Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal arises from Plaintiff’s suit against the City of Harahan (“the City”) for its alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In October 2019, the Harahan Police Department (“HPD”) Chief of Police determined that Plaintiff was guilty of numerous offenses. Plaintiff was entitled to a fifteen-day appeal window of the Chief’s disciplinary determinations. Plaintiff exercised his right to appeal a week after the charges. However, the Chief emailed the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s office (“JPDA”) to inform it of his disciplinary action against Plaintiff before he exercised his right. Plaintiff brought a civil rights suit against the City for violation of his procedural due process rights, stigma-plus-infringement, and defamation. He included Louisiana state law claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence. The City moved to dismiss his Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(c). The primary issue is whether the district court erroneously determined that Plaintiff had a liberty interest in his “future employment as a law enforcement officer.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the City’s Rule 12(c) motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s alleged liberty interest in his career in law enforcement has no basis in Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent. Moreover, he does not provide a different constitutional anchor for this proposed liberty interest. Because he fails to state facts supporting the violation of a cognizable liberty interest, he fails to plead a due process violation. Furthermore, the court declined to address the adequacy of the process he received. View "Adams v. City of Harahan" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, Houston Police Officer fatally shot a man. Plaintiffs, including the parents and estate of the victim, brought multiple claims against the officer who fatally shot the man, two other police officers, and the city. The individual defendants claimed qualified immunity. The district court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss in response to Plaintiffs’ complaint, dismissed Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal and requested reassignment to a different district judge. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs that the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against Defendant for excessive force, denial of medical care, and unlawful arrest was an error. The court reversed and remanded those claims. The court explained that taking as true that Defendant had no reason to believe the man was armed and that the shooting officer knew the man was seriously injured and likely could not move, a police officer would know, under these precedents, that to handcuff the man was an arrest without probable cause under clearly established law. The court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims is affirmed. The court denied, as moot, Plaintiffs’ request for reassignment to a new judge. View "Allen v. Hays" on Justia Law

Louisiana passed the Truth in Labeling of Food Products Act (the “Act”) to “protect consumers from misleading and false labeling of food products that are edible by humans.” The Act bars, among other things, the intentional “misbranding or misrepresenting of any food product as an agricultural product” through several different labeling practices. Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. (d/b/a Tofurky), markets and sells its products in Louisiana. Tofurky believes it operates under a constant threat of enforcement. Tofurky sued Louisiana’s Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court sided with Tofurky. It held that Tofurky had standing to challenge the Act and that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on Tofurky’s right to free speech. The State appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that nothing in the statute’s language requires the State to enforce its punitive provisions on a company that sells its products in a way that just so happens to confuse a consumer. The State’s construction limits the Act’s scope to representations by companies that actually intend consumers to be misled about whether a product is an “agricultural product” when it is not. This interpretation is not contradictory to the Act, and the court thus accepted it for the present purposes of evaluating Tofurky’s facial challenge. The district court erred in ignoring the State’s limiting construction and in implementing its own interpretation of the Act. View "Turtle Island Foods v. Strain" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Texas Government Code Section 808. He contends that Section 808’s divestment requirement violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing and dismissed his claims against the Texas Comptroller and the Texas Attorney General (collectively, “Defendants”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims. Article III grants jurisdiction to federal courts only over actions involving an “actual case or controversy.” The court concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged injury is—at most—speculative; he has wholly failed to allege that any risk of economic harm is “certainly impending.” Because Plaintiff cannot show how any investment or divestment decisions will affect his future payments, he cannot show that he has suffered an injury. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Section 808 causes him an injury by violating his own personal Fourteenth or First Amendment rights. View "Abdullah v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of depriving two persons of their constitutional rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 242. The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 12 and 360 months of imprisonment and ordered Defendant to pay $10,000 in restitution to one of the victims. Defendant appealed, arguing that the government failed to disclose impeachment evidence in violation of the Brady rule, and he sought a new trial on that basis.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the withheld evidence was not material. The court explained that there is no reasonable probability that if the government had disclosed the evidence of the victim’s arrest and pending criminal case, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s theory of how he would have used evidence of the victim’s arrest and pending criminal case to impeach the victim rests on speculation. Defendant does not point to any evidence that federal prosecutors could have influenced the Texas prosecutor’s conduct before the grand jury or the grand jury’s findings.   Moreover, the court concluded that Defendant is incorrect in sentencing him the district court “drew an adverse inference” from his silence that “may have resulted in added imprisonment.” Defendant does not point to any specific foundation in the record for his claim that the district court relied on his lack of remorse in determining his sentence. Any inferences the district court drew from Defendant’s refusal to comment at the sentencing hearing did not adversely impact his sentence and did not burden his Fifth Amendment privilege. View "USA v. Sepulveda" on Justia Law

