Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, is a Mississippi state inmate. Defendant is a physician and at relevant times was the medical director at the state facility where Plaintiff was housed. Because Plaintiff suffers from a complex psychiatric profile, Plaintiff’s cell was inside the facility’s medical unit. As a result of Plaintiff’s incitement, other prisoners, many of whom were also psychiatric patients, began to act similarly. Defendant went to the scene, as did as many as nine other staff members. There, Defendant asked Plaintiff to desist several times. Plaintiff did not. Defendant then ordered that Plaintiff receive two injections: Haldol, an antipsychotic, and Benadryl, an antihistamine intended as a prophylactic against any complication from Haldol. Plaintiff went to sleep following the injections, and nearby inmates quieted down. Afterward, Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 suit alleging that Defendant’s decision to forcibly medicate Plaintiff violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. The district court, relying on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence and out-of-circuit opinion, agreed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred when it declined to apply an Eighth Amendment framework to Plaintiff’s dispute over medical treatment. And, even if a Fourteenth Amendment framework were apposite, Plaintiff received all the process he was due. The court explained that it’s not as if Defendant suddenly and arbitrarily injected Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant injected him only after Plaintiff precipitated a disturbance that subjectively appeared imminently dangerous, only after multiple rounds of verbal persuasion failed, and only after a licensed medical professional determined that medication was appropriate. View "Pinkston v. Kuiper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an inmate in a Texas state prison. He was treated at a prison clinic and then discharged after the nurses told Plaintiff they believed he was "faking" his symptoms. Plainitff later experienced a brain stem stroke. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 claim, asserting prison staff denied him access to emergency medical treatment. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's claim.On appeal, Plaintiff claimed that the district court (1) erred in resolving disputed facts during screening; (2) erred in concluding that he failed to state a claim; (3) erred in determining that the warden and medical director were not liable as supervisors; and (4) abused its discretion in failing to rule on pending motions. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff's claim was not a constitutional tort, but instead a medical malpractice claim. View "Thompson v. TDCJ" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery. As part of Defendant’s sentence, and over his objection, the district court ordered Defendant to pay $5,000 in restitution to Parks Food Mart, the store he robbed. Defendant appealed this order of restitution on two grounds: first, that the district court erred in imposing restitution to a business entity and second, that the district court erred by ordering restitution in the amount of $5,000.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed but modified the amount of restitution to $3,500. The court explained that MVRA directs the district court to “reimburse the victim for lost income . . . and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense.” Here, Parks Food Mart was closed for approximately 6 hours on a Monday, from 6:15 p.m. to midnight, as law enforcement investigated the robbery. In the original PSR, the probation officer reported only that the business had suffered “$4,000 from missed earnings while being closed for investigation.” The court explained that it understands that sales are variable and there may have been reason for Parks Food Mart, in stating that the store closure resulted in $4,000 in lost earnings, to expect sales on the higher end the day of the robbery. At the same time, however, the court recognized that the store closure only impacted part of the day. Given these competing tensions and the lack of any other documentation as to the store’s losses, the court found the $3,500 figure to be a better-supported estimate of lost sales. View "USA v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1), and he was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment. His sentence reflected the district court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which is triggered when a Section 922(g) offender has three prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses” that were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the ACCA enhancement violated his constitutional rights because the facts establishing that he committed his previous violent felonies on different occasions were not charged in the indictment and either admitted by him or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the parties argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wooden v. United States instructs that the ACCA enhancement here was a constitutional error.1 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022). But in Wooden, the Court explicitly declined to address the issue that Defendant raised. Wooden is, therefore, “not directly on point” and thus does not “alter the binding nature” of Davis and White. View "USA v. Valencia" on Justia Law

Defendant and his co-defendant entered a CVS pharmacy through the store’s front doors to commit an armed robbery. When police officers arrived, they encountered Defendant and Parson attempting to exit the CVS. Defendant and co-Defendant retreated into the store while the officers sought cover outside the front door and in the parking lot. Defendant and co-Defendant then ran out of the store as they shot at the police officers. One police officer sustained a gunshot wound to the shoulder area. Co-Defendant sustained multiple gunshot wounds and was arrested immediately following the robbery. Defendant appealed the four-level sentencing enhancement for abduction to his base offense level under U.S.S.G. Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Defendant contended that the district court erred in applying the abduction sentencing enhancement for three reasons. First, Defendant argued that he “did not force the victim to ‘accompany’ him anywhere” and that forcing the cashier from the cashier area to the restroom “does not qualify as the type of ‘forced accompaniment’ required by the abduction enhancement.” The court disagreed. Defendant pointed a gun at the cashier and forced him to walk with Defendant from the cashier area to the restroom, where Defendant zip-tied the cashier’s hands. Thus, Defendant forced the cashier to accompany him.   Second, Defendant challenged the district court’s determination that the “different location” requirement of Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) was satisfied when he moved the cashier to the bathroom. Here, Defendant forced the cashier from the cashier’s area at the front of the store to the restroom. Accordingly, the different location requirement was also satisfied. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in imposing the abduction enhancement. View "USA v. Sansbury" on Justia Law

