Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Forensic Laboratory, Inc., KHS, the KISD Police Department, the KISD Board of Trustees (“KISD Board”), and a number of KHS, KISD, and KISD Police Department employees in their individual and official capacities. That suit was filed in the state district court in Fort Bend County, Texas. McClelland alleged (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights; and (3) various state law claims, including defamation, spoliation, and civil conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants motion to dismiss and denied several other pending motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly analyzed Plaintiff’s void-for-vagueness claim and did not err in dismissing it. It is well settled, in the educational context, that a plaintiff must allege a protected property interest. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is devoid of any such allegations. And, even if he had alleged lack of participation on the football team or team captainship in connection with vagueness, he still would not prevail. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process claims because Plaintiff did not allege the deprivation of his property or liberty interests. View "McClelland v. Katy Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a Houston lawyer who has appeared before Judge Newman, a former probate judge in Harris County. It is undisputed that Judge Newman used his private Facebook account to support his campaign for reelection as well as share news about his personal and family life with the public. Plaintiff commented on three of Judge Newman’s posts that related to his campaign for reelection. The comments accused Judge Newman of having “court cronies” and doing “favors for them at the expense of other litigants.” He also commented that he would not vote for Judge Newman and accused him of favoritism. Judge Newman deleted the comments and blocked Plaintiff’s account. Plaintiff sued Judge Newman under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that he violated his First Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion to amend his complaint and granted Judge Newman’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that he failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Judge Newman acted under the color of state law as required by Section 1983.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Judge Newman was not acting under the color of state law when he blocked Plaintiff and deleted his comments, the court held that Plaintiff has not met his burden under Section 1983. The court further held that the way in which Plaintiff sought to amend the complaint would not overcome its deficiencies. View "Kallinen v. Newman" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were a class of people who had been charged with misdemeanor and felony crimes in Dallas County and who were allegedly unconstitutionally incarcerated pretrial solely because they were financially unable to post required bail. While the case was arguably moot, the Fifth Circuit determined it had the discretion to determine whether a federal court should have proceeded to the merits of plaintiffs’ bail “reform” lawsuit in the first place.The court explained that Younger requires federal court abstention when three criteria are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. Finding all three prongs of Younger were met, the court overruled ODonnell I, ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 882F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), holding against abstention in this matter. As an alternate holding, the court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs' case was moot. View "Daves v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

A trusted prison inmate was working unsupervised in a hog barn when the ceiling collapsed, striking him in the head. He told the prison agricultural specialist that he needed medical attention. But the specialist thought the inmate looked no worse for wear and ordered him back to work. A short while later, the inmate asked another prison staffer for medical attention. The staffer radioed a supervisor. Based on the staffer’s report, the supervisor, too, thought nothing serious had happened and did not immediately grant the inmate’s request. The inmate’s condition later worsened. He was sent to the hospital and diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that prison staff violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference towards him. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Plaintiff alleged premises-liability claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants based on qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to raise a factual dispute over whether the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. But even if he had, he’d still need to show that his rights were “clearly established at the time of the violation.” The court explained that involves showing that “the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” It just isn’t enough to identify a right as “a broad general proposition.” The district court did not address qualified immunity’s second step. Further, the court agreed with Defendants that even assuming a violation, the law was not clearly established under this standard. View "Rogers v. Jarrett" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one drug conspiracy count for each predicate drug. It also convicted Defendant of two additional counts for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and carisoprodol. The district court sentenced him to 151 months imprisonment, the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. On direct appeal, Defendant argued that errors in the district court’s jury instructions require his retrial. In the alternative, Defendant argued that the district court miscalculated his Sentencing Guidelines offense level.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if idiosyncratic portions of the jury charge lacked clarity on Section 841(a)’s mens rea requirement, the adequate Section 846 mens rea instruction filled any gap by clearly requiring that the jury find that Defendant have understood the illegitimate nature of his conduct. Further, any error in Section 841(a) instruction was harmless. Moreover, the court wrote that here, the trial court’s remarks explained relevant, available inferences in conditional language but did not dictate that the jury reach any specific outcome. The trial court also emphasized to the jury that they should “not assume from anything I may have done or said during the trial that I have any opinion” concerning the case and that the jury must “arrive at your own verdict.” The court found that a review of the remainder of the trial record reveals no evidence of bias on the part of the trial judge. View "USA v. Ajayi" on Justia Law

