Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The State of Texas appeals the district court’s decision that Plaintiffs’ federal Taking Clause claims against the State may proceed in federal court. Because we hold that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against a state.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision for want of jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to return this case to the state courts. The court explained that the Supreme Court of Texas recognizes takings claims under the federal and state constitutions, with differing remedies and constraints turning on the character and nature of the taking; nothing in this description of Texas law is intended to replace its role as the sole determinant of Texas state law. View "Devillier v. State of Texas" on Justia Law

The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act (HISA) is a federal law that nationalizes governance of the thoroughbred horseracing industry. To formulate detailed rules on an array of topics, HISA empowers a private entity called the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the “Authority”), which operates under Federal Trade Commission oversight. Soon after its passage, HISA was challenged by various horsemen’s associations, which were later joined by Texas and the state’s racing commission. Plaintiffs argued HISA is facially unconstitutional because it delegates government power to a private entity without sufficient agency supervision. The district court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ “concerns are legitimate,” that HISA has “unique features,” and that its structure “pushes the boundaries of public-private collaboration.” Nonetheless, the court rejected the private non-delegation challenge.   The Fifth Circuit declared that the HISA is unconstitutional because it violates the private non-delegation doctrine. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded. The court explained that while acknowledging the Authority’s “sweeping” power, the district court thought it was balanced by the FTC’s “equally” sweeping oversight. Not so. HISA restricts FTC review of the Authority’s proposed rules. If those rules are “consistent” with HISA’s broad principles, the FTC must approve them. And even if it finds an inconsistency, the FTC can only suggest changes. What’s more, the FTC concedes it cannot review the Authority’s policy choices. The Authority’s power outstrips any private delegation the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit has allowed. Thus the court declared HISA facially unconstitutional. View "National Horsemen's Benevolent v. Black" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for illegally reentering the United States, a violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment on equal protection grounds. After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the district court sentenced him to 30 months imprisonment and three years supervised release. On appeal, Defendant argues that Section 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection principles. As for his sentence, he asserts that the district court (1) failed to consider sentencing disparities, (2) improperly considered the timing of an appeal in sentencing him to three years of supervised release, and (3) failed to consider the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy on supervised release for deportable defendants.   The Fifth Circuit agreed that the district court abused its discretion by considering the appeal clock in determining the appropriate term of supervised release. Accordingly, the court vacated that part of Defendant’s sentence and remanded for reconsideration of the supervised-release term. The court otherwise affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The court found that the district court imposed three years of supervised release solely out of fear that a lower sentence would moot an appeal. The timing of an appeal is not a factor that courts are tasked with considering in imposing supervised release. Such a consideration is also irrelevant because Defendant could appeal his conviction even after his sentence ends. The district court abused its discretion by basing the term of supervised release on the irrelevant timing for an appeal. View "USA v. Barcenas-Rumualdo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who identify as Moorish Americans, sought to enter the Caddo Parish Courthouse to file documents with the court clerk. Upon arriving at the security-screening station, plaintiffs informed the officers on duty that they wished to enter without passing through the security screening. After Plaintiffs’ repeated refusals to depart, the officers stated they would count to three and, if Plaintiffs refused to leave, they would be arrested. They did not depart and were arrested, charged with violating Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 14:63.3.Plaintiffs brought a litany of claims against various officials serving in Caddo Parish and the Louisiana state government based on their actions taken during the arrest. Plaintiffs also moved for recusal of the magistrate judge, which the district court denied.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs have pointed to no precedent that abrogates the general “search incident to arrest” rule when religious headwear is involved. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Further, the court held that there was no error in the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge did not work on this case in private practice nor work with Defendants’ counsel in the practice of law while he was working on this case. Nor is there evidence of any bias or knowledge of the case that would have required the district court, in its discretion, to order recusal. View "Foley Bey v. Prator" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of numerous wire fraud and money-laundering charges arising from a fraudulent scheme to cause the Department of Veterans Affairs to pay over $71 million in GI-Bill funding to his trade school. Defendant raised several challenges to his convictions and his sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in nearly all respects, except that it vacated the forfeiture order and remanded it for further proceedings. The court held that Defendant fails to show the evidence was insufficient to allow a rational jury to convict him on the money-laundering counts. Further, the court concluded that conclude that the indictment was not faulty and the district court did not err in declining to order a bill of particulars.   Moreover, the court explained that illegally provided services that could have “hypothetically” been provided in a “legal manner”—like Defendant’s operation of the school—implicate the second definition of proceeds under Section 981(a)(2)(B), under which a defendant may deduct “the direct costs incurred in providing the goods or services.” The focus of any Section 981(a)(2) analysis is the underlying criminal conduct, not the crime itself.   That subsection further provides that Defendant “shall have the burden of proof with respect to the issue of direct costs” and also that those costs “shall not include any part of the overhead expenses of the entity providing the goods and services, or any part of the income taxes paid by the entity.” Therefore the court remanded for determining whether Defendant can prove any offset under the terms of Section 981(a)(2)(B). View "USA v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant challenges two conditions of his sentence, 1.) that he refrain from excessive alcohol consumption, and 2.) that he take all mental-health medications that are prescribed by his treating physician. The government conceded that condition 1 should be struck because it was not orally pronounced by the district court. However, the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's claim that the district court's general discussion of the importance of mental health treatment was sufficient to meet the notice requirement. Thus, the court struck both conditions. View "USA v. Prado" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. Sections 78j(b) and 77ff. The district court sentenced Defendant to 168 months in prison and imposed roughly $6.8 million in restitution. In exchange for Defendant's plea, the Government agreed to dismiss five other counts, which carried a maximum term of 100 years in prison. As part of his agreement, Defendant waived his right to appeal.Defendant subsequently filed notice of appeal, challenging the application of a sentencing enhancement and the court's restitution award. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Defendant's appeal, finding that he waived the right to appeal when he signed the plea agreement. View "USA v. Meredith" on Justia Law

