Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in Texas state court against several officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, where he remains an inmate. He alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arising out of a housing transfer and subsequent physical altercation. According to Plaintiff, he had previously been sexually harassed and threatened by inmates in boot camp housing; after asking the sergeant for a transfer to the main building on account of the harassment and threats, he was assigned housing in the main building. Defendants removed the case to federal court, whereupon the district court granted their motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims except for two: his First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining claims with prejudice, and he appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The court reasoned that the facts are consistent with Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant transferred Plaintiff back to boot camp housing to teach him a lesson about seeking housing transfers from other officials, knowing that he faced a substantial risk of being assaulted by the inmates who he had previously reported to prison officials during the officer protection investigation. The court concluded that this statement is sufficient to create a genuine material factual dispute. However, the court did not decide whether, given this factual dispute, Defendant violated clearly established law. View "Luna v. Davis" on Justia Law

This case arises from major flooding events in the Houston area in 2016 and 2017. Local political subdivisions sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers, seeking compliance with alleged regulatory obligations. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The fundamental issue in the case is whether the Corps has violated any enforceable, legal obligation in the management of the relevant dams and reservoirs. A potential source for obligations imposed on the Corps is the 2012 Water Control Manual (“WCM”) adopted by the Corps for flood control in the relevant watershed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Section 702 of the APA has been satisfied in that the complaint alleges Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by agency action, that the suit is not one for money damages, and that the injury arises from an officer or employee who has acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of law. Further, the court held that the Tucker Act does not provide an “adequate remedy” to the County’s claims within the meaning of Section 704. Further, the court wrote that since the regulation does not specify when such conditions require the Corps to update a WCM, the Corps must exercise discretion in deciding when updating a WCM is necessary. Such discretion is antithetical to a mandatory duty. Thus the court concluded there is no discrete, mandatory duty to revise. View "Ft Bend Cty v. US Army Corps" on Justia Law

Defendant brought a facial challenge to Section 922(g)(8). The district court and a prior panel upheld the statute, applying the Fifth Circuit’s pre-Bruen precedent. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing en banc; while the petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bruen. The prior panel withdrew its opinion and requested a supplemental briefing on the impact of that case on this one.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court held that Bruen requires the court to re-evaluate its Second Amendment jurisprudence and that under Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) fails to pass constitutional muster. The court explained that the Government failed to demonstrate that Section 922(g)(8)’s restriction of the Second Amendment right fits within the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Government’s proffered analogues falter under one or both of the metrics the Supreme Court articulated in Bruen as the baseline for measuring “relevantly similar” analogues: “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” As a result, Section 922(g)(8) falls outside the class of firearm regulations countenanced by the Second Amendment. View "USA v. Rahimi" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 2015 of possessing child pornography and sentenced to an 86-month term of imprisonment and six years of supervised release. In 2019, Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release, and the district court sentenced him to fifteen more months of imprisonment to be followed by five years of supervised release. After starting his second term of supervised release, Defendant again violated its conditions. The district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to eighteen more months of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that his constitutional rights were violated at his preliminary revocation hearing, that the district court erred in detaining him pending the final revocation hearing, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence upon revocation.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that because it is impossible to say how the district court would have sentenced Defendant if it had known that the Guidelines range was nine months total and that the total statutory maximum sentence was twenty-four months, not nine months per violation, the court cannot resolve whether the district court’s error affected Defendant’s prison sentence. The district court may have varied or departed upwards and imposed the same eighteen-month sentence or a longer one, up to the twenty-four-month statutory maximum. Or, as evinced by the district court’s desire to follow the Guidelines, the district court may have imposed a more modest upwards variance or departure than eighteen months. Thus, the district court’s misunderstanding of its authority to sentence Defendant was not harmless. View "USA v. Greer" on Justia Law

The Texas State Preservation Board is charged with preserving and maintaining the Texas Capitol and its ground. Inder the 1987 Capitol Exhibit Rule, members of the public could submit an exhibit for display in the Capitol, provided the submission met certain undemanding requirements and had the endorsement of a qualifying state official.In 2016, Texas Governor Greg Abbott directed the Preservation Board to remove an exhibit that was submitted by the Freedom from Religion Foundation. Ultimately, the Board repealed the Capitol Exhibit Rule and the Foundation. Nevertheless, the district court held that the Board's exclusion of the Foundation’s exhibit was unlawful, and ordered them to display the exhibit in the Texas Capitol. The Board appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the Board closed what was a limited public forum and that the Board's actions mooted the Foundation's claim to injunctive relief. However, the court also noted that its holding does not preclude the Foundation from showing that it is entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, given that the Board repealed the Capitol Exhibit Rule in apparent response to the Foundation’s lawsuit. View "Freedom From Religion Fdn v. Abbott" on Justia Law

