Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

According to the indictment, Defendant, a citizen of Switzerland and a partner in a Swiss wealth-management firm, and co-Defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland and an employee of a different Swiss wealth-management firm (together, “Defendants”), engaged in an international bribery scheme wherein U.S.-based businesses paid bribes to Venezuelan officials for priority payment of invoices and other favorable treatment from Venezuela’s state-owned energy company. A grand jury returned a nineteen-count indictment charging Defendants with various offenses stemming from their alleged international bribery scheme. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motions to dismiss was improper because the indictment adequately conforms to minimal constitutional standards. Further, the indictment did not violate co-Defendant’s due process rights. Moreover, the court wrote the district court’s conclusion that Section 3292 failed to toll the statute of limitations is erroneous. The court explained that the totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person in co-Defendant’s position would not have equated the restraint on his freedom of movement with formal arrest. View "USA v. Murta" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child sexual abuse material. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months of imprisonment followed by lifetime supervision and ordered Defendant to pay a total of $61,500 in restitution to seven victims depicted in Defendant’s materials. On appeal, Defendant sought to vacate the order of restitution, contending that it was imposed in violation of the proximate-cause requirements described in Paroline v. United States. The Government moved to dismiss the appeal on the theory that it is waived by the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.   The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss. The court explained that because it is clear that the district court considered the Paroline factors at sentencing and ordered restitution as authorized by Section 2259, the statutory-maximum exception does not apply. Nor did the district court merely rubber-stamp the conclusion. To the contrary, it gave meaningful consideration to whether the evidence showed that Defendant’s conduct proximately caused the victims’ loss. Accordingly, the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement bars this appeal. View "USA v. Alfred" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are captains of charter boats operating in the Gulf of Mexico with federal for-hire permits, and their companies. They filed a class-action complaint in the Eastern District of Louisiana in August of 2020, naming as Defendants the Department of Commerce, NOAA, NMFS, and related federal officials. This appeal concerns a regulation issued by the United States Department of Commerce that requires charter-boat owners to, at their own expense, install onboard a vessel monitoring system that continuously transmits the boat’s GPS location to the Government, regardless of whether the vessel is being used for commercial or personal purposes.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and held that in promulgating this regulation, the Government committed multiple independent Administrative Procedure Act violations, and very likely violated the Fourth Amendment. The court wrote that two components of the Final Rule are unlawful. First, the Magnuson-Stevens Act does not authorize the Government to issue the GPS-tracking requirement. In addition, that rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act because it is arbitrary and capricious, in turn because the Government failed to address Fourth Amendment issues when considering it and failed to rationally consider the associated costs and benefits. Second, the business-information requirement violates the APA because the Government did not give fair notice that it would require the type of data specified in the Final Rule. View "Mexican Gulf v. U.S. Dept. of Comm" on Justia Law

The Hagens (Leah and Michael) were convicted by a jury of conspiring to defraud the United States and to pay and receive health care kickbacks. Each was sentenced to 151 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, plus restitution. Both Hagens appealed, arguing that the district court erred in excluding evidence, refusing to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense, and imposing a sentencing enhancement and restitution.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Hagens' convictions and sentences. The court found that the excluded evidence, which consisted of witness testimony, was irrelevant and cumulative. Thus, the district court did not err in excluding it. Even if the exclusion of the evidence wasn't warranted, the court determined that any error below was harmless.The court also held that the Hagans failed to put sufficient evidence forward justifying their requested jury charge on the safe-harbor affirmative defense. Finally, the court rejected the Hagens' claim that the lower court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for the couple's "sophisticated money laundering scheme." The court explained that evidence suggested the Hagens manipulated their wire transfer payments to conceal the kickback scheme, which justified the enhancement. View "USA v. Hagen" on Justia Law

After prevailing in state court on claims that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his state constitutional right to freedom of expression, Plaintiff filed a federal suit alleging the same set of facts but asserting for the first time a First Amendment claim. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit, finding that Defendants’ factual attack showed that the only remedy not barred by sovereign immunity was impossible to grant and that Kling’s claim was prescribed. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that a factual attack on a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is improper at the pleadings stage and that his state lawsuit interrupted prescription on his newly asserted federal claim because both rely on the same set of operative facts.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s official capacity claims as barred by sovereign immunity and accordingly affirmed that ruling in the district court’s decision. However, because there are no clear controlling precedents from the Louisiana Supreme Court as to whether prescription on Plaintiff’s federal claim was interrupted by his state action, the court certified to that court to answer the following:In Louisiana, under what circumstances, if any, does the commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupt prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit? View "Kling v. Hebert" on Justia Law

