Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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On November 4, 2020, San Antonio police officers stopped a car driven by Ronnie Diaz, Jr. They detected a strong odor of marijuana and found empty baggies commonly used for narcotics. Diaz admitted to having ammunition in his pocket and being a convicted felon. A search of the vehicle revealed a .45 caliber pistol, methamphetamine, counterfeit Xanax, and heroin. Diaz had prior convictions, including theft of a vehicle and evading arrest in 2014, and possession of a firearm as a felon in 2018.Diaz was charged in the Western District of Texas with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possessing firearms during a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge, arguing it violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Diaz was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 120 months for counts one and three, to run concurrently, and 60 months for count two, to run consecutively.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Diaz raised two claims: that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied, and that the statute exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The court dismissed the Commerce Clause argument as foreclosed by precedent. Applying the historical analysis required by New York Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, the court found that the regulation of firearm possession by felons is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Diaz and facially. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Diaz’s conviction. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

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Astrid Dariana Lopez Orellana, a noncitizen, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2019, fleeing gang threats in Honduras. In 2022, she was convicted of accessory after the fact to armed robbery under Louisiana law. Subsequently, she was taken into ICE custody and designated as an aggravated felon, leading to expedited removal proceedings.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) and a Notice of Intent (NOI) to remove her, alleging her conviction was an aggravated felony. Lopez requested withholding of removal, and an asylum officer found she had a reasonable fear of persecution if returned to Honduras. Her case was referred to an Immigration Judge (IJ). DHS later issued a new NOI and FARO on the same day, claiming her conviction was an aggravated felony related to obstruction of justice. Lopez challenged this, arguing the Louisiana statute did not match the federal definition of obstruction of justice, and that DHS violated procedural regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Louisiana accessory-after-the-fact statute requires only general intent, whereas the federal obstruction of justice offense requires specific intent. Therefore, the state statute is not a categorical match for the federal offense. The court also determined that DHS violated Lopez’s due process rights by not following proper procedures, such as issuing the FARO and NOI on the same day and failing to serve the FARO in a timely manner.The Fifth Circuit granted Lopez’s petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case to DHS for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court directed the government to facilitate Lopez’s participation in these proceedings. View "Orellana v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Independent candidates and minor political parties in Texas challenged several provisions of the Texas Election Code, arguing that these provisions, when combined, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by imposing severe and unequal burdens on non-wealthy Independents and Minor Parties. The provisions in question include requirements for obtaining ballot access through primary elections, party nominations, or nominating petitions, as well as restrictions on petitioning methods and timelines.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found that the requirement for candidates to submit hardcopy signatures for ballot access petitions was unconstitutional, reasoning that it imposed an unequal burden on the plaintiffs compared to Major Parties, which could use electronic methods. The court enjoined the enforcement of the paper-petitioning process but stayed its injunction pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the Anderson-Burdick framework to evaluate the constitutionality of the ballot-access laws. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the challenged provisions imposed severe burdens on them. The court upheld the numerical signature requirement, the costs associated with obtaining signatures, the time constraints on petitioning, and the restrictive petitioning procedures as justified by legitimate state interests. The court also upheld the filing fee or petition requirement for Minor Party candidates and rejected the claim that the provisions imposed more severe restrictions on presidential Independents.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the paper-petitioning requirement was unconstitutional, noting that all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, must obtain petition signatures through hardcopy methods. The court affirmed the constitutionality of the challenged provisions and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Nelson" on Justia Law

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Michael Ray Senn was convicted in a Texas state court of sexual assault and prohibited sexual conduct with his intellectually disabled daughter, Brenda, who has an IQ of 64 and the competence of a preteen. In 2011, Senn raped Brenda, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child in January 2012. DNA testing confirmed Senn as the biological father. A Texas jury found Senn guilty and applied a sentencing enhancement under Texas Penal Code Section 22.011(f), which increased the maximum sentence to life imprisonment because Senn was already married at the time of the assault.Senn's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the initial appellate decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Arteaga v. State. On remand, the appellate court initially found insufficient evidence for the enhancement but was later overruled by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Lopez v. State, which clarified that the enhancement applied if the defendant was married to someone other than the victim at the time of the assault. Senn's subsequent appeals, including an equal protection challenge, were rejected by the Texas courts.Senn then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that the application of the sentencing enhancement violated the Equal Protection Clause. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied his petition, holding that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Senn failed to demonstrate that the state court's application of the law was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law, specifically noting that the enhancement had a rational basis in protecting children and vulnerable individuals from sexual exploitation. View "Senn v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

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Paola Connelly, a non-violent marijuana user, was charged after El Paso police responded to a "shots fired" call at her home. Her husband, John, was found firing a shotgun at a neighbor's door and was arrested. Paola admitted to occasionally using marijuana for sleep and anxiety. A search of their home revealed drug paraphernalia and several firearms, including a pistol owned by Paola. She was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing firearms as an unlawful user of a controlled substance and 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) for providing firearms to an unlawful user.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Paola's motion to dismiss the charges. However, after the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Rahimi, the District Court reconsidered and found that §§ 922(g)(3) and 922(d)(3) were facially unconstitutional and that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional as applied to Paola under the Second Amendment. The government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while historical and traditional regulations may support some limits on a presently intoxicated person's right to carry a weapon, they do not support disarming a sober person based solely on past substance usage. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the charges against Paola as applied to her but reversed the facial challenges to §§ 922(g)(3) and 922(d)(3). The court concluded that there are circumstances where these statutes could be constitutionally applied, such as banning presently intoxicated individuals from carrying firearms. View "United States v. Connelly" on Justia Law

