Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants, manufacturers and distributors of liquid crystal display (LCD) panels, jointly removed this case to federal district court on the grounds that (1) the action was a class action under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(1)(B), or (2) the action was a mass action under the CAFA. The State moved to remand the case to state court and the district court granted the motion. Because it was undisputed that there were more than 100 consumers, the court found that there were more than 100 claims at issue in this case. Further, no disqualifying exceptions to the term "mass action" was applicable. Consequently, the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and the court found removal to be proper. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "State of Mississippi v. AU Optronics Corp., et al" on Justia Law

This case involved an interlocutory appeal from an order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification where the certified class putatively consisted of various governmental entities within the State of Louisiana whose representatives entered into contracts with defendants for cellular telephone service. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in deceptive billing practices that constituted a breach of contract and violated the state's unfair trade and consumer protection laws. The court agreed with defendants that the district court abused its discretion when it certified plaintiffs' class because, in doing so, it effectively certified an "opt in" class, which was impermissible under Rule 23. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanding for further proceedings. View "Ackal, et al v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a class action suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, against the largest United States casket manufacturer, Batesville; and against the three largest United States funeral home chains and distributors of Batesville caskets. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to foreclose competition from independent casket discounters (ICDs) who sold caskets directly to consumers at discount prices and maintained artificially high consumer casket prices in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, by engaging in a group boycott to prevent ICDs from selling Batesville caskets and dissuading consumers from purchasing caskets from ICDs. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants used concerted efforts to restrict casket price competition, including coordinating prices, limiting the advertisement of pricing, and engaging in sham discounting. The court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the claim for attorneys' fees and costs; affirmed the district court's dismissal of Consumer Appellants' and FCA's injunctive relief claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and affirmed the district court's denial of class certification. View "Funeral Consumers Alliance Inc, et al v. Service Corp. Intl, et al" on Justia Law

An individual owing a debt sued a debt collection agency. The suit alleged the agency's debt-collection letter violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, by contradicting and overshadowing the statutory notices in the letter. The standard for evaluating any potential deception in the letter was whether an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer would be confused by the letter. The district court concluded that the letter did not violate the statute. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the debt collection agency's letter was not inconsistent with and did not overshadow the letter's Section 1692g(a)'s notice; and (2) therefore, a least-sophisticated or unsophisticated consumer would not be confused by the letter. View "McMurray v. ProCollect, Inc." on Justia Law

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP); Countrywide Home Loans of Texas, Incorporated; and Countrywide Home Loans, Incorporated appealed an order for remand where the district court dismissed the lone federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667f, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Defendants argued that this was an abuse of discretion because Countrywide Home Loans of Texas was improperly joined and thus the district court had diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims. Plaintiffs argued that there was no improper joinder and that defendants waived any right to argue improper joinder or the existence of diversity jurisdiction when they failed to remove the action to federal court within 30 days of service of the original complaint that listed Countrywide Home Loans of Texas. The court held that defendants carried their burden of proving improper joinder; the district court had jurisdiction over the state law claims at the time of remand; and the exercise of that jurisdiction was mandatory. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision to remand the state law claims to Texas state court and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when elderly widow Dorothy Chase Stewart filed for bankruptcy in 2007 and Wells Fargo Bank filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court reciting debts owed from an outstanding mortgage on Ms. Stewart's house. The bankruptcy court subsequently found that Wells Fargo's mortgage claims exhibited systematic errors arising from its highly automated, computerized loan-administration program and issued an injunction requiring Wells Fargo to audit every proof of claim it had filed on or filed after April 13, 2007; to provide a complete loan history on every account and file that history with the appropriate court; and "to amend...proofs of claim already on file to comply with the principles established in this case and [In re] Jones." Wells Fargo appealed, challenging the claim amount and the injunction. The court vacated the injunction as exceeding the reach of the bankruptcy court. Because neither the injunction nor the calculation of Ms. Stewart's debt was properly before the court, the court dismissed as moot Wells Fargo's appeal of legal rulings underlying the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the mortgage.

Plaintiffs brought an enforcement suit against defendants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding that defendants' practice of offering discounted telephone services to employees and retirees ("Concession") was not a pension plan in whole or in part. The court affirmed summary judgment and held that the district court did not err in holding that Concession was one plan, at least as it regarded to all retirees; in refusing to examine the out-of-region retiree Concession in isolation; in concluding that although Concession did provide income to some retirees, such income was incidental to the benefit, and was not designed for the purpose of paying retirement income; and in holding that Concession did not result in a deferral of income.

Plaintiff sued defendant under the Louisiana Products Liability Act ("LPLA"), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2800.51-.59, for his injuries that resulted from his firing a Remington Model 710 rifle ("rifle"). At issue was whether the district court erred in its findings regarding the bolt-assembly pin and its "reasonably-anticipated-use" finding. The court applied a highly deferential standard and held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that the bolt-assembly pin was not in the rifle when plaintiff fired it and suffered injuries from the uncontained explosion. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err when it found that defendant should not have expected the rifle to be fired after someone had removed, but failed to install, the bolt-assembly pin. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial.