Justia U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several development groups entered into a public improvement contract with a Texas city, purchasing over 60 acres of land, much of it in a flood zone. The developers received a variance from the city, exempting them from obtaining a federal floodplain permit (CLOMR), and invested significant funds in developing the property, including constructing a bridge. In 2018, the parties executed updated agreements, including a Master Development Agreement (MDA), which required certain conditions to be met within five years or the contract would automatically terminate, ending the city’s reimbursement obligations. As the deadline approached, the city informed the developers that they would now need to obtain the previously waived CLOMR, citing a later-enacted ordinance. Unable to comply in time, the developers sought an extension, which the city council denied, resulting in termination of the MDA.The developers sued in Texas state court, alleging the city’s actions constituted an unconstitutional taking under federal and state law, and also brought claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Vested Rights Statute. The city removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the federal takings and declaratory judgment claims, finding the developers had not sufficiently alleged that the city acted in its sovereign rather than commercial capacity, and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the developers’ allegations arose from a contractual dispute, not a sovereign act by the city, and thus did not state a plausible takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim, as the core issues would be resolved in the remanded state court action. View "Mesquite Asset Recovery Grp v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas in 2010 for the killing of his fiancée’s thirteen-month-old daughter. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on DNA evidence and forensic testimony. Over the years, the petitioner pursued multiple avenues of postconviction relief, including direct appeal, state habeas petitions, and federal habeas petitions, all of which were denied. In 2024, he sought access to additional electronic DNA data from the Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences, arguing that this information was necessary to evaluate the reliability of the forensic evidence used at trial. After being denied access by the district attorney and the convicting court, he filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Texas’ postconviction relief procedures violated his due process rights by giving prosecutors unreviewable discretion to withhold evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed the § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a due process violation and that his request for an injunction resembled an improper petition for a writ of mandamus. The district court also denied his motion for discovery. The petitioner appealed and, in the interim, sought a stay of execution and authorization to file a successive habeas petition based on new evidence and scientific developments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Texas’ postconviction relief procedures do not violate due process, as they provide adequate opportunities for discovery and judicial review in habeas proceedings. The court also denied the motions for a stay of execution and for authorization to file a successive habeas petition, finding that the petitioner failed to meet the stringent requirements for such relief. The court granted leave to file a motion in excess of the word limit. View "In Re: Milam" on Justia Law

A man incarcerated in Texas state prison was classified as a member of a security threat group and placed in administrative segregation, a form of solitary confinement, for sixteen years. The only way for him to return to the general prison population was to complete a gang renunciation program, which required him to renounce his gang affiliation and participate in an interview. During the interview, he was questioned by prison and law enforcement officials about criminal activities that occurred during his incarceration. He refused to answer questions that could incriminate him, after which his application to the renunciation program was terminated for failure to cooperate. He filed grievances challenging the process, but they were denied or dismissed.He then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against several prison officials, alleging violations of his Fifth, First, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court initially dismissed his claims, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings. After further litigation, including the appointment of counsel and discovery, the district court again granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding no constitutional violations and holding that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination and First Amendment compelled speech claims because there was no clearly established law making their conduct unlawful in this context. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, the court assumed a liberty interest but found that the periodic classification reviews provided by the prison satisfied due process requirements. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Ballentine v. Broxton" on Justia Law

A group of drug manufacturers that participate in the federal Section 340B program challenged a Mississippi law, H.B. 728, which prohibits manufacturers from interfering with healthcare providers’ use of contract pharmacies to distribute discounted drugs to low-income and uninsured patients. The manufacturers argued that the law compels them to transfer drugs at a discount to private, for-profit pharmacies and expands their obligations under federal law, potentially enabling improper resale of discounted drugs. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect, claiming it constituted an unconstitutional taking and was preempted by federal law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied the manufacturers’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the manufacturers had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their takings or preemption claims, and thus were not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. The manufacturers appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, applying clear error review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the manufacturers had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on their claims. The court concluded that H.B. 728 did not effectuate a physical or regulatory taking, nor was it preempted by federal law under either field or conflict preemption theories. The court emphasized that, on the record presented, the manufacturers had not met their burden to justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction. The district court’s denial of injunctive relief was therefore affirmed. View "AbbVie v. Fitch" on Justia Law

In early 2023, police responded to a disturbance at a residence in Odessa, Texas, where Deimon Nolan Simpson, who had recently been evicted, attempted to enter the house he believed was still his. After being blocked by the new tenant, Simpson retrieved a firearm from his car, entered through a window, and shot the tenant’s dog. Simpson, a convicted felon with prior convictions including possession of a controlled substance, evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Simpson’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Simpson then pleaded guilty, admitting to the relevant prior felony convictions. On appeal, Simpson challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him under the Second Amendment, and also raised facial and Commerce Clause challenges, which he acknowledged were foreclosed by existing Fifth Circuit precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the constitutional challenge de novo. The court held that the felon-in-possession statute is constitutional as applied to Simpson because his predicate felony—evading arrest or detention with a vehicle—involved violent conduct, and there is a historical tradition of disarming individuals who pose a credible threat of violence. The court found that both historical and contemporary laws support permanent disarmament in such circumstances, and that the statute does not broadly restrict firearm rights but targets those with demonstrated threats to public safety. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. View "USA v. Simpson" on Justia Law

An ordained minister served as Executive Director of a regional Baptist convention, where he was responsible for implementing a joint ministry agreement with a national Baptist mission board. Disagreements arose between the minister and the mission board regarding the execution of their shared evangelical objectives, particularly concerning missionary selection, funding, and work requirements. The mission board expressed dissatisfaction with the minister’s leadership and gave notice to terminate the partnership agreement. Subsequently, the regional convention’s board unanimously voted to terminate the minister’s employment, citing concerns about his leadership and spiritual disposition. After his termination, the minister publicly criticized the mission board and its president, which led to further actions by the board, including security measures and the posting of a no-entry photograph of the minister at its headquarters.The minister filed suit in Mississippi state court against the mission board, alleging tortious interference with business relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The mission board removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi and moved to dismiss, arguing that the church autonomy doctrine barred the claims. The district court initially denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment for the mission board, concluding that the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine precluded adjudication of the minister’s claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit previously reversed and remanded, finding it premature to apply the doctrine at an early stage. After further discovery, the district court again granted summary judgment for the mission board on church autonomy grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the church autonomy doctrine, rooted in the First Amendment, bars civil courts from adjudicating employment-related claims that would require inquiry into religious doctrine, internal management, or ministerial decisions. The court concluded that all of the minister’s claims were precluded by this doctrine, regardless of the organizational structure of the Baptist entities involved. View "McRaney v. N Amer Mission Bd" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The presentence investigation report determined that the defendant’s offense level was increased due to two prior Louisiana felony convictions: aggravated battery and distribution of cocaine. The report also applied enhancements for a stolen firearm and use of the firearm in connection with another felony. The defendant objected to these enhancements and the classification of his prior aggravated battery conviction as a “crime of violence.” The district court overruled the objections, adopted the report’s findings, and sentenced the defendant to 120 months in prison, the statutory maximum.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, and that the district court erred in treating his prior aggravated battery conviction as a crime of violence for sentencing purposes. The defendant had not raised these arguments in the district court, so the Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error.The Fifth Circuit held that, under existing precedent, a conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not constitute plain error, and there has been no development in the law to suggest otherwise. Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the court found that the defendant failed to show a “realistic probability” that Louisiana courts would uphold an aggravated battery conviction based on reckless or negligent conduct, as required to demonstrate clear or obvious error under the categorical approach. The court concluded that neither the conviction nor the sentence was reversible under plain error review and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Sereal" on Justia Law

The case concerns a former CEO of a Texas credit union who was removed from his position after the credit union was placed into conservatorship by state authorities, with the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) appointed as conservator. The NCUA terminated the CEO, seized property, and allegedly withheld post-termination benefits. The CEO initially sued in Texas state court for those benefits. Before the credit union responded to that suit, the NCUA initiated an administrative enforcement action against him. In response, the CEO filed a federal lawsuit challenging the NCUA’s authority and the constitutionality of the administrative proceedings, raising claims about the removal protections for the administrative law judge, the lack of a jury trial, due process, and the non-delegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the federal suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that 12 U.S.C. § 1786(k)(1) explicitly precludes district court jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin or otherwise affect NCUA enforcement proceedings. The district court reasoned that the statutory language was clear and that any challenge to the administrative process must proceed through the statutory review scheme, which provides for review in the courts of appeals after the agency action is final.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that § 1786(k)(1) explicitly precludes district court jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin or otherwise affect NCUA enforcement actions, relying on its recent decision in Burgess v. Whang and Supreme Court precedent interpreting similar statutory language. The court rejected the argument that Congress must specifically reference 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to preclude federal question jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Moats v. Natl Crdt Un Admin Bd" on Justia Law

Cornelius Burgess, the former CEO of Herring Bank, was the subject of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) enforcement action that began with an investigation in 2010 and formal proceedings in 2014. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended in 2017 that Burgess be removed from his position, barred from the banking industry, and fined $200,000. The FDIC Board adopted this recommendation, but the enforcement order was stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, which addressed the constitutionality of ALJ appointments. After Lucia, the case was remanded for a new hearing before a properly appointed ALJ, who again recommended the same sanctions in 2022. Before the FDIC Board could issue its final order, Burgess filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking to enjoin the Board from issuing its decision on constitutional grounds.The district court found it had jurisdiction to hear Burgess’s claims despite 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), which generally precludes such jurisdiction. The court denied injunctive relief on Burgess’s claims regarding unconstitutional removal protections for the Board and ALJs, finding he had not shown harm from those provisions. However, it granted an injunction based on his Seventh Amendment claim, concluding he was likely to succeed on the merits and that the other factors for injunctive relief were met. The FDIC appealed the injunction, and Burgess cross-appealed the denial of relief on his removal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) explicitly strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin or otherwise affect the issuance or enforcement of FDIC orders, including on constitutional grounds. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive relief and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to reach the merits of Burgess’s constitutional claims. View "Burgess v. Whang" on Justia Law

Ernest Clark, while on probation for a Louisiana felony conviction of aggravated assault with a firearm, was found in possession of a firearm. He was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. Clark moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, and exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied his motion. Clark then pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which included a waiver of most appellate rights except for a direct appeal of the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss under the Second Amendment, as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi sentenced Clark to 64 months in prison and three years of supervised release. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Clark raised several claims, but acknowledged that most were foreclosed or waived by his plea agreement, except for his as-applied Second Amendment challenge and his Fifth Amendment equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disarming individuals convicted of violent felonies, such as aggravated assault with a firearm, and those found in possession of a firearm while on probation, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on its own recent precedents to conclude that Clark’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge failed. The court also found that Clark’s equal protection claim was waived by his plea agreement. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law