's losses were sustained consequent upon delivering insured property to UPS against a fraudulent check, causing the policy exclusion to apply; if yes. whether UPS's alleged errors are considered an independent cause of the losses under Texas law. The Texas Supreme Court concluded the ordinary meaning of “consequent upon” is but-for causation and answered “yes” to the first question. On the second question, the Texas Supreme Court answered “no” by concluding UPS’s alleged negligence was a concurrent cause of loss, dependent upon Gage’s handing over of the gold coins against fraudulent checks. In light of those answers, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. Gage’s losses were excluded from coverage. Gage’s extra-contractual claims were properly dismissed as they were predicated on coverage under the policy. View "Dillon Gage, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds" on Justia Law

CP and Cimarex entered into the Master Service Agreement (MSA). Cimarex hired CP to work at Cimarex’s Oklahoma oil well. CP assigned Trent, an employee of one of its subcontractors, to work at the well. A flash fire occurred at the well. Trent was severely burned Trent sued Cimarex and CP. Cimarex and its insurers settled with Trent for $4.5 million. The Texas Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (TOAIA) voids indemnity agreements that pertain to wells for oil, gas, or water or to mineral mines unless the indemnity agreement is supported by liability insurance. The MSA's mutual indemnity provision required Cimarex and CP to indemnify each other; CP was obligated to obtain a minimum of $1 million in commercial general liability insurance and $2 million in excess liability insurance, Cimarex was required to obtain $1 million in general liability insurance and $25 million in excess liability insurance. CP obtained more coverage than the minimum required by the MSA, but its policy limited indemnity coverage. Cimarex sought indemnity from CP, which paid Cimarex $3 million, but refused to indemnify Cimarex for the remaining $1.5 million.The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for CP. TOAIA contemplates that mutual indemnity obligations will be enforceable only up to the limits of insurance each party has agreed to provide in equal amounts to the other party as indemnitee. CP did not breach the MSA because CP was only required to indemnify Cimarex up to $3 million. View "Cimarex Energy Co. v. CP Well Testing L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) agreed to pay Parkcrest $11 million to build affordable housing. Liberty was Parkcrest’s surety. HANO terminated Parkcrest before the project was done. Parkcrest sued, alleging breach of contract. Liberty and HANO executed a “Takeover Agreement,” incorporating the original contract; Liberty stepped into Parkcrest’s shoes to finish the project. Liberty hired Parkcrest as its completion contractor. HANO claimed that Liberty had forfeited any right to continue working on the project and requested that it relinquish control of the site. Liberty claimed the termination was wrongful. Rather than following the contract’s dispute resolution procedures, Liberty filed a complaint-in-intervention in the HANO-Parkcrest litigation.The district court concluded that HANO had breached the Takeover Agreement and the underlying HANO Contract by terminating Liberty for convenience after Liberty had substantially completed the project, awarded Liberty and Parkcrest damages, and held HANO liable to Liberty for attorney’s fees, but left those fees unquantified. The Fifth Circut affirmed but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the fee award because a fee award is not a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. 1291 until reduced to a sum certain. The district court then awarded Liberty $526,192.25 in fees. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Liberty’s claim for fees arises from the contract, which authorizes fee-shifting “upon the receipt by [HANO] of a properly presented claim.” Liberty breached the contract’s dispute-resolution procedures, this breach was unexcused, so Liberty is entitled to nothing. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Housing Authority of New Orleans" on Justia Law

MDK, a Bolivian entity, filed suit against Proplant, a Texas-based corporation under both breach of contract and tort theories. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Proplant, concluding that MDK did not meet the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) standard for deferring summary judgment, and thus the district court did not err by ruling on Proplant's summary judgment motion before the parties had completed discovery. In this case, MDK's opening brief failed to adequately present its arguments that Proplant's summary judgment motion and the district court's summary judgment order were "legally deficient." Therefore, MDK has waived these issues.Finally, the court rejected MDK's contention that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on MDK's two breach of contract claims. In regard to the first claim, the court concluded that MDK has not pointed to any evidence suggesting that it did in fact execute the October Document. In regard to the second claim, the court concluded that MDK failed to meet its burden of demonstrating by competent evidence that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether YPFB awarded Proplant the O&M contract. View "MDK Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada v. Proplant Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Schlumberger in an action brought by Hess for breach of contract. Hess had contracted with Schlumberger to provide safety valves for several of Hess's deep-sea oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico. After Hess experienced problems with the valves, Schlumberger recalled them. Hess filed suit claiming that it was entitled to revoke its acceptance of the valves that Schlumberger had provided.The court upheld the district court's interpretation of two sections of API 14A standards that were incorporated into the sales contract. In this case, the district court did not err in interpreting API 14A Section 6.3.2.2 to require only that the drawings remain substantially the same and that the valves be manufactured using those drawings. Furthermore, the district court did not err in interpreting API 14A Section 7.6.2 regarding the seal spring (aka rosette spring) and that the contract contemplated dimensional inspection of the seal assemblies rather than inspection of the rosette springs within that assembly. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in making its factual findings relative to Schlumberger's compliance with 6.3.2.2. Assuming without deciding that Hess is correct that the proper standard is "producing cause," the court concluded that the district court's order is consistent with the application of such a rule. Finally, the district court did not clearly err in finding that any alleged non-conformity did not cause the valves' failure which in turn would have impaired their value. View "Hess Corp. v. Schlumberger Technology Corp." on Justia Law

