Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a class action alleging that the Bank violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. 1963 et seq., by failing to post an external notice of fees on its ATMs. While the suit was pending but before class certification, Congress amended the EFTA to eliminate the external notice requirement. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim and denied class certification. The court concluded that plaintiff has standing to bring her claim where Congress's determination that consumers were entitled to the fee information they need to decline a transaction before investing the time needed to initiate it protects a substantive, if small, right, and its deprivation is an injury-in-fact that allows plaintiff to pursue her claim; the Bank's attempt to "pick off" plaintiff's claim before the court could decide the issue of class certification fits squarely within the "relation back" doctrine, which saves her claim from mootness at this stage; the EFTA amendment eliminating the "two notice" provision does not apply retroactively to plaintiff's claim; and the EFTA amendment poses no more a barrier for putative class members than it does for plaintiff, for claims alleging violations before the amendment was enacted. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of class certification and remanded for further considerations. View "Mabary v. Home Town Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking statutory damages under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(2)(A), claiming that Buy Direct (dba Direct Buy) failed to provide the dates that payments would be due on an installment contract for membership in Direct Buy's wholesale membership club. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Direct Buy, concluding that Direct Buy failed to make the required disclosures to plaintiffs, who therefore were entitled to damages. View "Lea, et al. v. Buy Direct, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit pro se under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., against Equable, as successor in interest to Hilco. Plaintiff alleged that Hilco obtained his consumer credit report without a permissible purpose or plaintiff's consent, in violation of the section 1681(b). The magistrate court granted Equable's motion for summary judgment on the ground that certain discovery responses showed that plaintiff's suit was time barred under section 1681p(1) because he did not file suit within two years of receiving the May 2009 report. The court affirmed, concluding that, in light of Hyde v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank in Jefferson Parish, the limitations period began to run when plaintiff discovered that Hilco had obtained his credit report without his consent. View "Mack v. Equable Ascent Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Progressive for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),15 U.s.C. 1692 et seq., as well as violations of Texas state law. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Progressive's unaccepted offer of judgment rendered plaintiff's claims moot. The court concluded, however, that Progressive's incomplete offer of judgment did not render plaintiff's FDCPA claims moot. Under the FDCPA, an individual claimant was eligible to recover actual damages under section 1692k(a)(1). Plaintiff requested actual damages. Progressive's Rule 68 offer of judgment did not offer to meet plaintiff's full demand for relief because it did not include actual damages. Therefore, Progressive's offer left a live controversy for the court to resolve, plaintiff maintained a personal stake in the outcome of the action, and the offer did not render plaintiff's FDCPA claims moot. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Payne v. Progressive Fin. Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Serna defaulted on a loan he obtained through the Internet that was subsequently purchased by Samara. Attorney Onwuteaka, who owns Samara, obtained a default judgment and attempted to collect. Serna then filed suit in federal court, alleging that because he neither resided nor entered the loan agreement in Harris County where the judgment entered, the suit violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, venue requirement. A magistrate found Serna’s suit was untimely under the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period because he filed his complaint more than one year after Onwuteaka filed his petition in the underlying debt-collection action. The Fifth Circuit reversed, that the alleged FDCPA violation arose only after Serna received notice of the underlying debt collection action. The FDCPA provides that a debtor may bring an action “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” A violation of does not occur until the debt-collection suit is filed and the alleged debtor is notified of the suit.View "Serna v. Law Office of Joseph Onwuteaka" on Justia Law

This case involved the foreclosure sale of certain property owned by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of their claims against BAC and NDE under the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), Tex. Fin. Code 392.304(a), the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 17.41 et seq., and Texas common law. The court concluded that plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against BAC for misrepresenting the status or nature of the services that it rendered. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the TDCA claims under section 392.304(a)(14) as to that basis, remanding for further proceedings. Consequently, the court also reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' request for an accounting from NDE. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Miller, et al. v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, seeking damages and declaratory relief, brought a diversity action against two national banking associations, alleging violations of Louisiana consumer protection law in connection with a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. The district court dismissed the action in part pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and in part for failure to state a claim of a statutory exemption under Louisiana law. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims, which were "independent claims" for Rooker-Feldman purposes. However, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed nonetheless for failure to state a claim where the Louisiana consumer protection law did not provide plaintiff with an avenue of relief because both banks were exempt and where plaintiff had not disputed that her declaratory judgment could be dismissed under Louisiana's preclusion principles. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

This appeal involved claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Santander, a consumer finance company, was found by a jury to have negligently failed to comply with the law by promptly investigating plaintiff's credit dispute with Santander and to correct the information Santander misreported to a credit agency. On appeal, Santander contended that plaintiff did not offer legally sufficient evidence of his various claimed items of damage; plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages; and the district court improperly admitted letters from third parties to plaintiff. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment. View "Smith v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants, manufacturers and distributors of liquid crystal display (LCD) panels, jointly removed this case to federal district court on the grounds that (1) the action was a class action under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(1)(B), or (2) the action was a mass action under the CAFA. The State moved to remand the case to state court and the district court granted the motion. Because it was undisputed that there were more than 100 consumers, the court found that there were more than 100 claims at issue in this case. Further, no disqualifying exceptions to the term "mass action" was applicable. Consequently, the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and the court found removal to be proper. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "State of Mississippi v. AU Optronics Corp., et al" on Justia Law

This case involved an interlocutory appeal from an order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification where the certified class putatively consisted of various governmental entities within the State of Louisiana whose representatives entered into contracts with defendants for cellular telephone service. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in deceptive billing practices that constituted a breach of contract and violated the state's unfair trade and consumer protection laws. The court agreed with defendants that the district court abused its discretion when it certified plaintiffs' class because, in doing so, it effectively certified an "opt in" class, which was impermissible under Rule 23. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanding for further proceedings. View "Ackal, et al v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, et al" on Justia Law