Two outdoor-advertising companies filed applications with the City of Austin to digitize existing, traditional billboards and to upgrade signs with less sophisticated digitization. The City rejected their applications because the signs would advertise a business, service, or activity that was not located on the site where the sign was installed. The companies sued, arguing that the City’s Sign Code’s distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs violated the First Amendment. The district court upheld the Sign Code. When the case first came to this court, we reversed, holding that the on-premises/off-premises distinction was content-based and could not survive strict scrutiny. The U.S. Supreme Court, though, held that the City’s Sign Code was facially content neutral and, absent an impermissible purpose, would be subject to intermediate scrutiny. The court remanded.   The Fifth Circuit concluded, applying the Supreme Court’s new guidance, that the Sign Code survives intermediate scrutiny. The court explained that the effort to compare all billboards to all news racks fails. The Supreme Court could discern no meaningful difference between newspapers and commercial handbills. Both were sold on identical news racks and were equally responsible for the harm inflicted on public safety and aesthetics. In the context of sign regulations, by contrast, the court has discerned a meaningful difference between on-premises and off-premises signs. Further, the court found that municipalities have traditionally been given wide discretion in the domain of sign regulations, and Austin is entitled to that latitude. View "Reagan Natl Advtsng v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a bench trial of possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Sergeant had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity in the alley. First, Defendant’s location and timing provide a strong foundation for finding reasonable suspicion. Second, Defendant’s emergence and subsequent actions similarly give rise to reasonable suspicion. Third, Defendant’s inconsistent and nonsensical answers to the Sergeant’s questions gave rise to reasonable suspicion. Further, the court explained that even if the Sergeant and officer realized in the course of the seizure that Defendant was not the individual in the photograph, there remained numerous articulable and suspicious facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient to extend the seizure, namely Defendant’s actions and statements before the photograph’s arrival as well as his suspicious answers in response to questions generated by the picture itself. View "USA v. Roper" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal prisoner, appealed the denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1). Defendant offered four reasons for his Section 3582(c)(1) motion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant’s first three arguments are not cognizable bases for compassionate release and the fourth does not have merit.   Defendant argued that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective and that the Government breached his plea agreement. But because these claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, they are not cognizable under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c). Second, Defendant argued that he should get a sentence reduction because the First Step Act reduced the statutory minimums applicable to his offenses. But Congress did not make those reductions retroactive. And a prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support a compassionate release motion because such changes are neither extraordinary nor compelling. Third, Defendant briefly suggested that an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines favors his early release. Defendant did not adequately present this argument to the district court, however, so it is forfeited   Defendant’s fourth and final argument is the only one that states a possibly cognizable basis for compassionate release—namely, that COVID-19 constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. To support this argument, Defendant suggested that his prior COVID-19 infection and general ill health place him at greater risk from COVID-19 relative to the broader population. The court wrote it has repeatedly denied relief in cases where prisoners sought compassionate release due to fear of communicable disease, even when those prisoners were in poor health. View "USA v. McMaryion" on Justia Law

In May 2017, La’Shadion Shemwell was elected to the McKinney City Council. Shemwell’s term was cut short when the voters recalled him in November 2020. Shemwell claimed that the McKinney recall election procedures violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Six months after dismissing his first lawsuit and two months before his recall election, Shemwell filed this suit on September 13, 2020. He asserted the same claims, this time with an additional Plaintiff— a Latina District 1 voter. The district court held the case moot, declined to apply the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and granted the City’s motion to dismiss. The sole issue on appeal is whether the November 2020 recall election mooted Plaintiffs’ claim for prospective declaratory relief.   The Fifth Circuit found that the November 2020 election mooted this case and held that Plaintiffs’ failed to satisfy the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” mootness exception. The court explained that Shemwell—in his official capacity—failed to claim or prove that he was likely to run again for District 1, win, and face the allegedly unlawful recall provisions. And Plaintiffs’—in their capacity as voters—failed to claim or prove that there was more than an “abstract or hypothetical” possibility that they would ever vote in another recall election of a District 1 Council Member. Thus, any judgment issued after the recall election would have been an impermissible advisory opinion. Further, Plaintiffs repeatedly abandoned their claims for injunctive relief—and never pursued expedited relief. View "Shemwell v. McKinney, Texas" on Justia Law