The district court initially sentenced Defendant to a twenty-year term of imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release (“SR”). Later, however, the court vacated that sentence and imposed ten years in prison and three years of SR. Defendant fully served that reduced prison term and began his SR. But because he violated the conditions of SR, the district court revoked it and imposed additional terms of imprisonment and SR. After serving a new prison term and beginning the new term of SR, Defendant again violated the conditions, so the court revoked SR a second time.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s revocation judgments in consideration of the court’s earlier vacatur of his ten-year sentence. The court explained that the statutory framework and applicable precedent indicate that vacatur is warranted here. Defendant’s revocation judgments were part of his ten-year sentence. That sentence was vacated. The revocation judgments are therefore legally void and should be vacated as well. View "USA v. Lipscomb" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court in 1991. The United States Supreme Court ordered Petitioner resentenced in 2007. After he was sentenced to death a second time, Petitioner exhausted his state remedies and then petitioned for federal habeas relief. The district court denied his petition and did not certify any questions for appellate review. Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability (“COA”).   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s application for a COA. The court explained that the district court found the state court’s rejection of prejudice to be reasonable under Strickland, especially considering the jury’s opportunity to assess Petitioner’s credibility in light of the eyewitness description of the crime’s brutality. No reasonable jurist could find the district court’s assessment debatable or wrong. Further, the court reasoned that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s conclusion that, as evidenced in extremely thorough opinions by the state court and magistrate judge, the state court reasonably applied Strickland in holding that trial counsel was not ineffective in preparing and presenting a mitigation defense. View "Brewer v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant was a local law-enforcement agent who worked as a taskforce officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Defendant was charged with stealing money and property from arrestees, as well as destroying evidence of those activities. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Following the verdict, Defendant asserted that one of the jurors (“Juror”) had failed to disclose his acquaintance with Defendant and Defendant’s wife, and Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of juror bias. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to twenty-seven months of imprisonment. Defendant argued that the Juror’s prior romantic relationship with Defendant’s wife necessitated, at a minimum, a questioning before the court.” Defendant asserted that such questioning would reveal that the Juror was actually biased, entitling Defendant to a new trial.   The Fifth Circuit remanded for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of juror bias. The court explained that although not every claim of actual bias on behalf of a juror militates a hearing, the district court here abused its discretion by ruling on the motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. Defendant has established that the Juror and Defendant’s wife were friends in high school, that the Juror attended Defendant’s wedding, and that the Juror and Defendant’s wife communicated over social media up until Defendant was indicted. The Juror failed to reveal any of this information during voir dire. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant made a sufficient showing to entitle him to a hearing on his juror bias claim. View "USA v. Gemar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent more than twelve years in state prison because of his wrongful conviction for two murders. In 2015, the state district court granted the Harris County District Attorney’s motion to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was released from prison. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Texas Office of the Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which provides state compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state crimes in state courts. His petition was denied because (1) it was not based on a finding that Plaintiff was “actually innocent,” (2) Plaintiff had not received a pardon, and (3) the district attorney had not filed a qualifying motion. While Plaintiff was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, he brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in federal district court. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the remainder of Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.   The Fifth Circuit previously certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court in this matter, asking whether the Tim Cole Act bars maintenance of a federal lawsuit involving the same subject matter that was filed before the claimant received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. Having received a response from the Texas Supreme Court in the affirmative, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In light of this clarified meaning of Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act, the court analyzed the district court’s grant of Defendants summary judgment motion and found that Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit is barred by his acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation. View "Brown v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

SR Construction held a lien on real property owned by RE Palm Springs II. The property owner is a corporate affiliate of Hall Palm Springs LLC, who had financed the original undertaking for a separate real estate developer. The latter requested leave of the bankruptcy court to submit a credit bid to purchase the property from its affiliate, which the bankruptcy court granted. The bankruptcy court later approved the sale and discharged all liens. The construction company appealed the bankruptcy court’s credit-bid and sale orders. Finding that the lender was a good faith purchaser, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and dismissed the appeal as moot under Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the pandemic dramatically changed not only the lender’s plans for the Property but it also severely impacted the affiliate’s ability to market and sell a hotel, particularly an unfinished one. In sum, these two factors must also be weighed in considering whether any of the actions or procedures, particularly with regard to pricing or timing issues, were performed in bad faith or as a result of sub-optimal external forces beyond the lender’s control. The court explained that the record facts, framed by the external context and circumstances, make plain that there is no error in the judgments of the able bankruptcy and district courts. Accordingly, the court held that the lender did not engage in fraud and was a “good faith purchaser.” View "SR Construction v. Hall Palm Springs" on Justia Law