Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When an armed fugitive held a 15-year-old girl hostage inside Plaintiff, City of McKinney (the “City”), police officers employed armored vehicles, explosives, and toxic-gas grenades to resolve the situation. The parties agree the officers only did what was necessary in an active emergency. However, Plaintiff’s home suffered severe damage, much of her personal property was destroyed, and the City refused to provide compensation. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The district court held that, as a matter of law, the City violated the Takings Clause when it refused to compensate Baker for the damage and destruction of her property. The City timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that as a matter of history and precedent, the Takings Clause does not require compensation for damaged or destroyed property when it was objectively necessary for officers to damage or destroy that property in an active emergency to prevent imminent harm to persons. Plaintiff has maintained that the officers’ actions were precisely that: necessary, in light of an active emergency, to prevent imminent harm to the hostage child, to the officers who responded on the scene, and to others in her residential community. View "Baker v. City of McKinney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant had two children together. After the couple separated, the children remained in Mexico with Galaviz. In July 2021, Defendant took the children to El Paso and refused to return them. Plaintiff filed an action in the district court requesting the return of the children to Mexico under the Hague Convention. Defendant raised two affirmative defenses claiming that returning the children would violate their fundamental right to an education and would expose them to a grave risk of harm or an intolerable situation. The district court concluded that Defendant had satisfied his burden and denied Plaintiff’s request for the return of the children. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in the present case, the district court’s findings regarding the children’s healthcare, including the children’s cognitive decline, the fact that they remained non-verbal, or their regression to using diapers, may be supported by evidence that would be sufficient in a custody dispute. However, this evidence falls short of meeting Defendant’s clear and convincing burden. Finally, Defendant presented no evidence that unsuitable childcare would expose the children to a grave risk of harm. He merely expressed concern that Plaintiff often left the children with her older daughters, and they did not take care of the children. This is not clear and convincing evidence of a grave risk of harm. View "Galaviz v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense. Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. A different district court agreed with a similar argument and declared that Texas must provide testing if a sufficient basis is shown that it would have affected sentencing and not just the finding of guilt. The district court relied on the pendency of a decision in Gutierrez as a reason to grant Plaintiff a stay of execution. The State of Texas sought to vacate the stay of execution.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate at least until a decision in that case. The court explained that at that time it will order additional briefing. Accordingly, the court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. The related appeal has similar issues that could affect the proper resolution in this case. Waiting for that decision is not required by any general procedural rule or by rules of the court. Nonetheless, the court explained that it should wait for that decision unless there is some basis to distinguish the present appeal. View "Murphy v. Nasser" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of the 2000 murder of an 80-year-old woman. After the jury found him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of another vicious crime who identified Plaintiff as her attacker. Plaintiff was not tried for that offense . Plaintiff is now seeking DNA testing of evidence from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him. The State of Texas filed an emergency appeal seeking to vacate a stay of execution entered by the district court. The issue on which the district court decided to enter a stay is whether the inmate is entitled to have DNA testing performed on certain evidence. The district court granted a stay because similar issues were pending before the Fifth Circuit in a case brought by a different Texas prisoner. That related case is fully briefed and has been orally argued, and a decision in the case is pending.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a stay is appropriate, at least until a decision in that related pending case. The court explained that here the district court order bars Texas officials from carrying out “lawful and important conduct” because it prevents them from performing Plaintiff’s execution. Moreover, the district court’s order does not operate on the judicial proceeding but restricts the actions of specific defendants. That is the function of an injunction.  The court entered no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time. Therefore, the stay of execution will remain in effect. View "Murphy v. Nasser" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs—three doctors, a news website, a healthcare activist, and two states —had posts and stories removed or downgraded by the platforms. Their content touched on a host of divisive topics like the COVID-19 lab-leak theory. Plaintiffs maintain that although the platforms stifled their speech, the government officials were the ones pulling the strings. They sued the officials for First Amendment violations and asked the district court to enjoin the officials’ conduct. The officials argued that they only “sought to mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by “calling attention to content” that violated the “platforms’ policies,” a form of permissible government speech. The district court agreed with the Plaintiffs and granted preliminary injunctive relief.   The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the injunction in part, and modified the injunction in part. The court affirmed with respect to the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, the FBI, and CISA and reversed as to all other officials. As to the NIAID officials, it is not apparent that they ever communicated with the social media platforms. Instead, the record shows, at most, that public statements by Director Anthony Fauci and other NIAID officials promoted the government’s scientific and policy views and attempted to discredit opposing ones—quintessential examples of government speech that do not run afoul of the First Amendment. Further, as for the State Department, while it did communicate directly with the platforms, so far, there is no evidence these communications went beyond educating the platforms on “tools and techniques” used by foreign actors. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from her tenured professorship at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University (TSU) in August 2020. She then sued TSU and several TSU employees for Title VII constructive discharge, Equal Pay Act (EPA) retaliation, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed all her claims, holding that res judicata barred her Section 1983 claims and that she failed to state Title VII and EPA claims.   The Ffith Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff alleges that TSU investigated her for discrimination but found no evidence that Plaintiff discriminated, that defendant “threw her hair into Plaintiff’s face in the law school lobby,” and that defendant yelled at Plaintiff that she couldn’t park in a church parking lot. But no facts suggest that these were more than personal disputes between the parties. Indeed, their parking lot confrontation was not even on school property. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant “has made comments about [her] race,” but she does not identify the comments or their context. The court explained that Plaintiff does not allege conduct by TSU that plausibly—not just possibly—states a constructive discharge claim. Further, the court held that Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant acted under color of state law and thus fails to state a Section 1983 claim. View "Sacks v. Texas Southern University" on Justia Law