At issue is whether Defendant was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when an officer, with emergency lights engaged, pulled behind Wright’s parked vehicle, and he did not attempt to flee or terminate the encounter but failed to comply fully with the officer’s commands. The district court, at the end of an evidentiary hearing, however, denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding erroneously that the Terry stop was initiated instead at a later point in the encounter.   The Fifth Circuit, while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal, remanded to the district court for it, based on the record developed at the suppression hearing, to prepare expeditiously written findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the seizure at the earlier point in time was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that Defendant not complying fully with some of the Officer’s commands was improper, to say the least, but his behavior does not show defiance of the Officer’s authority. Defendant sufficiently submitted to the show of authority because he objectively appeared to believe he was not free to leave, and he did not attempt to flee, nor terminate the encounter. The court further explained that because the district court’s findings and conclusions turn instead on events occurring after the Terry stop, the court is unable to deduce from them whether the district court concluded the totality of the circumstances prior to the Officer’s pulling behind Wright’s vehicle provided reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. View "USA v. Wright" on Justia Law

Movant, a Texas prisoner, moved for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 application with respect to his conviction for two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of evading arrest and detention in a motor vehicle. He is one of many Texas prisoners who, after previously filing state habeas applications, have since learned that Weldon Ralph Petty, the state prosecutor who opposed their state habeas applications, was also employed by one or more district judges to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law in those same habeas cases.   The Fifth Circuit denied the motion for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2254. The court explained that to the extent that Movant attempts to present a claim of actual innocence, the Court “does not recognize freestanding claims of actual innocence on federal habeas review.” Likewise, he may not rely on an assertion of actual innocence to serve as a gateway to overcoming the bar to the successive filing. Additionally, infirmities in state postconviction proceedings are not grounds for relief under Section 2254.9 Thus, none of Movant’s proposed challenges state a claim that is cognizable on federal habeas review View "In Re: Isaias Palacios" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his request for an adjustment to a restitution order. Defendant claimed that the $1,400 stimulus payment he received under the American Rescue Plan was exempt from levy and that any payment would violate the Taking Clause.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's request to adjust his restitution order. In so holding, the court held that the stimulus payment does not meet any exception and that he was required to apply the complete payment towards any restitution he owed. View "USA v. Stark" on Justia Law

In the wake of a 2017 mass shooting in Las Vegas, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, interpreted existing regulations on machineguns as extending to bump stocks. Plaintiff relinquished several bump stocks and then filed this case, seeking to invalidate ATF's interpretation.The district court found in favor of the ATF, as did a panel of Fifth Circuit judges. However, on rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that "a plain reading of the statutory language, paired with close consideration of the mechanics of a semi-automatic firearm, reveals that a bump stock is excluded from the technical definition of 'machinegun' set forth in the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act."The court went on to explain that, even if it determine the language to be ambiguous, it would apply the rule of lenity to interpret the statute against imposing criminal liability. Notably, three judges concurred with the court's opinion on lenity grounds, and the opinion also garnered a three-judge dissent. View "Cargill v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff began working as an environmental, safety, and health specialist at Targa’s Venice, Louisiana plant. He alleged that Targa violated the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute (“LEWS”) by discharging him after he refused and reported a manager’s directive to dilute sewage samples. The district court denied Targa’s motion for summary judgment and, following a bench trial, rendered judgment for Plaintiff. Targa argues on appeal that Plaintiff’s report of the manager’s directive and refusal to comply do not constitute “protected activities” under LEWS.     The court certified questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court, explaining that certification is necessary because the court lacks clear guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court on how to resolve these issues, and the outcome is determinative of the entire appeal. The certified questions are: (1) Whether refusals to engage in illegal or environmentally damaging activities are “disclosures” under the current version of the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute, La. Stat. Ann. 30:2027; and (2) Whether the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute affords protection to an employee who reports to his supervisor an activity, policy, or practice of an employer which he reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation, where reporting violations of environmental law, rules, or regulations, is a part of the employee’s normal job responsibilities. View "Menard v. Targa Resources" on Justia Law