Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of capital murder for beating to death her two-year-old daughter. Petitioner argues that the state trial court denied her constitutional right to present a complete defense by excluding two expert witnesses from testifying at the guilt phase of her trial. The now-vacated panel decision concluded that petitioner fairly presented a complete-defense claim to the state courts; the state courts simply overlooked it; and petitioner therefore got the benefit of de novo review of her complete-defense claim in federal court. The court concluded that this was error.The court concluded that the state courts adjudicated petitioner's claims on the merits and thus the relitigation bar in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies. Evaluating the relevant state court decisions under the relitigation bar, the court rejected petitioner's contention that she satisfied the relitigation exceptions. In this case, the court rejected petitioner's claim that the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986); the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); and the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. The court noted that various dissenting opinions contradict AEDPA, Supreme Court precedent, and the record in this case. View "Lucio v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. After the district court rejected the petition and denied a certificate of appealability (COA), petitioner sought a COA under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2) to appeal numerous issues.The Fifth Circuit granted a COA and received additional briefing on a single issue pertinent to his Batson challenges to the jury's makeup. The court affirmed the district court's refusal to consider newly discovered evidence relevant to petitioner's Batson claim, because Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), bars its consideration. Furthermore, the court found no error in the district court's conclusions where petitioner failed to meet the standards embodied in section 2254(d); he has no basis to offer evidence outside the state record; and a certain spreadsheet was correctly barred from consideration in federal court. The court rejected petitioner's five other claims for relief and denied a COA on each of these claims. View "Broadnax v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the University as barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff's action involved employment discrimination and retaliation claims, and he sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The court held that Texas A&M is an agency of the State of Texas, so a suit against the former is a suit against the latter. Furthermore, neither of the two exceptions to sovereign immunity apply in these circumstances. In this case, Congress did not abrogate the State's sovereign immunity, and the State did not knowingly and plainly waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit. View "Sullivan v. Texas A&M University System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a detainee in the Harris County jail awaiting trial, filed what he described as a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from pretrial custody, contending that the conditions at the jail were insufficient to protect his constitutional rights in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. The district court denied relief regardless of whether the petition was brought under federal habeas law, 28 U.S.C. 2241, or civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Fifth Circuit construed plaintiff's petition as seeking habeas relief and affirmed the district court's denial of such relief. The court concluded that the Great Writ does not, in this circuit, afford release for prisoners held in state custody due to adverse conditions of confinement. Therefore, plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). View "Rice v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against seven district judges of Tarrant County's family law courts in their official capacities, District Judge Patricia Baca-Bennett in her personal capacity, and the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she was fired for refusing to support a political candidate and for her husband's political activity.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit, holding that plaintiff was in a policymaking and confidential role and thus, under the Elrod/Branti exception, could constitutionally be discharged for the exercise of rights that would otherwise by protected by the First Amendment. The court also held that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claims against the County because plaintiff failed to plead a constitutional violation. Furthermore, because Baca-Bennett did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights, this is enough for Baca-Bennett to be entitled to qualified immunity. Even if plaintiff's rights had been violated, Baca-Bennett certainly did not have "fair warning that [her] conduct violate[d] a constitutional right." View "Haddock v. Tarrant County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against SHSU and TSUS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act, alleging sex discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. Plaintiff then filed a separate action against UHD and UHS under Title VII, alleging that UHD's denial of employment constituted retaliation.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of all of plaintiff's claims and remanded, directing that plaintiff's cases be reassigned to a new district judge for further proceedings. The court noted that a litigant has the fundamental right to fairness in every proceeding; fairness is upheld by avoiding even the appearance of partiality; and when a judge's actions stand at odds with these basic notions, the court must act or suffer the loss of public confidence in our judicial system. In this case, the court concluded that the district court erred in its sua sponte dismissal of TSUS and UHS where the district court failed to give plaintiff an adequate opportunity to respond before it dismissed her claims against TSUS and UHS with prejudice. Furthermore, it follows that the district court likewise erred when it denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion by repeatedly denying plaintiff's requests for discovery, including her requests to depose witnesses with knowledge material to her claims. View "Miller v. Sam Houston State University" on Justia Law

