Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence because Department officials gave him credit for time served in pre-trial detention but only for one (rather than both) of his two consecutive sentences. That was the right thing to do under the law, then in effect. But Plaintiff was entitled to the more generous provision in effect at the time his sentence was entered. As a result, he served over a year longer than he should have. After his release, Plaintiff brought suit against various Louisiana officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, among other claims. This appeal concerns only one of those claims: Plaintiff’s claim against the head of the Department, Secretary James LeBlanc (“Defendant”). Defendant appealed the denial of qualified immunity, arguing that his conduct wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that while the right to timely release is clearly established, Plaintiff does not show how Defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Plaintiff contends that Defendant was objectively unreasonable because he failed to assign the task of calculating release dates to an attorney. But nothing in the Constitution requires that such actions be undertaken by a member of the bar. View "Taylor v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on five counts arising from a series of armed robberies of cell phone stores. He appealed his convictions and sentence. Defendant contends that he suffered a Speedy Trial Act violation because he was indicted more than thirty days after his arrest.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant does not dispute that the continuance satisfies the statutory language for exclusion. He contends instead that the extended time should nonetheless not be excluded because his counsel did not consult with him before filing the motion to continue. The court explained that this contention runs counter to the statutory text of the Speedy Trial Act, which expressly carves out delays resulting from continuances sought “at the request of the defendant or his counsel.” The text does not require that counsel obtain her client’s consent to seek a continuance.   Defendant also argued that the district court erred in its jury instructions on his Section 924(c) charges. He contends that the court erroneously defined the predicate offense, a “crime of violence,” as including attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The court held that because Defendant has not shown that his substantial rights were affected by the erroneous jury instruction, he fails plain-error review. Even if the error affected his substantial rights, the court would not exercise its discretion to correct the error because the error here did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding. View "USA v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after law enforcement officers discovered a gun in his jacket during a warrantless search. The sole question on appeal is whether, by tossing his jacket over a fence onto his mother’s property, Defendant forfeited his property or privacy interest in the jacket, thereby freeing officers to seize and search the jacket heedless of Fourth Amendment constraints.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence, as well as the denial of his motion to suppress, and remanded. The court held that Defendant did not abandon his jacket by tossing it over his mother’s fence because he did not thereby manifest an intent to discard it. The Government elected to rely exclusively on its abandonment theory, expressly waiving alternative grounds for affirmance at oral argument. The court explained that the district court relied on Colbert to conclude that Defendant abandoned his jacket, and therefore retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents, by tossing it over his mother’s fence. But the court explained that it does not think it can fairly be said that Ramirez manifested an intent to disclaim ownership in his jacket simply by placing it on the private side of his mother’s fenced-in property line. View "USA v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after law enforcement officers discovered a gun in his jacket during a warrantless search. The sole question on appeal is whether, by tossing his jacket over a fence onto his mother’s property, Defendant forfeited his property or privacy interest in the jacket, thereby freeing officers to seize and search the jacket heedless of Fourth Amendment constraints.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s s conviction and sentence, as well as the denial of his motion to suppress, and remanded. The court held that Defendant did not abandon his jacket by tossing it over his mother’s fence because he did not thereby manifest an intent to discard it. Further, the court wrote that he put it for safekeeping where he knew he could find it again and where he could trust that strangers—if acting lawfully—would be unable to get at it. And so, Defendant’s jacket enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection under Jones’s property-rights formulation too. The Government elected to rely exclusively on its abandonment theory, expressly waiving alternative grounds for affirmance at oral argument. View "USA v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport is a major airport located in Jackson, Mississippi. Since 1960, the airport has been operated by the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, whose five commissioners are selected by the city government. In 2016, the Mississippi legislature passed, and the governor signed into law SB 2162, which abolishes the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and replaces it with a regional authority composed of nine commissioners, only two of whom are selected by Jackson city government.   A Jackson citizen filed a suit seeking to enjoin the law. The mayor, the city council, the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, its board of commissioners, and the commissioners in their individual capacities intervened in that lawsuit. The intervenors contend that SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection rights of the citizens of Jackson by eliminating the locally controlled Jackson Municipal Airport Authority for racially discriminatory reasons. The intervenors served subpoenas on eight nonparty state legislators who participated in SB 2162’s drafting and passage. The Legislators refused to comply with Request #3 in the subpoena, which sought documents and communications related to SB 2162, asserting that any responsive discovery would either be irrelevant or protected by legislative privilege. The magistrate judge, and later the district court, rejected this position.