Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In exchange for Defendant’s guilty plea on the superseding indictment’s principal drug-dealing charge (“Count 1”), the Government dismissed all other charges. The parties stipulated to a recommended prison sentence of 240 months. The district court followed the parties’ sentencing recommendation and dismissed all remaining counts in the superseding indictment “on the motion of the United States. Some months later, the Government discovered the procedural snag at the heart of this case: the superseding indictment to which Defendant pleaded guilty had been returned by a grand jury whose term had expired. At a plea hearing in which Defendant indicated satisfaction with his trial counsel’s performance and familiarity with the “grand jury mess-up[]” that had occurred in his initial case, Defendant pleaded guilty in accordance with the new plea agreement. The district court then imposed the 144-month sentence the parties agreed to and noted for the record the key terms of the provision quoted above.   Without conducting a hearing, the district court accepted a magistrate’s recommendation that Defendant’s Section 2255 motion be denied. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the expired grand jury’s untimely superseding indictment in Defendant’s first criminal case was null and void when jeopardy would have otherwise attached at Defendant’s jury trial and, accordingly, could not have placed Defendant in actual legal jeopardy within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because the failure of Defendant’s trial counsel to advise Defendant of a meritless double jeopardy argument was neither deficient nor prejudicial, the district court was correct to deny Defendant’s habeas corpus petition. View "USA v. Slape" on Justia Law

Plaintiff regularly reports on local crime, missing persons, community events, traffic, and local government. Plaintiff published a story about a man who committed suicide and identified the man by name and revealed that he was an agent with the U.S. Border Patrol. Two arrest warrants were issued for Plaintiff for violating Texas Penal Code Section 39.06(c). According to Plaintiff, local officials have never brought a prosecution under Section 39.06(c) in the nearly three-decade history of that provision.Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her claims against the officials under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She also appeals the dismissal of her municipal liability claims against the City of Laredo, but not her claims against Webb County. The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments claims, as well as her civil conspiracy claims. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims against the City of Laredo. The court explained that it has no difficulty observing that journalists commonly ask for nonpublic information from public officials, and that Plaintiff was therefore entitled to make that same reasonable inference. Yet Defendants chose to arrest Plaintiff for violating Section 39.06(c). The court accordingly concluded that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the existence of similarly situated journalists who were not arrested for violating Section 39.06(c). View "Villarreal v. City of Laredo" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress narcotics evidence that the Government seized after a letter carrier’s thumb slipped through a hole in a package, initiating an allegedly illegal search. According to Defendant the Fourth Amendment per se applies to letter carriers because they are government actors subject to its warrant requirement. According to the Government, this letter carrier was not a government actor to whom the Fourth Amendment applies, and her inspection of the package did not fall within its purview. The district court agreed with the Government and denied Defendant’s motion.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Fourth Amendment does not per se apply to the letter carrier, the district court correctly concluded that she did not perform an unconstitutional warrantless search of a package that could justify the suppression of evidence. The court, therefore, did not reach Defendant’s arguments with respect to the exclusionary rule, the good faith exception, and the inevitable discovery and fruit of the poisonous tree doctrines. The court wrote that the building inspectors, firefighters, teachers, healthcare workers, and USPS employees that courts have identified as government actors to whom the Fourth Amendment applies were all carrying out law enforcement functions. The same cannot be said of the letter carrier. Her inspection of the package addressed to 109 Hogan Drive does not resemble the “arbitrary invasions by government officials” that the Fourth Amendment was ratified to protect against. View "USA v. Johnlouis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed her employment was terminated in retaliation for complaining she was going to be paid late. She filed a complaint against a department head within the Texas A&M Engineering Station in his individual capacity (“DH”), alleging he violated the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)  DH moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim because the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, and in the alternative, that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court determined that neither immunity applied.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the rejection of sovereign immunity as a defense, affirmed the denial of the defense of sovereign immunity and vacated the judgment denying the defense of qualified immunity. The court held that holding public officials individually liable for retaliation under the FLSA also is consistent with the court’s prior holdings regarding individual liability in other FLSA contexts. However, the court wrote it discovered no Fifth Circuit opinion that holds qualified immunity is a defense under the FLSA. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s claim would be barred by qualified immunity because she does not allege that DH violated a clearly established law. However, the antecedent question is whether qualified immunity applies to the FLSA to begin with. The court, therefore, remanded for the district court to decide this question in the first instance. View "Stramaski v. Lawley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff formed the Enelre Foundation as a Stiftung under the laws of Liechtenstein. Stiftung is a German word meaning, roughly, “foundation” or “endowment.” Enelre’s purpose is to provide education and general support for Plaintiff and his children. Plaintiff transferred $3 million to Enelre’s bank accounts. He later learned the IRS would consider Enelre a “foreign trust,” triggering certain reporting requirements. Plaintiff belatedly filed the reports, and the IRS assessed penalties. Plaintiff paid the penalties and then filed this refund action. The district court granted summary judgment for the government.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly found that Enelre qualifies as a foreign trust. Its organizing documents explain that Enelre’s purpose is to support its beneficiaries and limit its transactions to pursuing and realising its purpose. This is characteristic of an ordinary trust. The documents also prohibit Enelre from conducting commercial trade. Liechtensteinian Public Registry filings confirm this prohibition. Enelre’s familial purpose, lack of business objective, and bar on commercial activity render it a trust. Enelre’s form of organization confirms it is a trust. Enelre is subject to Liechtenstein’s “Act on Trust Enterprises.” View "Rost v. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant the owner of a home health agency was convicted of Medicare fraud. On appeal, she complained that her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated. Turns out, Defendant’s pretrial counsel was also representing one of the Government’s star witnesses. The Fifth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Defendant’s lawyer’s conflict of interest—a conflict the Government knew about— adversely affected his representation, and the district court answered: yes.The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that as the Government admits, it never offered Defendant a plea deal while she was represented by her conflicted pretrial counsel, or after. So there is no rejected plea deal to measure Defendant’s harm against. The court explained the constitutional right to counsel is “perhaps the central feature of our adversarial system,” as it “helps make real the Constitution’s other criminal procedure promises. The court wrote that the Government’s proposed remedy— to keep the convictions intact but remand for new plea negotiations— wouldn’t neutralize the taint of the constitutional violation. View "USA v. Sheperd" on Justia Law

