Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. At sentencing, the judge included the following condition of probation: "If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that the defendant has notified the person about the risk." At sentencing, Defendant did not object to the condition, but later challenged the condition on appeal.The Fifth Circuit, reviewing for plain error, held that the condition was not an improper delegation of authority to probation officers. The court reasoned that Defendant's probation officer was not given the authority to determine whether Defendant was subject to the condition; only that the probation officer can determine when, where, and to whom Defendant must give notice. View "USA v. Mejia-Banegas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an office services and facilities management company, refused to bargain with a labor union based on its position that the union was not a "properly certified representative of its employees." In turn, the union filed a claim with the NLRB, claiming that Petitioner violated the NLRA by refusing to bargain in good faith. The NLRB found in the union's favor.The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, rejecting Petitioner's argument that the prosecution was ultra vires. Petitioner claimed that President Biden's removal of the NLRB General Counsel was unlawful and that his replacement lacked authority to bring the complaint against Petitioner. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that no provision of the NLRA protects the General Counsel of the NLRB from removal.The Fifth Circuit then rejected the merits of Petitioner's claim, finding that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the NLRB's decision. Thus, the court granted NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Exela Enterprise Solutions v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellee sued officers asserting various Section 1983 claims including excessive force, unreasonable seizure due to an arrest without probable cause, malicious prosecution, violation of her First Amendment rights for arresting her in retaliation for filming the officers, and violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court held that disputed issues of material fact barred summary judgment on the excessive force claim and that, viewing the facts in Appellee’s favor, the officers violated a clearly established right.   The Fifth Circuit denied Appellee’s motion to dismiss, reversed the district court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded with instructions that Appellee’s claims be dismissed.                                                                                        The court analyzed the officers’ actions and found that their conduct was not so objectively unreasonable as to violate Appellee’s constitutional rights. First, Appellee’s minor injuries weigh in favor of finding qualified immunity. Second, qualified immunity can apply even when only one factor weighs against the plaintiff. Finally, it was reasonable of Appellants to believe that, in light of Appellee’s interjections, comments, resistance, and indignation, some degree of force would be necessary to subdue her. The court further held that even if the officers violated Appellee’s constitutional rights, the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. View "Solis v. Serrett" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant for capital murder in the death of a police officer. The Fifth Circuit rejected Appellant's last-minute efforts to stop the imposition of his sentence.The Fifth Circuit held that Appellant is unlikely to prevail on his request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”), and he is unlikely to succeed on his Sec. 1983 claim. In addressing habeas, the court rejected Appellant's request for COA on his future-dangerousness claim, and his request for COA on his Lackey claim. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a stay of execution and dismissal of the 1983 claim and denied the COA.Here, Appellant argued his death sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it was based in part on the jury’s finding of a “probability that Appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” The court explained that reasonable jurors would not find it debatable whether Sec. 2244(b)(1) barred this claim. Further, the court reasoned that it’s undebatable that this claim is procedurally defaulted. Additionally, the court held substantive meritlessness is an independent ground for refusing a COA on Plaintiff’s future-dangerousness claim. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s claim is not a method-of-execution challenge; it is a challenge to the validity of his death sentence. It is therefore not cognizable under Sec. 1983. View "Buntion v. Collier" on Justia Law

