Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He challenged his sentence on several grounds, particularly the district court’s imposition of a four-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. The linchpin of this case is whether Defendant’s repeated instances of being a felon in possession of a firearm were relevant conduct justifying the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court thoroughly analyzed the factors for relevant conduct— similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity—and concluded the evidence weighed in favor of the Government. Here, Defendant was sentenced to 70 months—well below the 10-year statutory maximum. The district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, in its analysis. Further, the court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines do not generally prohibit double counting. The Guidelines permit the district court to consider a defendant’s prior felony convictions in calculating both his offense level under Section 2K2.1(a) and his criminal history category. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in calculating Defendant’s sentence on this basis. View "USA v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2005, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, was ordered removed in absentia. In 2018, he moved to reopen and rescind the removal order, and an immigration judge (IJ) denied his request. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the BIA dismissed his appeal. He petitioned for a review of that dismissal. He contends that the BIA and the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because the record does not show that his notice to appear (NTA) was ever filed with the immigration court, as required by 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.14(a).   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court reasoned that it has previously explained that Section 1003.14 “is not jurisdictional” but is “a claim-processing rule.” Thus, Petitioner’s jurisdictional challenge fails. Further, Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by relying on a reconstructed record that did not contain his NTA. The court explained that it discerned nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner’s Form I-213 “is incorrect or was obtained by coercion or duress,” the BIA could thus properly rely on it as “inherently trustworthy and admissible as evidence” that Petitioner received notice of his removal hearing. Though Petitioner presented his own sworn declarations challenging his understanding of the translator’s statements, documents he may have signed, and his need to attend a removal hearing, he failed to present such compelling evidence that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it. The BIA thus did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal from the denial of his motion to reopen. View "Alexandre-Matias v. Garland" on Justia Law

Governor Abbott filed suit on January 4, 2022. He alleged that the military vaccine mandate is arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). He also alleged that all but one of the Government’s planned enforcement measures violates the Constitution. For relief, Governor Abbott sought an order declaring the vaccination requirement and the challenged enforcement measures unlawful, Guardsmen. He also requested costs, attorneys’ fees, and any other relief the court deems proper. Governor Abbott then moved for an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants from enforcing the vaccine mandate against members of the Texas militia not in federal service. The district court denied the motion. The Governor appealed under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1).   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Governor Abbott’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the Government conceded that its erstwhile vaccine mandate is unnecessary to military readiness by repealing it. The question, therefore, is whether the President can punish non-federalized Guardsmen in Texas who refused to get COVID injections before the President and Congress deemed such injections unnecessary. The court held that the Constitution’s text, history, and tradition foreclose the President’s efforts to impose such punishments. View "Abbott v. Biden" on Justia Law

The City of Balch Springs Police Department hired an officer who a jury later convicted of murdering a teenage boy while on duty. Plaintiff (the boy’s father) sued the City under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the department’s use-of-force policy was constitutional and also that Plaintiff’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary theories of liability lacked factual support.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ultimate judgment. Plaintiff argued that the City’s policy is facially unconstitutional because it contains “no immediacy requirement necessary to justify an officer’s use of deadly force” and because it calls “for an officer to use the officer’s own subjective beliefs in determining whether deadly force was justified.” The court explained that a local government’s official, written policy is itself unconstitutional only if it affirmatively allows or compels unconstitutional conduct. The City’s policy passes muster under that standard. It does not affirmatively allow officers to use deadly force absent an immediate threat, and it does not affirmatively allow officers to rely on subjective factors when evaluating whether to use deadly force. Likewise, the prior constitutional violations that Plaintiff relies on are too dissimilar and generalized to establish a pattern. For that reason, Plaintiff cannot show that the City’s training, supervisory, and disciplinary failures (if any) arose from deliberate indifference. In turn, he cannot satisfy Monell’s third element. View "Edwards v. Balch Springs, Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant, his wife, and another were indicted for mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The parties jointly owned Seven Arts Pictures Louisiana, LLC (Seven Arts), through which they purchased a dilapidated mansion at 807 Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans with the goal of converting it into a film postproduction facility. To offset the costs of the project, Seven Arts applied for film infrastructure tax credits offered by the State of Louisiana. The Government alleged that the parties “submitted fraudulent claims for tax credits, mostly by (1) submitting false invoices for construction work and film equipment or (2) using “circular transactions” that made transfers of money between bank accounts look like expenditures related to movie production.” The jury convicted Defendant on all charged counts. Defendant moved for a new trial as well as for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial but partially granted his motion for acquittal. Specifically, the court entered judgments of acquittal for Hoffman on five counts of wire fraud.   The Fifth Circuit held that the panel does not agree with the judgment that should be rendered in this case. Judge Jolly would affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety. Chief Judge Richman would dismiss the appeal, concluding the notice of appeal was not timely. Judge Dennis would remand for an evidentiary hearing and resentencing. The net effect is that the sentence imposed by the district court stands, and the case is not remanded to the district court. The district court’s judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court. View "USA v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions of possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated their convictions. The court held that the jury could not reasonably conclude, based on the available evidence, that either Defendant had possession of the marihuana with intent to distribute. The court explained that Defendant’s statement that he rearranged the bundles while showing more than mere presence does not establish an adequate nexus sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find possession. The co-Defendant’s statements that he “just helped” and “understood” he was in possession after the Agent explained the charges to him are similarly insufficient for a reasonable jury to find he possessed the marihuana. Further, the court found that it would be unreasonable for the jury to infer Defendant had possession with intent to distribute based on his statement to the Agent that he “just helped.” Second, Defendant’s statement made to DEA Agents after the Agent explained the charges against him was not a confession. View "USA v. Campos-Ayala" on Justia Law

