Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a rule permitting remote voting and proxy participation, allowing Members to be counted as present for quorum purposes even if not physically on the House floor. Using this procedure, the House passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023, with a majority of votes cast by proxy. The Act was subsequently passed by the Senate and signed into law by the President. The State of Texas challenged the validity of certain provisions of the Act, arguing that the Constitution’s Quorum Clause required a physical majority of Members to be present in the House chamber for business to be conducted.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held a bench trial and found that Texas had standing to challenge the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, a provision of the omnibus legislation. The district court concluded that the enrolled-bill rule, which generally bars courts from questioning the validity of a law based on legislative procedure, did not apply to this constitutional challenge. On the merits, the district court determined that the Quorum Clause required physical presence and enjoined enforcement of the challenged provision against Texas.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction. The Fifth Circuit held that the enrolled-bill rule did not bar judicial review of Texas’s constitutional claim because the facts were undisputed and the challenge was purely legal. The court then concluded that the Quorum Clause does not require physical presence, relying on the constitutional text, Supreme Court precedent, and historical congressional practice. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated the permanent injunction, holding that the House’s proxy-voting rule did not violate the Quorum Clause. View "State of Texas v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Evan Norman visited a bar where he consumed several alcoholic drinks and fell asleep. At the request of the establishment, Deputy Ingle removed Norman and instructed him to go home, warning that he could be arrested for public intoxication. Norman repeatedly asked for the deputies’ names and badge numbers and made comments to them. As the deputies returned to the bar, Norman followed and continued to engage with them. The situation escalated when Norman reached over Deputy Sutton’s arm and pointed at Deputy Ingle, leading to physical shoving. Norman then attempted to punch Deputy Ingle and placed him in a headlock. In response, the deputies used force to subdue Norman, including multiple punches to his head. Norman was arrested and left facedown for about ten minutes while awaiting medical assistance, during which he suffered significant facial injuries.Norman filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the deputies and others, alleging excessive force, denial of medical care, failure to intervene, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment violations. The district court dismissed claims against the county and sheriff but allowed claims against the deputies to proceed. The deputies moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding the use of force, resistance, and medical care, and ruled that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo, considering video evidence of the incident. The court held that the video evidence resolved any material factual disputes and showed that the deputies’ actions did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. The court found the use of force reasonable under the circumstances, no denial of medical care, and no basis for failure to intervene or other claims. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Norman v. Ingle" on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Brewster County, Texas, observed a pickup truck towing a horse trailer near a border patrol checkpoint during a shift change—a time and place known for smuggling activity. The deputy recognized the driver, who had previously been identified as a possible smuggler. Without being signaled or ordered, the driver pulled over to the shoulder, and the deputy parked behind him. During a casual conversation, the deputy noticed an open alcohol container in the truck. The driver gave inconsistent and suspicious answers about the trailer’s contents and ownership, and after further questioning, eventually admitted that there were people hidden in the locked compartment of the trailer. The deputy then discovered three undocumented immigrants inside.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the defendant had been seized with reasonable suspicion and that his consent to search the trailer attenuated any taint from the deputy’s actions. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of transporting illegal aliens but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. It found that the initial encounter was consensual, that the deputy’s actions did not constitute a seizure until reasonable suspicion had developed, and that the deputy’s incidental contact with the truck did not amount to a trespassory search. The court also determined that the discovery of the open alcohol container was lawful and that the subsequent evidence was not subject to suppression. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Larremore" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey caused significant flooding at the Arbor Court apartment complex in Houston in 2017, the property’s owner, DM Arbor Court, Limited (DMAC), sought permits from the City of Houston to repair the damage. The City denied these permits, invoking a provision of its flood control ordinance that had not previously been used for such denials. The City determined that a majority of the complex’s buildings had sustained “substantial damage,” requiring costly elevation before repairs could proceed. As a result, DMAC was unable to repair or redevelop the property, which led to the loss of tenants and the property sitting idle.DMAC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that the City’s denial of repair permits constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case as unripe, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the case ripe once the City’s Director of Public Works formally denied the permit application. On remand, after a bench trial, the district court rejected DMAC’s takings claim, concluding that the property retained some economic value and that DMAC was not deprived of all economically beneficial use. The court also found that the City’s actions were justified under the Penn Central framework, emphasizing the public interest in flood management.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the City’s denial of the repair permit deprived DMAC of all economically viable use of Arbor Court, constituting a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the City’s regulatory action amounted to a per se taking requiring just compensation. View "DM Arbor Court v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Ronald Donell Brown led a drug trafficking organization that transported large quantities of cocaine and marijuana from Houston, Texas, to Atlanta, Georgia. In 2014, after a shipment of cocaine was stolen, Brown believed two associates were responsible and sought to retaliate. He and others kidnapped one associate, Eric Williams, who escaped, but was later shot and wounded by Brown. Brown then orchestrated the murder of the second associate, Marcus Celestine, by providing information and a weapon to intermediaries, resulting in Celestine’s death outside a parole office. Brown was arrested in 2017 on unrelated charges and later indicted federally on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit murder for hire, intentional killing during drug trafficking, and firearm offenses related to crimes of violence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Brown’s motion to suppress evidence, finding that communications involving a confidential informant and Brown’s attorneys were not protected by attorney-client privilege, and that Brown’s Sixth Amendment rights had not been violated because the government’s alleged intrusion occurred before adversarial proceedings began. At trial, Brown was convicted on several counts. The government later moved to dismiss two firearm-related counts (Counts Three and Four) after trial, citing double jeopardy concerns. The district court granted this motion, denied Brown’s request for a continuance to respond, and sentenced him to life imprisonment on the remaining counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply and that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Counts Three and Four and the sentences for Counts One and Two, holding that the district court, not the government, must exercise its discretion to determine which multiplicitous convictions to dismiss and then resentence accordingly. The case was remanded for that purpose. View "USA v. Brown" on Justia Law