Landmark issued a “deductible buyback” insurance policy, covering SCD properties. SCD’s high-deductible primary insurance policy was issued by Lexington. The Landmark policy covers damage also covered by Lexington and states: “Perils Covered: Windstorm or Hail associated with a Named Storm,” following the Lexington policy's Named Storm definition: “a storm that has been declared by the National Weather Service to be a Hurricane, Typhoon, Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Storm, or Tropical Depression.” In August 2017, Hurricane Harvey, a “Named Storm,” under the Lexington and Landmark policies, caused tremendous flooding damage to one of SCD’s insured properties. There was no reported wind damage to the property nor evidence that the property suffered damage from hail. The Lexington policy paid out millions of dollars for loss in excess of the “Windstorm deductible” in that policy,Landmark sought a declaration that SCD’s policy did not apply to the loss sustained. The Fifth Circuit reversed a judgment in favor of SCD and rendered judgment for Landmark. If SCD’s interpretation of the policy were correct, then the Landmark policy simply could have stated that all damage from a Named Storm is covered (regardless of the peril that caused the damage). The policy does not state that but frames its coverage as applying to specific “[c]overed perils.” View "Landmark American Insurance Co. v. SCD Memorial Place II, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In this dispute over terms of an online auction, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion by improperly admitting evidence and taking judicial notice of the terms. The court explained that Exhibit 41, an internet printout, was not properly authenticated, and the district court abused its discretion by determining that the exhibit was fit under Federal Rule of Evidence 803. Furthermore, the district court erred in taking judicial notice of the terms because a private internet archive falls short of being a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned as required by Rule 201. Because the district court's errors were not harmless, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Weinhoffer v. Davie Shoring, Inc." on Justia Law

BP retained the Responders (O’Brien’s and NRC) for nearly $2 billion to assist with the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Thousands of the Responders' workers filed personal injury lawsuits against BP, which were consolidated and organized into “pleading bundles.” The B3 bundle included “all claims for personal injury and/or medical monitoring for exposure or other injury occurring after the explosion and fire of April 20, 2010.” In 2012, BP entered the “Medical Settlement” on the B3 claims with a defined settlement class. The opt-out deadline closed in October 2012. The Medical Settlement created a new type of claim for latent injuries, BackEnd Litigation Option (BELO) claims. After the settlement, plaintiffs could bring opt-out B3 claims if they did not participate in the settlement, and BELO claims if they were class members who alleged latent injuries and followed the approved process. Responders were aware of the settlement before the district court approved it but neither Responder had control over the negotiations, nor did either approve the settlement.In 2017, BP sought indemnification for 2,000 BELO claims by employees of the Responders. The Fifth Circuit held that BP was an additional insured up to the minimum amount required by its contract with O’Brien’s; the insurance policies maintained by O’Brien’s cannot be combined to satisfy the minimum amount. O’Brien’s is not required to indemnify BP because BP materially breached its indemnification provision with respect to the BELO claims. View "O'Brien's Response Management, L.L.C. v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, the Archdiocese purchased a roof membrane system from Siplast, for installation at a Bronx high school. Siplast guaranteed that the system would “remain in a watertight condition for a period of 20 years.” In 2016, school officials observed water damage in the ceiling tiles after a rainstorm and notified the installing contractor and Siplast. A designated Siplast contractor unsuccessfully attempted to repair the damage and prevent leaks. The Archdiocese ultimately obtained an estimate for remediation and replacement of approximately $5,000,000.The ensuing lawsuit alleged “Breach of the Guarantee” Siplast submitted a claim to its insurer, EMCC, asserting coverage under commercial general liability policies that covered “property damage” caused by an “occurrence,” defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The policies were subject to exclusions for “Your Product/Your Work” and “Contractual Liability.” The district court granted EMCC summary judgment, finding that while the complaint did allege property damage that was caused by an “occurrence,” the alleged damage fit within the Your Product/Your Work Exclusion. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that EMCC had a duty to defend. The underlying complaint contains allegations of damage to property other than Siplast’s roof membrane as part of the claim against Siplast; the exclusion does not apply. View "Siplast, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law