A Louisiana jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder. In this habeas proceeding, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel erred by failing to contact an eyewitness who would’ve supported his defense. He has twice been denied state postconviction relief. He sought federal habeas relief for a second time. The district court held the petition untimely and dismissed it with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded so that the district court can rule on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the first instance. The court explained that courts of appeals may reach an abandoned timeliness defense when the waiver or forfeiture results from a mistake—but not when the state’s decision to focus exclusively on the merits of the habeas claim is based on a deliberate judgment call. And that is especially so where timeliness is complex, but the merits are straightforward. But rather than decide the merits of Petitioner’s claim in the first instance, the court concluded that remanding the case back to the district court is appropriate. View "Ficher v. Bickham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this pro se action in federal district court alleging, as relevant here, that the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) violated her children’s rights under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000ff, et seq. The district court dismissed the GINA claims because Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring those claims on her own behalf and because Plaintiff—who is not a licensed attorney—could not proceed pro se on behalf of her children. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in holding that she cannot represent her children in federal court.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the GINA claims and remanded. The court held that an absolute bar on pro se parent representation is inconsistent with Section 1654, which allows a pro se parent to proceed on behalf of her child in federal court when the child’s case is the parent’s “own.” 28 U.S.C. Section 1654. The court explained this condition would be met if federal or state law designated Plaintiff’s children’s cases as belonging to her. The court remanded because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider whether Plaintiff’s children’s claims under the GINA belong to Plaintiff within the meaning of Section 1654. View "Raskin v. Dallas Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to assaulting, resisting, or impeding various officers or employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 111(a)(1) and (b). Defendant appealed the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a primary issue, in this case, is whether a court may apply Section 3C1.1 when a defendant obstructs another person’s arrest, which in this case is that of Defendant’s brother. The court wrote that when Defendant assaulted the agent, he violated Section 111 and triggered the base offense level in Section 2A2.4. Then, when Defendant physically prevented the agent from arresting another member of Defendant’s group, he obstructed the administration of justice in an offense that was closely related to his instant offense of conviction. In other words, there is a sufficient nexus between Defendant’s relevant conduct and his conviction for the assault of a federal officer. It is, therefore, plausible, in light of the record as a whole, for the district court to have found that Defendant’s conduct is properly categorized as an obstruction of justice under Section 3C1.1. View "USA v. Mendoza-Gomez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought multiple claims against various defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. As relevant here, they asserted two general categories of claims—that the officers used excessive force in executing the search warrant and that the search and seizure were unlawful. As against the individual officers, Plaintiffs asserted both direct claims and claims premised on failure to intervene. And as against Lieutenants, Plaintiffs asserted that the two lieutenants are directly liable for excessive-force and search-and-seizure and liable on a failure to supervise theory. Finally, Plaintiffs also asserted wrongful death and survival as separate “causes of actions,” in their words. Several of the officers moved to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. The court affirmed the aspects of the judgment denying the motions to dismiss the excessive-force claims asserted against several co-Defendants and denying one Lieutenant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ excessive force and search-and-seizure claims premised on a failure-to-supervise theory.   The court reversed the district court’s ruling denying the Lieutenant’s motion to dismiss the excessive force and search-and-seizure claims based on direct liability. The court concluded that this was error because the Lieutenant was not personally involved in obtaining the search warrant or in effectuating the search. “Personal involvement is an essential element” of demonstrating liability under Section 1983. View "Tuttle v. Sepolio" on Justia Law