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Legislators to produce a privilege log. But the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared with third parties. View "Jackson Muni Airport v. Harkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, is a Mississippi state inmate. Defendant is a physician and at relevant times was the medical director at the state facility where Plaintiff was housed. Because Plaintiff suffers from a complex psychiatric profile, Plaintiff’s cell was inside the facility’s medical unit. As a result of Plaintiff’s incitement, other prisoners, many of whom were also psychiatric patients, began to act similarly. Defendant went to the scene, as did as many as nine other staff members. There, Defendant asked Plaintiff to desist several times. Plaintiff did not. Defendant then ordered that Plaintiff receive two injections: Haldol, an antipsychotic, and Benadryl, an antihistamine intended as a prophylactic against any complication from Haldol. Plaintiff went to sleep following the injections, and nearby inmates quieted down. Afterward, Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 suit alleging that Defendant’s decision to forcibly medicate Plaintiff violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. The district court, relying on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence and out-of-circuit opinion, agreed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred when it declined to apply an Eighth Amendment framework to Plaintiff’s dispute over medical treatment. And, even if a Fourteenth Amendment framework were apposite, Plaintiff received all the process he was due. The court explained that it’s not as if Defendant suddenly and arbitrarily injected Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant injected him only after Plaintiff precipitated a disturbance that subjectively appeared imminently dangerous, only after multiple rounds of verbal persuasion failed, and only after a licensed medical professional determined that medication was appropriate. View "Pinkston v. Kuiper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an inmate in a Texas state prison. He was treated at a prison clinic and then discharged after the nurses told Plaintiff they believed he was "faking" his symptoms. Plainitff later experienced a brain stem stroke. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 claim, asserting prison staff denied him access to emergency medical treatment. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's claim.On appeal, Plaintiff claimed that the district court (1) erred in resolving disputed facts during screening; (2) erred in concluding that he failed to state a claim; (3) erred in determining that the warden and medical director were not liable as supervisors; and (4) abused its discretion in failing to rule on pending motions. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiff's claim was not a constitutional tort, but instead a medical malpractice claim. View "Thompson v. TDCJ" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery. As part of Defendant’s sentence, and over his objection, the district court ordered Defendant to pay $5,000 in restitution to Parks Food Mart, the store he robbed. Defendant appealed this order of restitution on two grounds: first, that the district court erred in imposing restitution to a business entity and second, that the district court erred by ordering restitution in the amount of $5,000.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed but modified the amount of restitution to $3,500. The court explained that MVRA directs the district court to “reimburse the victim for lost income . . . and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense.” Here, Parks Food Mart was closed for approximately 6 hours on a Monday, from 6:15 p.m. to midnight, as law enforcement investigated the robbery. In the original PSR, the probation officer reported only that the business had suffered “$4,000 from missed earnings while being closed for investigation.” The court explained that it understands that sales are variable and there may have been reason for Parks Food Mart, in stating that the store closure resulted in $4,000 in lost earnings, to expect sales on the higher end the day of the robbery. At the same time, however, the court recognized that the store closure only impacted part of the day. Given these competing tensions and the lack of any other documentation as to the store’s losses, the court found the $3,500 figure to be a better-supported estimate of lost sales. View "USA v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1), and he was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment. His sentence reflected the district court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which is triggered when a Section 922(g) offender has three prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses” that were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the ACCA enhancement violated his constitutional rights because the facts establishing that he committed his previous violent felonies on different occasions were not charged in the indictment and either admitted by him or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the parties argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wooden v. United States instructs that the ACCA enhancement here was a constitutional error.1 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022). But in Wooden, the Court explicitly declined to address the issue that Defendant raised. Wooden is, therefore, “not directly on point” and thus does not “alter the binding nature” of Davis and White. View "USA v. Valencia" on Justia Law

Defendant and his co-defendant entered a CVS pharmacy through the store’s front doors to commit an armed robbery. When police officers arrived, they encountered Defendant and Parson attempting to exit the CVS. Defendant and co-Defendant retreated into the store while the officers sought cover outside the front door and in the parking lot. Defendant and co-Defendant then ran out of the store as they shot at the police officers. One police officer sustained a gunshot wound to the shoulder area. Co-Defendant sustained multiple gunshot wounds and was arrested immediately following the robbery. Defendant appealed the four-level sentencing enhancement for abduction to his base offense level under U.S.S.G. Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Defendant contended that the district court erred in applying the abduction sentencing enhancement for three reasons. First, Defendant argued that he “did not force the victim to ‘accompany’ him anywhere” and that forcing the cashier from the cashier area to the restroom “does not qualify as the type of ‘forced accompaniment’ required by the abduction enhancement.” The court disagreed. Defendant pointed a gun at the cashier and forced him to walk with Defendant from the cashier area to the restroom, where Defendant zip-tied the cashier’s hands. Thus, Defendant forced the cashier to accompany him.   Second, Defendant challenged the district court’s determination that the “different location” requirement of Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) was satisfied when he moved the cashier to the bathroom. Here, Defendant forced the cashier from the cashier’s area at the front of the store to the restroom. Accordingly, the different location requirement was also satisfied. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in imposing the abduction enhancement. View "USA v. Sansbury" on Justia Law