Since 2011, Jonesboro’s wastewater system has spewed sewage onto Stringer’s property and into her home during heavy rains. Stringer repeatedly complained to the town and its mayor, then brought a “citizen suit” under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1365, with constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for the uncompensated taking of her property and the mayor’s retaliation. Stringer ran against the mayor in 2014 and claims he retaliated by ignoring her pleas, getting the town to sue her frivolously, and refusing to provide sandbags. The Louisiana Departments of Health (LDOH) and Environmental Quality (LDEQ) have long known about the problems. LDEQ sent the town warning letters and issued compliance orders about unauthorized discharges, including those afflicting Stringer. LDOH issued a compliance order about the discharges on Stringer’s property, imposed mandatory ameliorative measures, and assessed a daily fine. The district court dismissed, finding that the CWA prohibits such suits when a state is addressing the problem through “comparable” state law and finding her section 1983 claims untimely under Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period. The Fifth Circuit affirmed as to the section 1983 claims. Stringer was long aware of the underlying facts and failed to sue within a year. The Fifth Circuit reversed in part. The enforcement action to which the court pointed—the state health department’s enforcement of the sanitary code—is not “comparable” to the CWA under circuit precedent. View "Stringer v. Town of Jonesboro" on Justia Law

In 1998, Brown was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Before Brown’s anticipated 2011 release, the state obtained a civil commitment order under the Texas Sexually Violent Predator Act. The Act required civilly committed persons to “reside in a Texas residential facility under contract with" OVSOM or another approved location and to participate in OVSOM-provided “treatment and supervision.” While confined at Fort Worth, Brown was indicted for violating his commitment terms and confined at the Tarrant County Jail as a pre-trial detainee. Brown posted bond and was transferred to the Cold Springs Jail, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding with OVSOM’s predecessor: Tarrant County (Sheriff Anderson) would provide “housing, meals, and other usual services” in the Work Release Program; OVSOM's predecessor had responsibility for “obtaining and paying for all programs" required for its clients. Brown, acquitted of violating his commitment terms, did not receive sex offender treatment at Cold Springs.Brown filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, based on the 20-day confinement without sex offender treatment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his claims against Tarrant County and Anderson. Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity and Brown states no claim against the county. At the time of the challenged conduct, there was a circuit split on whether sexually violent or dangerous offenders have a due process right to treatment. Anderson’s failure to provide Brown with sex offender treatment did not violate clearly established law. View "Brown v. Tarrant County" on Justia Law

Louisiana bar owners challenged the Governor’s restrictions to the operation of bars in response to COVID-19. The Bar Closure Order prohibited on-site consumption of alcohol and food at “bars,” but permitted on-site consumption of alcohol and food at “restaurants.” Two district courts denied the bar owners’ motions for preliminary injunctive relief. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court applied “rational basis” review. The classification at issue is based on a business permit, and does not differentiate on the basis of a suspect class. The Bar Closure Order’s differential treatment of bars operating with AG permits is at least rationally related to reducing the spread of COVID-19 in higher-risk environments. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. View "Big Tyme Investments, L.L.C. v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Herndon pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida to bank fraud with an agreed loss amount of over $3 million. Before sentencing, Herndon was diagnosed with cancer and underwent extensive medical treatment. In 2013, she was sentenced below the guidelines range of 78–97 months to 60 months' imprisonment, supervised release, and $3,008,437 in restitution. Because Herndon needed additional medical treatment, the district court agreed to allow her to voluntarily surrender one year later; Herndon was released to home confinement and obtained several extensions. Ultimately, a warrant was issued and Herndon was taken into custody in April 2015.Herndon learned that the Bureau of Prisons calculated her sentence from the date she had entered custody (April 2015), rather than the March 2013 date she had been sentenced, and calculated her anticipated release date as August 2019. Herndon filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in the Southern District of Florida asking the court to amend the judgment to reflect its oral pronouncement, which she asserted had awarded her credit for the time she would spend on home confinement. Herndon then filed a section 2241 motion in the Northern District of Texas. While her section petition was pending, Herndon was released in July 2019. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition as moot. Herndon had already received the sole relief sought in her petition: release from confinement. View "Herndon v. Upton" on Justia Law