Seven codefendants appeal their various convictions stemming from a multi-million-dollar healthcare conspiracy involving surgery-referral kickbacks at Forest Park Medical Center in Dallas, Texas. They challenge convictions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”), the Travel Act, and for money laundering. The defendants in this case are, with three exceptions, the surgeons whom Forest Park paid to direct surgeries to the hospital—Won, Rimlawi, Shah, and Henry. One exception is Forrest— she is a nurse. Another is Jacob—he ran Adelaide Business Solutions (Adelaide), a pass-through entity. The other is Burt—he was part of the hospital’s staff. Defendants raise many of the same issues on appeal, often adopting each other’s arguments.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the state law at issue here is the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute (TCBS). Here, it does not matter if the physician was acquitted because there could still be sufficient evidence in the record that defendants “offer[ed]” a benefit in violation of the TCBS regardless of whether any physician accepted it.  Further, the court explained that even assuming no rational jury could have found a single conspiracy, the surgeons fail to show that this error “prejudiced their substantial rights.” Henry and Forrest do not raise this point at all. Won and Shah address it only briefly and fail to provide any record citations to support the proposition that “clear, specific, and compelling prejudice” resulted in an unfair trial. View "USA v. Shah" on Justia Law

Defendant Officer arrested Plaintiff for telephone harassment after she witnessed Plaintiff call in false complaints about her neighbors’ supposedly loud music. The harassment charges were dropped, however. Plaintiff then sued Defendant for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Her claim was dismissed based on qualified immunity. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the magistrate judge erred by (A) concluding Defendant reasonably believed she had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for telephone harassment and (B) determining no issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that, before arresting Plaintiff, Defendant called the district attorney’s office to ensure that a telephone harassment charge was proper. The court wrote that as the magistrate judge observed, nothing about the circumstances taints Defendant’s beliefs as unreasonable: (1) Plaintiff called multiple times to report loud music that day; (2) other officers found no loud music playing when they arrived; (3) the alleged noisemakers claimed they were not playing loud music; (4) no music was playing during the several hours Defendant was on the scene; and (5) while Defendant stood behind the neighbors’ fence hearing no noise, she received reports Plaintiff was still calling in complaints. Thus the court wrote that it sees no error in the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Defendant reasonably believed probable cause supported Plaintiff’s arrest. View "Perry v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Louisiana’s Attorney General filed a request for mandamus relief seeking to vacate the district court’s hearing scheduled to begin on October 3 and require the district court to promptly convene trial on the merits of this congressional redistricting case.   The Fifth Circuit granted in part and ordered the district court to vacate the October Hearing. The court explained that redistricting based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. Section 10301, is complex, historically evolving, and sometimes undertaken with looming electoral deadlines. The court explained that the district court did not follow the law of the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit court. Its action in rushing redistricting via a court-ordered map is a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no alternative means of appeal. Issuance of the writ is justified “under the circumstances” in light of multiple precedents contradicting the district court’s procedure here. The court held that the state has no other means of relief and is not seeking to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal. Further, the court noted that if this were ordinary litigation, the court would be most unlikely to intervene in a remedial proceeding for a preliminary injunction. Redistricting litigation, however, is not ordinary litigation. The court held that the district court here forsook its duty and placed the state at an intolerable disadvantage legally and tactically. View "In Re: Jeff Landry" on Justia Law

BD LaPlace, LLC, doing business as Bayou Steel (Bayou Steel), operated a steel mill in LaPlace, Louisiana. Without giving The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) notice, Bayou Steel terminated Plaintiffs’ employment and closed the LaPlace mill where they worked. Seeking to recover under the WARN Act, Plaintiffs initially filed a putative class action complaint against Bayou Steel in Delaware bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs dismissed that action and filed the instant class action in federal district court. Rather than suing their employer Bayou Steel, Plaintiffs sued Bayou Steel BD Holdings II, LLC and Black Diamond Capital Management, LLC(a private equity firm that advised the fund that owned BD Holdings II). Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial, which the district court denied. Defendants sought summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging both the denial of their jury demand and the summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that there is no right to a jury trial under the WARN Act. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BD Holdings II. But the district court erred in granting summary judgment to BDCM because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether BDCM exercised de facto control over Bayou Steel’s decision to close its LaPlace steel mill and order Plaintiffs’ layoffs. The court explained that if BDCM “specifically directed” the closing of the mill without proper notice, the company may be liable for Bayou Steel’s WARN Act violation even absent the other factors. View "Fleming v. Bayou Steel" on Justia Law