Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff led police on a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood. Once Plaintiff exited his vehicle, Defendant sheriff's deputy tased Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the deputy, claiming he violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights. The District Court denied the deputy's claim of qualified immunity, finding there were material factual disputes as to whether a reasonable officer would have viewed Plaintiff as an immediate threat; whether Plaintiff's apparent surrender was a ploy to evade arrest; and whether Plaintiff was tased once or twice.The Fifth Circuit reversed. After considering the threat posed by Plaintiff in fleeing law enforcement as well as the force used by the deputy, the court determined that the deputy did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Plaintiff was unable to overcome the bar of qualified immunity. View "Salazar v. Molina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former FBI special agent, asked a federal district court to order the FBI to issue him a top-secret clearance and reinstate his employment. He also sought damages against FBI officials for revoking his clearance and suspending him, for preventing him from taking other employment while suspended, and for delaying the release of letters that Plaintiff says contain his protected speech. The district court dismissed those claims. It concluded that Plaintiff has no cause of action against the officers in their individual capacities. And it reasoned that its subject matter jurisdiction does not include the power to order the FBI to reinstate his security clearance.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. His claims seeking to reverse his suspension and termination fall outside the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. And he has no cause of action to bring the remaining individual capacity claims. The court explained that the Supreme Court has twice rejected federal employees’ attempts to sidestep the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA’s”) remedial scheme. The court found that just as the CSRA precludes extra-statutory review of “adverse actions” defined by Section 7712, it precludes extra-statutory review of ancillary constitutional claims brought as a “vehicle by which [plaintiffs] seek to reverse” those adverse actions. View "Zummer v. Sallet" on Justia Law

Defendants dismissed Plaintiff from two graduate nursing studies programs. She sued, claiming that her dismissal violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause. The district court refused to dismiss some of her claims. The Defendants appealed part of that order, contending that they have sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA claims and that she failed to state Fourteenth Amendment claims.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Defendants' appeal in part finding that the court lacks appellate jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court affirmed the order in part and reversed the order in part, concluding that Plaintiff stated some Title II claims but not all of the claims that the district court refused to dismiss. Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity at this stage of the litigation because Plaintiff’s allegations did not permit the court to assume that Defendants did not violate her due-process rights. The court explained that it has appellate jurisdiction over only the denial of sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA claims. The court wrote it must assume that Plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. The state may or may not be correct that its rebuttal evidence vitiates any inference that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability. But the pleading stage was not the right time to raise those contentions. Although the court has done so in the past, Plaintiff’s allegations do not permit the court to assume that the Due Process Clause was not violated. View "Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ" on Justia Law

The Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) regularly engages local parish jails to house convicted state prisoners. Five of the locally housed prisoners brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against local jail officials and DPSC officials. They alleged that the DPSC officials, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, looked away from the administrative failure they knew was leaving prisoners in jail who had served their sentences. The DPSC officials challenged the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.   Plaintiffs proceeded against Defendants under two theories, arguing that DPSC officials violated the Plaintiffs’ clearly established right to timely release from prison by: (1) failing to adopt policies ensuring the timely release of DPSC prisoners; and (2) directly participating in the conduct that caused their over detention.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of a “pattern of similar constitutional violations,” such that their inaction amounted to a disregard of an obvious risk. DPSC’s Lean Six Sigma study revealed that 2,252 DPSC prisoners were annually held past their release date. Defendants cannot avoid the evidence that the study exposed unlawful detentions of prisoners. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendants’ awareness of this pattern of delays and their conscious decision not to address it rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Further, because a reasonable jury may find that Defendants’ inaction was objectively unreasonable in light of this clearly established law, they have failed to show they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Crittindon, et al v. LeBlanc, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five counts of sex trafficking. He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that there is insufficient evidence to support one count of his conviction, and that the prosecutor made an improper remark in her closing argument.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that under the Speedy Trial Act the federal government must file an information or indictment against the defendant “within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges” otherwise the charges must be dismissed. Defendant argues that the Speedy Trial Act clock must include his detention by state authorities as the state charges were a “ruse” to avoid its reach in that State and federal authorities cannot “collude” to detain a defendant “solely for the purpose of bypassing the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.” Here, the court held that the state had a legitimate and independent reason to detain Defendant and was not holding him primarily as a ruse for the federal government’s eventual arrest, Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act. Further, Defendant was unable to show that the length of the delay was prejudicial. View "USA v. Mearis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, brings a Section 1983 suit alleging the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and unidentified prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court requested the Texas State Attorney General’s Office provide a supplemental administrative report, known as a Martinez report, to develop the record. Upon reviewing the report, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims as frivolous.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court explained that in reviewing whether a district court properly dismissed a prisoner’s complaint for failure to state a claim, it applies the same standard as dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Further to show deliberate indifference a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official was aware that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Here, Plaintiff did not mention any relationship between the allegedly unconstitutional acts and the Director or any prison policy. Without such an allegation, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against him.   Next, the court concluded that if the Martinez report conflicts with the pro se plaintiff’s allegations, the district court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, not the records in the report. Here, the district court relied on the Martinez report’s medical records in the face of Plaintiff’s conflicting allegations to conclude Plaintiff’s treatment was sufficient and any delay in treatment was not due to deliberate indifference. View "Davis v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action shortly after her son’s death, alleging that officers violated her son’s constitutional rights by failing to provide him with medical treatment while he was dying in a jail cell. The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the officers’ motion. It found genuine disputes of material fact surrounding Plaintiff’s claims that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the man’s serious medical needs. And it concluded that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and found that (1) the fact disputes identified by the district court are material to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims, and (2) the court’s decision in Easter clearly established the man’s rights before the officers allegedly violated them.The court explained that in reviewing qualified immunity it looks to: (1) whether the defendant violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory rights; and (2) whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation. The court reasoned those it lacks jurisdiction to review the genuineness argument because the officers’ arguments do not address why the fact disputes the district court did find cannot affect the outcome of Plaintiff’s lawsuit—the materiality inquiry. Further, in reviewing Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006), the court held that a reasonable jury could find that the officers each refused to treat the man, ignored his cries for help, and overall evinced a wanton disregard for his serious medical needs. View "Sims v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The City of New Orleans (the “City”) implemented a program called the Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATES”), which used mail to collect fines for traffic violations captured by street cameras. Plaintiffs alleged that the city violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by confiscating their property and keeping it without just compensation. The City moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) certified one question: whether the failure to comply with a state court judgment may be construed as a taking?   The Fifth Circuit answered in the negative. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs do not and could not argue that the extraction of fines under ATES was a taking. The court explained that takings are generally effected through the power of eminent domain. In this case, the City acquired Plaintiffs’ money not through eminent domain nor through any other lawful power, but rather through ultra vires implementation of ATES. That posture makes this case unlike prototypical takings actions. Further, Plaintiffs conceive of the city as “taking” their money in 2019, even when that money had been in the city’s possession since 2010 at the latest. And they insist that the City’s conduct from 2008 to 2010 was necessary to effect a taking that did not actually arise until 2019. Such a theory sits uneasily with a linear conception of time and is not rooted in the text of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, Plaintiffs are left with no plausible allegation that the city has effected a taking of their property. View "Lafaye v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

Defendants, ERR, LLC; Evergreen Resource Recovery, LLC (collectively “ERR”), owns and operates a wastewater treatment facility. One of ERR’s spill contractors, Oil Mop, performed oil removal and soil remediation. Oil Mop submitted a claim to the National Pollution Funds Center (“NPFC”) for reimbursement of removal costs after ERR refused to pay. The NPFC reimbursed Oil Mop and billed ERR for what it paid Oil Mop.   ERR refused to pay and the Government then sued ERR for what it paid Oil Mop. The Government moved to strike ERR’s demand for a jury trial.  The district court held a bench trial after concluding that the Government’s Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) claims sound not in law but in equity.   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed ERR’s Seventh Amendment challenge and held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees ERR’s right to a jury trial of the Government’s OPA claims. The court explained that it must consider two factors when determining whether a right of action requires a jury trial. First, the court compared the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, the court examined the remedy sought and determined whether it is legal or equitable in nature.   Here, the court concluded that the Recoupment Claim sounds in law and hence triggers ERR’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury. Next, the court held that both the nature of the Government’s action and the type of remedy sound in law. View "USA v. E.R.R." on Justia Law

Petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal based on claims he was targeted by gangs for his religious activities. An immigration judge (IJ) disbelieved Petitioner’s story and denied his application. After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal and denied reconsideration, Petitioner filed two petitions seeking review.   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s application. The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider this argument because Petitioner has not exhausted it. The court reasoned that Petitioner did not raise the argument initially before the BIA, despite the fact that he was in possession of the pertinent documents.   Next, in regard to Petitioner’s argument that the IJ’s bias denied him due process, the court held that the record does not show “obvious bias” and Petitioner failed to point to record evidence showing the IJ’s “hostility due to extrajudicial sources” or “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” The court reasoned that IJ occasionally questioned Petitioner about his religious activities, but only because those activities were the basis for his claims.   Finally, Petitioner argued that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The court held that the evidence does not compel the conclusion that the IJ’s negative credibility determinations were wrong. The court reasoned that IJ may assess credibility based on inconsistencies between an applicant’s testimony and prior statements. Here, the IJ cited “specific inconsistencies” and “identified crucial omissions in statements” by Petitioner and his sister and in the letters he provided. View "Cardona-Franco v. Garland" on Justia Law