Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Senate Bill 8 -- a statute that requires a woman to undergo an additional and medically unnecessary procedure to cause fetal demise before she may obtain a dilation and evacuation (D&E) abortion, the safest and most common method of second trimester abortions -- imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion before fetal viability in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment holding that SB8 is facially unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. Applying the undue burden test in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016), rather than June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2114 (2020), the court held that SB8's burdens substantially outweigh its benefits and constitutes an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain a previability abortion. Under the statute, the court explained that all women seeking a second trimester abortion starting at 15 weeks LMP would be required to endure a medically unnecessary and invasive additional procedure that provides no health benefit; for most women, the length of the procedure would increase from one day to two, adding to the costs associated with travel, lodging, time away from work, and child care; and SB8 forces abortion providers to act contrary to their medical judgment and the best interest of their patient by conducting a medical procedure that delivers no benefit to the woman. Weighing SB8's significant burdens upon female patients against its nonexistent health benefits and any other limited benefits it may actually confer, the court concluded that it is clear that the law places a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking" a previability abortion. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted TDCJ's motion to stay the district court's permanent injunction requiring TDCJ to follow specific procedures to protect Pack Unit inmates from COVID-19. Plaintiffs are two inmates incarcerated at the Wallace Pack Unit, a state-run lockup housing geriatric, medically compromised, and mobility-impaired inmates. Plaintiffs filed suit against the TDCJ over its response to the coronavirus, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. As the suit was progressing, the virus was spreading, infecting over 500 inmates, 20 of whom have died.Considering the Nken factors for granting a stay, the court held that TDCJ is likely to succeed on appeal where plaintiffs failed to comply with the exacting procedural preconditions imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), specifically the PLRA’s mandatory and jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. Even putting aside plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, their constitutional claim failed on the merits. The court held that TDCJ's response, albeit imperfect did not amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that TDCJ will be irreparably harmed absent a stay, and the balance of harms and public interest favor a stay. View "Valentine v. Collier" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the Secretary's emergency motion for stay pending appeal of the district court's order enjoining the Secretary and local officials from enforcing Governor Abbot's October 1, 2020 Proclamation which restricted hand-delivering mail ballots to a single designated early voting clerk's office. The Proclamation left in place the previous forty-day expansion for delivering mail-in ballots and the always-available option of the U.S. mail.The court considered the Nken factors in determining whether to grant a stay and held that the Secretary has made a strong showing that she will likely succeed on the merits, because the district court erred in analyzing plaintiffs' voting rights and equal protection claims. Assuming that the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework applies, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying it to the voting rights claim where the district court vastly overstated the "character and magnitude" of the burden allegedly placed on voting rights by the Proclamation. Rather, the Proclamation is part of the Governor's expansion of opportunities to cast an absentee ballot in Texas well beyond the stricter confines of the Election Code. Furthermore, the district court undervalued the state interests furthered by the Proclamation in ballot security, election uniformity, and avoiding voter confusion. In regard to the equal protection claims, the court concluded that the district court misconstrued the nature of the alleged burden imposed by the Proclamation. The court explained that the proclamation establishes a uniform rule for the entire State: each county may designate one early voting clerk's office at which voters may drop off mail ballots during the forty days leading up to the election. That voters who live further away from a drop-off location may find it inconvenient to take advantage of this particular, additional method to cast their ballots does not limit electoral opportunity. Therefore, the Secretary is likely to show that the Proclamation does not impermissibly classify voters based on county of residence, and a state's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory voting regulations. Finally, the court held that the remaining Nken factors favored a stay where the Secretary has shown irreparable harm absent a stay; the balancing of harms weighs in favor of the state officials; and the public interest favors the Secretary. View "Texas League of United Latin American Citizens v. Hughs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas answered the Fifth Circuit's question and held that a transferee on inquiry notice of fraud cannot shield itself from the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act's (TUFTA) clawback provision without diligently investigating its initial suspicions of fraud—irrespective of whether a hypothetical investigation would reveal fraudulent conduct. Having received the answer from the Supreme Court of Texas, the court once again held that defendants' good faith defense must fail.The court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the Magness Parties, holding that the record does not show that they accepted the fraudulent transfers in good faith; neither of the cited statements at issue demonstrate that the Parties diligently investigated their initial suspicions of the Stanford International Bank's Ponzi scheme on inquiry notice; the Parties have not shown that the Seventh Amendment or due process requires the court to remand for another jury trial; and the Parties have not demonstrated that, as a matter of law, the court cannot render a decision in favor of the Receiver based on the existing record. View "Janvey v. GMAG, LLC" on Justia Law