Defendant, El Paso found Plaintiff’s son in the process of hanging himself from a basketball hoop. But it was dark, Defendant was afraid the man might have a weapon, and the man did not respond to Defendant’s orders to show his hands. So Defendant tased the man once, took down his body, and performed CPR. To no avail. The man soon after died in the emergency room from the hanging. His parents sued Defendant for using excessive force, the district court denied qualified immunity, and Defendant appealed.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and rendered judgment granting Defendant qualified immunity. The court explained that the district court and Plaintiffs rely on cases holding that officers may not use force against arrestees who are already subdued and in police custody. This case is markedly different. The reason Defendant tased the man was that he was not in custody and Defendant was afraid he might have a weapon. Even if that fear turned out to be groundless—something the court wrote it cannot decide here—Defendant still did not transgress any clearly established law. View "Ramirez v. Escajeda" on Justia Law

In response to sexual abuse allegations by another student, a Texas A&M panel found Plaintiff responsible for violating Texas A&M’s policy. Plaintiff sued Texas A&M and several university administrators for sex discrimination under Title IX and deprivation of constitutional due process under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court ultimately granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title IX erroneous outcome and 1983 due process claims. Thus, only Plaintiff’s Title IX selective enforcement claim was allowed to proceed. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The district court then certified its rulings for interlocutory appeal on the grounds that they turn on two controlling questions of law.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and concluded that Texas A&M did not violate Plaintiff’s due process rights. The court explained that Plaintiff received advanced notice of the allegations against him. He was permitted to call witnesses and submit relevant, non-harassing evidence of his innocence to a neutral panel of administrators. He was represented by counsel throughout the entirety of his disciplinary proceeding. He had the benefit of listening to the accuser’s description of the allegations directly. And he and his attorney had the opportunity to submit an unlimited number of questions to the disciplinary panel. View "Van Overdam v. Texas A & M Univ" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal and his state habeas petition was also unsuccessful. Through state habeas counsel, Petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3599(a)(2), to assist him in preparing a petition for federal habeas relief. Petitioner identified specific attorneys he wanted to represent him. The district court granted Petitioner's motion for counsel, but appointed an attorney other than those requested by Petitioner. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion under Sec. 3599(a)(2), seeking to substitute his court-appoitned counsel. The district court rejected Petitioner's request, holding he had not offered a sufficient basis for substituting counsel because the court-appointed conflict-free counsel was competent to handle death-penalty matters. Petitioner appealed the court's interlocutory order.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The court noted that it routinely reviews challenges to the denial of a motion to substitute counsel on appeal from a final judgment. Thus, the judgment petitioner challenged did not trigger the court's jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. View "Tracy v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant made two social media posts indicating that he paid another man, who was positive for COVID-19, to lick every item at a local grocery store. Defendant did not actually pay the other man, but the posts "set off alarm bells" resulting in FBI agents being dispatched to the grocery store.Defendant was indicted and ultimately convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1038(a)(1) for orchestrating a hoax that simulated another crime. Defendant claimed on appeal that the biological-weapons statute did not extend to conduct such as licking items in a grocery store and that the terrorist-hoax statute is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. The Fifth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges, finding that although the biological-weapons statute does contain an implied exception for local crimes, Defendant's purported conduct was serious enough to place him within the purview of federal law enforcement, and threats like Defendant's are not protected by the First Amendment. View "USA v. Perez" on Justia Law