The defendant, who had a prior Louisiana felony conviction for illegal use of a weapon stemming from a drive-by shooting in 2021, was released on parole in March 2023. One month later, he was found as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation, where police discovered four loaded firearms, including one reported stolen. He was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and with possessing unregistered firearms under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).In the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, the defendant moved to dismiss both counts, arguing that the statutes were unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him. The district court denied the motion, holding that convicted felons are not protected by the Second Amendment and that the statutes align with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The defendant then pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession charge in exchange for dismissal of the other count, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the preserved as-applied constitutional challenge de novo. The court held that, under current precedent, the statute’s facial constitutionality was foreclosed. Addressing the as-applied challenge, the court found that the defendant’s prior conviction qualified as a predicate felony and that the government had identified relevant historical analogues—specifically, founding-era “going armed” laws that imposed similar burdens and justifications. The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as applied to the defendant, is consistent with the Second Amendment and the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The Institute for Free Speech (IFS), a nonprofit organization that provides pro bono legal services for First Amendment litigation, sought to represent a Texas politician and a political committee in challenging a Texas election law. This law requires political advertising signs to include a government-prescribed notice. IFS refrained from entering into representation agreements due to fear of prosecution under the Texas Election Code, which prohibits corporations from making political contributions, including in-kind contributions such as pro bono legal services.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed IFS's complaint for lack of Article III standing, concluding that IFS's claims were not ripe and that qualified immunity barred the individual-capacity claims. The district court assumed IFS had standing but found that the claims were not ripe because the prospective clients did not yet qualify as a candidate and a political committee. The court also concluded that sovereign immunity did not bar the official-capacity claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that IFS had standing to pursue its claims. The court found that IFS had demonstrated a serious intent to engage in constitutionally protected conduct, that its proposed conduct would violate Texas law, and that there was a substantial threat of enforcement. The court also concluded that IFS's claims were ripe for adjudication, as the prospective clients qualified as a candidate and a political committee under Texas law.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of standing and ripeness. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the individual-capacity claims based on qualified immunity, as the right to provide pro bono legal services in this context was not clearly established. The court also affirmed that the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity applied, allowing the official-capacity claims to proceed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Institute for Free Speech v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Jose E. Amstutz, a police officer employed by Harris County Precinct 6, was terminated after his wife filed a police report alleging domestic abuse. Amstutz was placed on leave and later terminated following an internal investigation that found he violated several policies. Amstutz claimed his wife had a history of making false allegations and had informed his supervisors about this potential. After his termination, Amstutz struggled to find other law enforcement employment, which he attributed to the General Discharge noted in his F-5 report.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Amstutz’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for not responding to the timeliness challenge. The court also dismissed his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, finding that he had not pleaded a protected property interest in his at-will employment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the ADEA claims, agreeing that Amstutz failed to address the timeliness challenge, thus waiving opposition to that argument. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claims, concluding that Amstutz did not identify any independent source of law that would create a property interest in his employment. The court found that Amstutz’s employment was at-will and that he did not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. Consequently, the court also dismissed Amstutz’s Monell claim against Harris County, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Amstutz v. Harris County" on Justia Law

Joseph Terrell Goody, a documented gang member with a lengthy criminal history, was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. His criminal record includes convictions for cocaine possession, robbery, assault, deadly conduct, evading arrest, and burglary. On September 26, 2020, Goody was pulled over for traffic violations, and officers found cocaine, methamphetamine, and a suspicious guitar case in his car. The case contained a loaded rifle. Goody was arrested and later pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas sentenced Goody to 57 months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release, with a special condition prohibiting him from associating with gang members. Goody appealed his conviction and the supervised-release condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Goody raised three arguments on appeal: the facial unconstitutionality of the felon-in-possession ban under the Second Amendment, a violation of the equal protection principle under the Fifth Amendment, and the vagueness of the supervised-release condition. The court rejected all three arguments. It upheld the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession ban, found no merit in the equal protection claim, and determined that the supervised-release condition was not plainly erroneous. The court noted that similar conditions have been routinely imposed and upheld by other courts. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Goody" on Justia Law

A Texas statute, Senate Bill 315, prohibits individuals under 21 from working at sexually oriented businesses (SOBs) to prevent sex trafficking and sexual exploitation. Plaintiffs, including the Texas Entertainment Association and several adult cabarets and bookstores, challenged the constitutionality of S.B. 315 under the First Amendment, suing the Texas Attorney General and the Executive Director of the Texas Workforce Commission.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a bench trial and upheld the statute as constitutional. The court found that Texas enacted S.B. 315 with the reasonable belief that it would curb sex trafficking and that the law was sufficiently tailored to that end. The court applied intermediate scrutiny, concluding that the statute furthered the state's interest in reducing sex trafficking and did not restrict substantially more speech than necessary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate. The court found that S.B. 315 was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest by providing evidence linking SOBs to sex trafficking and sex crimes. The court also determined that the statute allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication, as it did not significantly restrict the expressive conduct of SOBs or their employees. The court concluded that S.B. 315 was not overbroad, as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the statute prohibited or chilled a substantial amount of protected speech. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that S.B. 315 is constitutional under the First Amendment. View "Ass’n of Club Executives v. Paxton" on Justia Law