After the Chairman refused to issue media pass cards to certain individuals that would have given them access to the floor of the House chamber, the individuals and their employer filed suit alleging constitutional violations.The Fifth Circuit held that exceptional circumstances justifying a court's moving beyond actual mootness will be less likely found when the party seeking review failed to utilize the procedures that had been available. A party seeking to continue litigation after time has run out should not be allowed to do so when it failed to use the time it had.The court applied these considerations to this appeal and held that this case has become moot and is not saved by the exception for cases capable of repetition, yet evading review. Therefore, the court lacked authority to review the legislative-immunity issue. The court explained that Empower did not utilize the opportunities it had in its first suit, and thus cannot complain that the dispute has evaded review. In this case, although Empower requested credentials before the Regular Session of the 86th Texas Legislature began, the House Business Office's requests for more information and Empower's responses delayed a decision. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded to the district court for the suit to be dismissed. View "Empower Texans, Inc. v. Geren" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the Secretary's motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Texas House Bill 25 (HB 25), which eliminates straight-ticket voting. The court applied the factors for ruling on a stay and observed the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis that courts should not alter election rules on the eve of an election.In staying a preliminary injunction that would change election laws eighteen days before early voting begins, the court recognized the value of preserving the status quo in a voting case on the eve of an election, and found that the traditional factors for granting a stay favor granting one here. In this case, the Secretary has shown that she is likely to succeed on the merits that the district court erred in issuing an injunction that altered the status quo of Texas election law this close in time to an election. Furthermore, the Secretary has met the burden of showing irreparable injury absent a stay; any harms to plaintiffs do not outweigh the other preliminary factors; and public interest weighs heavily in favor of a stay. View "Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Hughs" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of murder and aggravated assault. Because of petitioner's prior convictions at the time of the shooting, he was a felon in possession of a firearm. Therefore, the jury could consider petitioner's failure to retreat in evaluating the reasonableness of his actions. In this case, petitioner claimed that he fired the weapon in self-defense and that his lawyer did not tell him that the jury could consider his failure to retreat under Texas law.The court held, under the Strickland test, that counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance when he was silent on a central component of the self-defense statute and thus petitioner could not appreciate the extraordinary risks of passing up the State's plea offer. However, under the Frye prejudice test, the court held that petitioner failed to carry his burden of proof by showing that the prosecution would not withdraw the plea or that the court would have accepted it. View "Anaya v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of various constitutional rights and under Louisiana tort law. In this case, after defendant approached, questioned, and reached to grab plaintiff outside of his home, plaintiff fled, fell off a fence, and dislocated his shoulder.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the unreasonable search claim and remanded for the district court to consider qualified immunity before proceeding to the merits of the case. The court stated that details in the complaint make plausible the allegation that defendant's search of the curtilage of plaintiff's home was unreasonable insofar as it infringed on plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy and exigent circumstances were lacking. However, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the unreasonable seizure claim.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's remaining section 1983 claims, holding that plaintiff failed to state a false arrest/false imprisonment claim, because he failed to plausibly allege that his ultimate arrest was false; failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983 because, as the district court correctly observed, there is no freestanding right under the Constitution to be free from malicious prosecution; and failed to state a claim for a violation of procedural and substantive due process because resort to a generalized remedy under the Due Process Clause is inappropriate where a more specific constitutional provision provides the rights at issue. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to allege a claim under Louisiana law for infliction of emotional distress. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and the three evidentiary rulings appealed by plaintiff. View "Arnold v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Officer Currie's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, alleging constitutional violations after Mark Mayfield committed suicide. The Madison Police Department had arrested Mark and two conspirators, and the basis for the arrest warrant was the affidavit of Currie, who stated that Mark had communicated with conspirators and assisted them in their effort to photograph the wife of United States Senator Thad Cochran in an assisted living facility. Currie claims that there was no constitutional violation because the issuance of the arrest warrant broke the causal chain, immunizing her from liability.The court held that there are two ways to overcome the independent-intermediary doctrine: first, in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986), the Supreme Court held that an officer can be held liable for a search authorized by a warrant when the affidavit presented to the magistrate was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable; and second, under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and its progeny, officers who deliberately or recklessly provide false, material information for use in an affidavit or who make knowing and intentional omissions that result in a warrant being issued without probable cause may still be held liable.The court held that, under Malley, the information Currie and other investigators provided to the magistrate throughout the course of their investigation clearly was sufficient to establish probable cause to issue a warrant for Mark's arrest. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs adequately alleged wrongdoing under Malley. The court remanded to the district court for further consideration of Franks. View "Mayfield v. Currie" on Justia Law

Wardrip committed five murders in Texas in 1984-1986.. He surrendered to police and confessed to his last murder. Wardrip was released on parole in 1997. After DNA testing connected Wardrip to unsolved murders, he was arrested and confessed to four other murders. At trial, the state introduced Wardrip’s prison disciplinary record, with only two infractions during his 11 years in prison. Wardrip’s defense counsel called a parole officer and an employer to testify to Wardrip’s good behavior while on parole. Waldrip’s attorney, Curry, later explained that suggesting Wardrip had rehabilitated would have required putting Wardrip on the stand. Curry wanted jurors to focus on the fact that Wardrip was not a disciplinary problem and not a danger to anyone if imprisoned for life. The jury found that Wardrip would be a threat to society and that mitigating circumstances did not warrant life imprisonment. The court sentenced Wardrip to death. Texas courts denied habeas relief.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of federal habeas relief. It was not an “unreasonable determination of the facts” for the state court to find that Curry had conducted a reasonable investigation that made him aware of Wardrip’s good conduct while imprisoned and made a reasonable strategic decision regarding what evidence to present, satisfying Strickland’s standard for effective assistance of counsel. It was also reasonable for the court to conclude that whatever else Curry might have done, the failure to take those steps had not prejudiced Wardrip. View "Wardrip v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law