Defendant is an elected constable in Harris County, Texas. Plaintiff is his counterpart in adjoining Waller County. After a 911 caller reported that Plaintiff had aimed a gun at him on a local tollway in Harris County, Defendant’s deputies stopped and questioned Plaintiff, then released him minutes later.Plaintiff sued Defendant, who asserted qualified and statutory immunities. Defendant argued that the stop was lawful, Defendant wasn’t present at the time, and state law shields him from the tort claims. But the district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.At issue is whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and if Texas law immunizes Defendant from Plaintiff’s tort claims. The court found that because reasonable suspicion supported the investigatory stop, Plaintiff did not adequately plead an unreasonable seizure. Further, Plaintiff failed to plead a colorable constitutional violation. Thus, absent constitutional violation, Defendant can’t be liable for supervising one, ratifying one, or failing to train his deputies to avoid one.Next, as for the state claims, Plaintiff sued Defendant for defamation and IIED. The court found that the critical issue is whether Defendant’s actions are linked to his job responsibilities. Here, the connection exists, therefore Defendant is entitled to dismissal and his immunities bar all claims against him. View "Smith v. Heap" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' son was killed when he attempted to drive through a low water crossing in Camp Bullis, a military training base outside San Antonio, Texas. As Plaintiff's son navigated the crossing, water swept across the road, ultimately resulting in his death.Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, claiming the government failed to inspect the low water crossing, failed to warn approaching motorists about the dangers of flooding, and failed to install guard rails that may have prevented water from accumulating on the road. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, finding the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") applied.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under the FTCA, the federal government waives sovereign immunity for actions based on the negligence of federal employees who are acting within the scope of their employment. However, immunity is not waived if the federal employee is carrying out a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency. To be discretionary, an action must involve some element of judgment or choice.Here, the relevant regulation states that "[a]ll Range/Control Area/Impact Area gates will either be locked or guarded by the unit using the area." A natural reading of the regulation imposed an obligation on the officers who were on-site to lock the gate. Thus, the discretionary exception to the FTCA did not apply. View "Barron v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a temporary employee on a construction job suffered a diabetic attack at work. Six days later, the plaintiff was terminated along with several others. After exhausting her administrative remedies, the plaintiff sued her employer in the Eastern District of Texas, bringing claims for damages under the ADA, alleging she had been discriminated against due to her diabetes.The circuit court found that the evidence was that plaintiff was terminated immediately after an event that highlighted her ADA-protected disability. The court reasoned proximity of her diabetic episode on the job and her termination was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case that she was included in the group to be terminated for ADA violative reasons. The court further found that plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination and show that a fact question exists as to whether that explanation is pretextual. Thus, the plaintiff established the elements of her prima facie case and she has also presented “substantial evidence” that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory rationale for her inclusion in the reduction in force was pretextual. An issue of material fact remains regarding whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her disability by including her in the reduction of force. View "Gosby v. Apache Industrial" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged President Biden’s September 9, 2021 order requiring all executive employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. After finding that the equities favored the plaintiffs and that they were likely to succeed at trial, the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of President Biden’s Order nationwide.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prelamination injunction. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) provides “comprehensive and exclusive procedures” for the review of employment-related disputes between civil-service employees and the federal government. The court held that the CSRA provides meaningful administrative review of the plaintiff’s claims. Because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust available review under the CRSA, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claim. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their claim was "wholly collateral" to the CSRA scheme. View "Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden" on Justia Law

Defendant was federally charged with various child pornography offenses. However, the district court found him incompetent and committed the defendant for evaluation and treatment. The defendant was released to live with his mother and, shortly thereafter, regained competency. However, before trial, the defendant was again deemed incompetent. The district court committed the defendant to a second term of competency-restoration treatment.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order committed the defendant to a second term of competency-restoration. While it is a violation of due process to try an incompetent person for a crime, 18 U.S.C. 4241(a) allows the court to commit an incompetent defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment for a reasonable period of time, but not to exceed four months. A defendant can be committed for a second term of hospitalization, provided the court finds there is a substantial probability the defendant will regain competency during that time. However, if the medical facility treating the defendant certifies he has regained competency, the court must hold a hearing.The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that once the medical facility certified he was competent, he could only be subject to civil commitment. Section 4241(a) allows for two commitment periods. The hospital warden's certification of the defendant's competency does not affect the district court's ability to order a second period of commitment. View "USA v. Ceasar" on Justia Law

While the defendant was a pain-management doctor, he reached an agreement with a pharmacist (“MM”). Per the agreement, MM would create a boilerplate prescription pad designed to assist the defendant in prescribing unnecessary medication. Second, the defendant signed an incomplete form, and third, his employee would step in and complete administrative work before faxing the form to MM. MM would then complete the form for fraudulent insurance reimbursement.The Government brought an eight-count indictment against the defendant. The jury acquitted him on Counts 1–7, but it hung on Count 8. He moved to dismiss Count 8 on double-jeopardy grounds. The defendant must show that the jury necessarily found some fact, and this fact must be an essential element of a retrial. The court reasoned that the defendant failed to meet this because his participation isn’t a necessary element of the Count 8 offense. Defendant next argues that the Government cannot retry him without broadening the indictment. However, the defendant moved to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds, not on the grounds of constructive amendment or variance. Defendant argued only that the collateral-estoppel portion of the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes a total bar to retrial. Even if the defendant asked the district court to exclude a particular argument, the court does not have the authority to review that decision. View "USA v. Auzenne" on Justia Law