Golden Glow Tanning Salon filed a civil rights suit against the City of Columbus, which shut down its business for seven weeks at the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Subsequent experience strongly suggests that draconian shutdowns were debatable measures from a cost-benefit standpoint, in that they inflicted enormous economic damage without necessarily “slowing the spread” of Covid-19. Golden Glow contends that the City Ordinance created an arbitrary distinction between tanning salons and liquor stores that bore no rational relationship to public health given the salon’s ability to operate safely and without customer contact   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the proffered reason is not arbitrary. Further, this conclusion is not altered by Golden Glow’s contention that it could have maintained a safer environment than could liquor stores. Under rational basis review, overinclusive and underinclusive classifications are permissible, as is some resulting inequality. Further, here, the closure of the salon constitutes a deprivation of some economically productive uses (i.e., the uses forbidden by the Ordinance’s Section 2). Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the City Ordinance rendered the entire property “valueless.” The district court was correct to find that there had been no per se taking. View "Golden Glow v. City of Columbus, MS" on Justia Law

Four years ago, L.L. was having a “severe mental health episode” and voicing “suicidal ideations.” So, his mother called the police. When the Chief of Police arrived, he ordered his officers to enter the home and, in the mix-up, L.L. was shot. Plaintiff sued the City of Duncanville for the Chief’s decision, namely “ordering officers . . . into the house.” Plaintiff argued that the Chief was a “policymaker” who—with a “callous disregard for individuals suffering from mental health episodes”—caused the “deprivation” of L.L.’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court wasn’t convinced and dismissed the case.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Chief’s decision to intervene wasn’t based on deliberate indifference to any risk to L.L.’s rights. The court explained that first, it wasn’t “highly predictable” that a Fourth Amendment violation would result from the Chief’s order. The single decision exception—especially when tied to deliberate indifference—applies in rare and narrow scenarios.   Second, Plaintiff can’t show that the Chief, at the time of his order, had the “requisite degree of culpability,” namely that he completely disregarded any risk to Liggins’s Fourth Amendment rights. L.L. had stopped taking his prescription medication and was “suffering from a severe mental health episode.” View "Liggins v. Duncanville TX" on Justia Law

Appellants, two police officers, arrested Plaintiff, a student, at a school basketball game. The district court denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding a dispute of material fact regarding the events surrounding Plaintiff's arrest. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s decision.The Fifth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The issues raised by Plaintiff create factual disputes that meet the required threshold to overcome Appellant's qualified immunity defense at this stage. View "Byrd v. Cornelius" on Justia Law