A man was shot and killed in his jewelry shop in 1983, and Decedent was sentenced to death for the crime. Thirty years later, Louisiana vacated Decedent’s conviction because new evidence identified the real murderer. After his release from prison, Decedent filed a Section 1983 suit seeking damages from police officers, prosecutors, and the local government for suppressing, fabricating, and destroying evidence. Decedent died shortly thereafter, leaving Plaintiff as the executrix of his estate. In 2021, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint in its entirety based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as to some defendants and 12(c) as to others.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff brought a traditional negligence claim. Louisiana uses the typical reasonable-person standard to assess an individual’s liability for negligence. For the same reasons that Plaintiff did not adequately plead constitutional violations due to the defendants’ suppression, fabrication, and destruction of evidence, she also fails to plead sufficient factual matter to show that they violated the standard of care of a reasonable officer. Accordingly, the court found that the district court thus properly dismissed this claim. View "Armstrong v. Ashley" on Justia Law

Believing Texas intends to enforce its abortion laws to penalize their out-of-state actions, Plaintiffs sued Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton. Paxton moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs then issued subpoenas to obtain Paxton’s testimony. Paxton moved to quash the subpoenas, which the district court initially granted. On reconsideration, however, the district court changed course, denied the motion, and ordered Paxton to testify either at a deposition or evidentiary hearing. Paxton petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to shield him from the district court’s order.   The Fifth Circuit granted the writ. The court held that the district court clearly erred by not first ensuring its own jurisdiction and also by declining to quash the subpoenas. The court held that the district court committed a “clear abuse of discretion” by finding that exceptional circumstances justified ordering Paxton to testify. Paxton has therefore shown a clear and indisputable right to relief. Further, the court explained that because mandamus is a remedy of last resort, the writ cannot issue unless the petitioner has no other adequate means of obtaining the relief he seeks. Here, not only has Paxton sought the writ, but he has also filed a separate interlocutory appeal. Plaintiffs argued that this appeal is an adequate alternative avenue for relief, making the writ inappropriate. In re FDIC controls here because Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss Paxton’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Paxton’s only remaining source of relief is the writ. Without it, he will be compelled either to submit to testifying or risk contempt charges for violating the court’s order. View "In Re: Ken Paxton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence. After his release, he sought redress for this violation of his rights by bringing a lawsuit against various Louisiana officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Louisiana state law. The district court dismissed most of Plaintiff’s claims but allowed a supervisory liability claim against Department Secretary James LeBlanc to proceed by denying qualified immunity. Secretary LeBlanc appealed the denial of qualified immunity, arguing that his conduct wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the right to timely release is clearly established. But Plaintiff failed to adequately brief—and has thus forfeited—any meritorious argument that Secretary LeBlanc’s behavior was objectively unreasonable in light of that right. The court explained that to the extent that Plaintiff argues the merits, it’s inadequately briefed. Plaintiff’s entire presentation on the issue of objective unreasonableness amounts to just this single conclusory statement: “It is inherently unreasonable for the secretary . . . to fail to enact policies and procedures to ensure the prompt release of inmates who have served their sentences in accordance to the law.” A single, unsupported sentence isn’t enough to adequately brief the issue. View "Taylor v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

The decedent committed suicide in his cell. On behalf of her minor child, Plaintiff sued the warden at Ouachita Correctional Center (“OCC”) and the sheriff of Ouachita Parish in their official capacities; she also purports to have sued them in their individual capacities. All federal claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of the decedent’s Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff additionally sued under related state laws for negligence and vicarious liability. The district court granted summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the warden cannot be sued in his official capacity. Official-capacity suits may be brought only against an official acting as a policymaker. Further, although the sheriff can be sued in his official capacity, those claims also fail. The Sheriff, as the final policymaker in the Parish, does satisfy the second requirement of the analysis and can be sued in his official capacity, assuming Plaintiff provides evidence that the conduct prong is met. However, Section 1983 does not allow recovery under a theory of respondeat superior; a plaintiff must show that the local government’s policy or custom violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Moreover, the court explained that even if Plaintiff adequately pleaded her individual-capacity claims, she has not alleged a genuine dispute as to any material fact to hold defendants responsible under a supervisory-liability theory. View "Guillot v. Russell" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns an alleged international bribery scheme between U.S.-based businesses and Venezuelan officials. On Defendants’ motions, the district court dismissed all counts charged against them and suppressed statements made during an interview. The government timely appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. First, the court held that because extraterritoriality concerns the merits of the case, not the court’s power to hear it, the district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these counts. Further, Defendants’ contention that the indictment does not sufficiently allege that they are agents of a domestic concern does not lend itself to the conclusion that the indictment is inherently insufficient. Moreover, the term “agent” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendants. Additionally, the court wrote that the allegations that Defendants engaged in conduct that occurred in part in the Southern District of Texas satisfy the money-laundering statute’s extraterritorial provision. The district court erred in concluding otherwise. Finally, the environment in which the agents questioned Defendant, wherein his attorney could safeguard against police coercion, does not present the same inherently coercive pressures as the station-house questioning at issue in Miranda. The district court’s order suppressing the statements, then, was erroneous. View "USA v. Murta" on Justia Law