A Texas jury convicted Defendant of murder and sentenced him to death. After his direct appeal and habeas petitions were both denied in state court, Defendant raised 31 claims in a federal habeas petition. The district court denied all his claims and also denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Defendant asked the Fifth Circuit to issue a COA on eight of those claims, which he presents as posing five distinct legal issues.   The Fifth Circuit denied Defendant a COA on all of his claims. The court first found that it is beyond debate that Defendant’s claim would still be unexhausted for failing to fairly present the Confrontation Clause claim to the state habeas court. Further, the court explained that the state court concluded that Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to use a peremptory strike against these jurors. Defendant has not identified any clearly established federal law that would allow reasonable jurists to debate this conclusion. Moreover, the court wrote that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s fifth stated reason for striking a juror at all. Therefore, the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s Batson claim is not debatable. Next, the court found that the habeas court conducted an extensive argument-by-argument review of Defendant’s comparative juror analysis argument. It considered each argument that Defendant said should have been raised. It found that each of these arguments was meritless and that, as a result, Defendant’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them. View "Harper v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

the Biden Administration issued an executive order that re-established an interagency working group (“Working Group”) to formulate guidance on the “social cost of greenhouse gases.” That order directed the Working Group to publish dollar estimates quantifying changes in carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions (collectively, “greenhouse gases”) for consideration by federal agencies when policymaking. Working Group has since published “Interim Estimates” based largely on the findings of its predecessor working group. The Plaintiffs-States (“Plaintiffs”) challenge E.O. 13990 and the Interim Estimates as procedurally invalid, arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with various agency-specific statutes, and ultra vires. They obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court. Defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel stayed the injunction.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed this action because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations of “injury in fact” rely on a chain of hypotheticals: federal agencies may (or may not) premise their actions on the Interim Estimates in a manner that may (or may not) burden the States. Such injuries do not flow from the Interim Estimates but instead from potential future regulations, i.e., final rules that are subject to their own legislated avenues of scrutiny, dialogue, and judicial review on an appropriately developed record. View "State of Louisiana v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, his wife, and his three children are Libyan citizens who have resided lawfully in the United States for over a decade. Plaintiff filed an I-140 petition seeking a waiver of the labor-certification requirement of his visa because he is a “professional holding an advanced degree whose work is in the national interest of the United States.” While the petition was pending, Plaintiff and his family filed I-485 applications for status adjustment to legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1255(a). Section 1255 grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the status of certain aliens to LPR status if they have met certain statutorily specified conditions. The USCIS granted the family’s I-485 petitions prematurely. The district court found that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the original denial of the I-140 because Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the order of dismissal. The court held that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a status-adjustment decision by the USCIS under either the APA or the INA because the alien retains the right to de novo review of that decision in his final removal proceedings. Thus, the court found that Plaintiffs have not yet exhausted administrative remedies and the court may not exercise jurisdiction. View "Elldakli v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”). In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).   The Fifth Circuit denied Cactus Canyon’s petition, holding that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold equipment. But the plain language and purpose support the inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.” The court concluded that the braking standard unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since a “system”—by definition at the time of the standard’s passage—is composed of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its related components, including those that do not simply function to stop and hold the vehicle. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries v. MSHR" on Justia Law

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Polanco" on Justia Law