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Jose Paz Medina-Cantu was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition as an illegal alien, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(2), and illegal reentry into the United States, violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b). He moved to dismiss the firearm possession charge, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The district court denied his motion, referencing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Portillo-Munoz, which held that the Second Amendment does not extend to illegal aliens.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Medina-Cantu’s motion to dismiss, holding that Bruen did not abrogate the precedent set by Portillo-Munoz. Medina-Cantu then pleaded guilty to both counts without a plea agreement but preserved his constitutional argument for appeal. He was sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. Medina-Cantu argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bruen and United States v. Rahimi abrogated Portillo-Munoz. However, the Fifth Circuit held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi unequivocally overruled Portillo-Munoz. The court emphasized that under its rule of orderliness, it could not overturn another panel’s decision unless there was an unequivocal change in the law by the Supreme Court or an en banc decision. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) under the Second Amendment. View "USA v. Medina-Cantu" on Justia Law

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Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates challenged a Louisiana law that prohibits automobile manufacturers from selling directly to consumers and performing warranty services for cars they do not own. Tesla alleged that the law violated federal antitrust law, due process rights, and equal protection rights. The defendants included the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission, its commissioners, the Louisiana Automobile Dealers Association (LADA), and various dealerships.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Tesla's claims. The court found that the private defendants were immune from antitrust liability, Tesla had not plausibly pleaded a Sherman Act violation against the governmental defendants, there was insufficient probability of actual bias to support the due process claim, and the regulations passed rational-basis review for the equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the dismissal of Tesla's due process claim, finding that Tesla had plausibly alleged that the Commission's composition and actions created a possible bias against Tesla, violating due process. The court vacated and remanded the dismissal of the antitrust claim, noting that the due process ruling fundamentally altered the grounds for Tesla's alleged antitrust injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claim, holding that the regulations had a rational basis in preventing vertical integration and controlling the automobile retail market.In summary, the Fifth Circuit reversed the due process claim dismissal, vacated and remanded the antitrust claim dismissal, and affirmed the equal protection claim dismissal. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Tesla v. Louisiana Automobile Dealers" on Justia Law

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The case involves a long-standing litigation concerning the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office and the conditions at Orleans Parish Prison. Plaintiffs, including detainees and the United States, argued that the jail provided constitutionally inadequate housing and medical care. In 2013, a district court approved a consent decree to address these issues, which included a plan to construct a mental health annex, known as Phase III. Despite years of delays, the district court ordered the construction to proceed. No party appealed these orders at the time.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana oversaw the case initially. In 2016, the parties entered a stipulated order to develop a plan for appropriate housing for prisoners with mental health issues. The Compliance Director later proposed the construction of Phase III, which was agreed upon by the former Sheriff and the City. However, the City later sought to explore alternatives, leading to further court orders in 2019 to proceed with Phase III. The City’s subsequent motion to halt the project was denied, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. City of New Orleans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is currently reviewing the case. The new Sheriff, Susan Hutson, moved to terminate all orders concerning Phase III, arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits the construction of a new jail facility. The district court denied this motion, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that it could review the denial of the motion but not the underlying orders, as the Sheriff’s motion was not a proper procedural mechanism under the PLRA to challenge the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. The appeal was dismissed, and the construction of Phase III continues. View "Anderson v. Hutson" on Justia Law

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Commercial fishers challenged the constitutionality of the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council's actions, specifically targeting the approval and implementation of Amendment 54, which significantly reduced the greater amberjack catch limit. The plaintiffs argued that the Council members were improperly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution and were unconstitutionally insulated from removal. They sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to set aside the Final Rule implementing the catch limit and to prevent further development of annual catch limits for the greater amberjack fishery.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment to the government. The court found that six of the Council’s seventeen members were improperly appointed as inferior officers. However, it concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because the constitutional violation was not the proximate cause of their injuries. The decision to implement Amendment 54 was made by the NMFS Assistant Administrator, not the Council. Additionally, the court noted that the remaining eleven Council members were properly appointed and constituted a quorum.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and remanded it to the district court. The appellate court instructed the lower court to determine whether it had jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' request to declare Amendment 54 void and to enjoin the Council from developing further catch limits. The district court was also directed to address whether the NMFS Assistant Administrator’s review and approval of the Final Rule functioned as a ratification of the Council’s actions. The appellate court emphasized the need for a thorough district court analysis of the ratification issue before addressing the validity of the Council members' appointments and the plaintiffs' entitlement to relief. View "Arnesen v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant Sonya Porretto owns Porretto Beach in Galveston, Texas. After filing for bankruptcy in 2009, her case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. In 2020, the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the Porretto Beach property back to her. In 2021, Porretto filed a lawsuit against the City of Galveston Park Board of Trustees, the City of Galveston, the Texas General Land Office (GLO), and its Commissioner, alleging that their actions constituted takings without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Porretto’s lawsuit. The court concluded that Porretto lacked standing to sue the GLO and its Commissioner because her complaint did not establish a causal link between their actions and her alleged injuries. The court also found that it lacked bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Porretto did not invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for her constitutional claims. Additionally, the court denied Porretto leave to amend her complaint and her motion for recusal of the presiding judge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Porretto’s claims against the GLO and its Commissioner without prejudice, agreeing that Porretto lacked standing. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Porretto’s claims against the Park Board and the City of Galveston, finding that the district court does have federal question jurisdiction over her constitutional claims despite her failure to cite § 1983. The case was remanded for the district court to consider alternative arguments for dismissal and the issue of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Porretto’s motion for recusal and her request for reassignment to a different judge. View "Porretto v. City of Galveston" on Justia Law